

U.S. Arms Help Enrich Laos Warlord

By Jack Anderson

Gen. Kouprasith Abhay, the Laotian warlord who controls the capital city of Vientiane, has become a millionaire by using American-armed troops to protect his logging operation.

The teak he cuts is delivered across the Mekong River to Thailand where it is sold for huge profits to the U.S. military establishment. He has supplemented his income, too, by supplying prostitutes as a U.S.-financed construction project.

His enterprise is dismayingly typical of the success stories of foreign satraps who have grown rich off U.S. aid.

The titillating details are told in a confidential field report to the Agency for International Development, which dispenses U.S. aid and provides a front for the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos. The facts have also been confirmed by my associate Les Whitten, who conducted an on-the-spot investigation in Vientiane.

The wily warlord, whose control of Vientiane makes him the real power behind Premier Souvanna Phouma, got the timber rights by having the Laotian Assembly falsely declare the land "unused." Actually, the land is occupied by hundreds of Lao peasants, who farm the highland rice plots that nestle among the teak forests.

Gen. Abhay uses his soldiers not to fight the Communist Pathet Lao but to keep them

out of his forests. His troops also cow the Lao peasants who had gone there ahead of him to cultivate rice. Those who object to his logging operations, conducted in the name of the Lao Timber Society, are driven off.

For in placid Laos, the man with the gun is the law—and Kouprasith Abhay has the guns, largely supplied, of course, by the U.S. for the purpose of fighting the Pathet Lao.

The general has tried delicately to keep his prostitution business quiet. But the AID field report alleges that he dispatched a dozen prostitutes to bring a little night life to Nam Ngum, 60 miles north of Vientiane, where the U.S. is helping to build a \$3-million dam.

The construction has brought a huge influx of workers, who provide the customers for Abhay's ladies of the night. To AID's horror, the ladies were housed in quarters next to AID's own leadership training building. When AID protested to Abhay's colonel-on-the-scene, he merely shrugged and disclaimed any connection with the women.

No Gab for Colonel

AID retaliated by cutting off the colonel's gasoline supplies, thus reducing his troops to riding bicycles. Rather than give up his own staff car for an undignified two-wheeler, the colonel capitulated. Still insisting that the women were beyond his jurisdiction, he or-

dered soldiers to tear down the offending house.

They promptly rebuilt it in another part of the village, and the construction men began coming down with venereal disease. Absenteeism also increased sharply.

AID sent for penicillin and, with the cooperation of the Japanese contractors building the dam, set up a clinic. AID proposed to the colonel that the prostitutes be issued identification passes and be treated regularly.

To do so would have been a confession that prostitution was practiced in Gen. Abhay's military domain. This would have offended the general's sensibilities and jeopardized the colonel's career. He flatly refused.

The disease finally became so rampant that the girls were chased away—still infected—to spread the disease throughout the country.

Textile War

Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans invited Kiichi Miyazawa, the Japanese minister of international trade and industry, to his apartment the other day in a futile attempt to head off a textile war between the United States and Japan.

Their failure to come to terms is expected to bring protectionist legislation that not only will boost the price of shirts, sweaters, skirts and scarves in this country but could produce economic repercussions around the world.

Stans and Miyazawa spent four hours alone, without advisers or interpreters, discussing voluntary controls on Japanese textile imports.

When President Nixon agreed last November to return Okinawa to Japanese control, he was led by Prime Minister Sato to understand that Japan, in return, would accept voluntary textile curbs.

Miyazawa seemed quite willing to implement the prime minister's somewhat vague promise. Stans and Miyazawa emerged from their four-hour meeting with an understanding that they would negotiate an agreement.

But Miyazawa was accompanied to the U.S. by more than two dozen Japanese textile manufacturers. They wouldn't listen to talk of voluntary limitations. They recalled bitterly that they had agreed in 1964 to hold down cotton sales to the U.S., with an understanding that the arrangement would be temporary. Now the agreement has been renewed for another three years.

The Japanese manufacturers, therefore, flatly refused to go along with an agreement to limit the sales of non-cottons. An embarrassed Miyazawa went back to Stans and explained that he had spoken too soon. Sheepishly, Miyazawa said he would have to retract what he had agreed at their private, four-hour meeting in Stans's apartment.

Stans immediately set about drafting protectionist legislation, and the textile war seemed about ready to erupt.

29 JUN 1970

THE PERISCOPE

SOLZHENITSYN: INTO EXILE?

Author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn may be exiled from the Soviet Union for his bitter public protest against the detention of biologist Zhores Medvedev in a mental hospital (page 47). Soviet diplomats have sounded out several neutral European governments as to whether they would accept Solzhenitsyn as a permanent resident.

SINO-SOVIETS: MORE SHOOTING

Since the spread of the Indochina war into Cambodia—which aroused bitter new disagreement between Peking and Moscow—a new series of minor skirmishes has erupted along the Sino-Soviet border. So far neither side has publicized the new incidents, which have taken place in Sinkiang and in Manchuria, but word of the fighting has been leaked to foreign diplomats by both the Chinese and Soviet Governments.

MOSCOW'S MODEST HELP FOR HANOI

According to a recent U.S. intelligence estimate, Soviet aid to North Vietnam since 1962 totals \$370 million—\$120 million in military aid and \$250 million in economic aid. This is far less than the previously accepted figure of \$1 billion.

LAOS: OUR MEN IN MUFTI

One subterfuge that the Pentagon and the CIA have employed to circumvent the Geneva agreements barring foreign military men from Laos has worked this way: U.S. military officers and noncoms assigned to Laos simply took off their uniforms, resigned their commissions or enlisted ratings and went into the country as "civilians." Pentagon personnel records reveal that the men involved were reinstated in their military ranks when they left Laos.

Newspaper Objectivity

WASHINGTON POST

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4

A Commentary

By Nicholas von Hoffman

There exists in the plethora of publications we're lucky we don't have to read a magazine called Editor & Publisher. It is read or at least subscribed to by most executives in the newspaper business. This makes it a faithful reflection of the mentality which guides most, but not all, our daily newspapers.

In makeup, story selection, editorial policy and use of language, Editor & Publisher consistently lives up to the best in journalism as it was practiced circa 1935. Leafing through its pages will tell you why so many newspapers are dull, uninformative and reactionary.

A recent issue of the magazine contained a story with this headline: Readers Split Over Reporter's Beard. The article that followed in E & P's notable prose said that, "The public image of newspapermen got perhaps its severest test when the Dayton Daily News invited readers' response to photos of a bearded reporter. Appearing on the front page was a picture combo showing the daily growth of Dale Huffman's hirsute adornment; complete with a ballot for readers to indicate whether they wanted the beard shaved or saved. Readers turned thumbs down on the reporter's beard."

At least it can't be said that newspaper editors are holding out the good stuff and privately circulating it among themselves. They treat themselves as badly as they treat their readers. Another story in the same issue describes a speech given by the assistant managing editor of the Santa Ana (California) Register to his local Rotary Club. If you want to know more, you'll find it on page 22 of the June 13 number.

Editor & Publisher isn't wholly given over to trivia. It has articles about important topics and they too tell us something about the minds that edit the American daily press, as with the piece that was run with this slightly paranoid headline: Attack on Objectivity Increases From Within.

The article quotes from a speech given by an important Associated Press editor to a group of Pennsylvania newsmen. What he says tells more about print journalism than the story about the reporter and his beard:

"Those of you who read the various professional journals are aware that objective reporting is coming under increasing attack from within our own ranks. There is abroad in the profession a movement, unorganized but vocal, generally known as the New Journalists. Basically, their argument is that the reporter has the right to draw conclusions from the facts he gathers. Unless he is permitted to do so, they say, it is impossible to put simple, unvarnished facts in perspective. To quote the New Journalists, the self-discipline required to remain impartial reduces reporters to the status of mere eunuchs . . . the catch words and phrases of the New Journalists betray their real concern. They are not content to be observers. They are determined to exert an influence, to be opinion makers. They talk about the importance of what reporters think, of the reporter's right to take a moral stance, to have firm convictions and to express them in print. Always beware of the man who talks in terms of 'moral commitments.' Invariably he is a man who has totally bought the line peddled by advocates of one cause or another."

Most American newspaper editors would agree with our speaker, who's not named here because his words are so prototypic. Vice President Agnew would agree; so would many other politicians and many newspaper readers who believe the news is slanted and who, like our speaker, are printing the unvarnished facts.

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ad absurdum with Agnew's attack on the media. Newspapers have dutifully reported the attack every time he gives it, making themselves a conveyor belt for the impression that he and his buddies are being persecuted by a hippie-controlled national press. Seldom do these accounts include a paragraph saying that most American newspapers editorially support him and his boss.

By these standards objectivity consists of limiting oneself to accurate quotation. Let the speaker be a liar, an ignoramus, mistaken or a truth teller, this school of thought holds that journalism has no responsibility to establish the facts independently. It's left to the reader to get the facts to judge our public controversialists, an obvious impossibility in a society disputing over topics that range from the storage of pathogens in biological warfare, to monetary liquidity, to the presence of CIA agents in Laos, to the identity of major polluters of Lake Erie.

Our current definition of news suggests a range of motivation that runs from extreme A to extreme B: patriotism, honor, votes, public service, self defense, love of freedom and peace and a few others. In a time when more people grow up having absorbed the precepts of the social sciences, such inferences as to why events take place are unbelievable. Only Marxists and Christians of the Billy Graham stamp, that is behavioral determinants, can read the accounts of the words and deeds of men on most of our front pages and take them seriously.

Objective news is not only incredible to people brought up in the contemporary mode, it's also biased. This kind of objectivity rejects information that tends to throw doubt on ancient institutions and established practice by calling it partisan. Editors don't want to print that kind of bad news.

They will print bad news that makes an evil appear to be the work of bad men or criminals. They will print bad news that is the work of God, like fires, earthquakes, and plane crashes. They will print bad news that may lead readers to question other country's social systems, that may cause people to wonder about the way other countries select their leaders, make their decisions, transact their public business, but rarely and only in our few good papers, do they do this in regard to ourselves.

When our speaker says editors should be on guard against reporters who have "bought the line peddled by one cause or another," his words mean editors should be on guard against reporters who've not bought the line that editors are trying to peddle.

But editors themselves only half believe in this mythic objectivity. If they did they'd pay the highest wages to the men who most excel at this kind of formula journalism. This isn't the case at all. The best paid writers are the columnists and feature writers who're hired to express opinion.

Newspaper executives are well paid. Most reporters aren't. They don't enter the business for money but for other reasons—excitement, prestige, fascination with the uplifting decision that if a man chases after it long enough, he may be able to write, not unvarnished facts, but some form of truth is never objective.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0007000300014

SOUPHANOUVONG: "NIXON GANGSTER LOGIC"

Civil war has raged for 20 years in Laos, situated west of Vietnam, north of Cambodia, east of Thailand, south of China. Progressive forces, led by prince Souphanouvong, chairman of the central committee of the Laotian Patriotic Front, now occupy virtually two-thirds of the country. The remaining third, along the western border with Thailand, is in the hands of a coalition "neutralist" and rightist regime supported by the U.S. (more than \$50 million a year) which sits in Vientiane, the administrative capital.

In the last months, the Laotian Patriotic Front has registered victory after throughout Laos. On June 9, patriotic forces captured the strategic town of Saravane. In recent weeks, the liberation army has gone on the offensive in dozens of areas, including battles with troops from Thailand sent into Laos by the corrupt Bangkok military government to bolster the shaky Vientiane regime.

During his recent swing through Southeast Asia Guardian staff correspondent Wilfred Burchett submitted four questions to prince Souphanouvong. Following are his answers, received last week.

What is the present military situation in Laos? The Western press mentions that in capturing towns like Attapeu and Saravane, the Pathet Lao forces have for the first time violated the 1962 cease-fire line. What is your comment?

The present military situation in Laos shows that on the one hand the American escalation of "special war" has been redoubled and on the other that the deeper they plunge in such escalation the greater will be the defeat of the U.S. and its puppets. From a strategic viewpoint they were severely defeated in the Plain of Jars. Indeed, this was the first serious defeat in Laos for President Nixon's theory of using puppet troops with maximum American firepower.

Despite such escalation the U.S. and puppet forces were not able to change the situation in their favor. On the contrary, they have been driven onto the defensive from a military point of view and politically they are more isolated than ever. As for the Laotian patriotic forces they have retained and constantly developed their position of active initiative. After having kicked the enemy out of the Plain of Jars and completely recaptured the whole area, the patriotic forces directed their attack against the hideout of the "special forces" at Sam Thong-Long Cheng. They liberated Attapeu and other places near the Bolovens plateau. That is to say they have punished the enemy in the jumping off points and bases for their criminal attacks.

Right from the start the Laotian patriotic forces have scrupulously respected the letter of the 1962 Geneva agreements. But as the U.S. and puppet forces have undertaken a most criminal war of aggression against the Laotian people, our armed forces have been forced to fight back, making use of their sacred rights of self defense.

The patriotic forces must expel the enemy from those areas which it has illegally occupied, punish them in the bases from which they launched their attacks and perpetrated their crimes. In so doing we are safeguarding the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos and effectively defending the 1962 Geneva agreements. It is in basing ourselves on these agreements and on the concrete reality of the present situation in Laos and our desire for peace that we have put forward our five-point proposal for a political settlement of the Laotian problem (Guardian, April 11, 1970). Although there has been no responsible reply from the other side, we will nonetheless persevere in seeking a political solution based on our five points.

The U.S. puppet forces have never respected their commitments. Hardly were the 1962 agreements signed, than the U.S. and puppet forces, at the same time launching terrorist "pacification" operations throughout

the rest of the country. In fact they have completely liquidated what the Western press refers to as the 1962 "cease fire line." Just as they have torn up the whole 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

Those who sow the wind reap the whirlwind. If they don't want to reap another whirlwind the Americans and their valets in Vientiane, Bangkok and Saigon had better not sow any more wind. If they charge ahead, heads down, in new criminal adventures against the Laotian people they will have to bear the entire responsibility for the disastrous consequences.

The official explanation for the American bombings of Laos and the presence of U.S. troops there is the existence of a Ho Chi Minh trail and the presence of North Vietnamese troops. What is the extent of U.S. and Thailand troops in Laos and how serious are the U.S. bombings?

With a view to turning Laos into a neo-colony, the Americans have never ceased their interference and aggression against Laos nor their trampling underfoot its neutrality and independence. They have violated the 1962 Geneva agreements. They have introduced thousands of U.S. advisors, CIA personnel

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disappointed the Administration and angered some of its critics. Yet there are indications the situation is improving.

Earlier this week Paul W. McCracken, chairman of President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers, told the economic policy committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that evidence of improvement includes a slowing of the rise of wholesale food and commodity prices and a lower rate of wage increases.

As a story in this newspaper reported yesterday, a growing number of private economists, though still probably a minority, believe the worst of the inflation is over. That alone would be encouraging.

Mr. Nixon's go-slow approach clearly was the result of careful calculation. There were several ways to cool the overheated economy that the Administration inherited, and many things to be considered in choosing a course.

First, there was the matter of monetary policy. Super-easy money had done a lot to get the economy into its inflated state, so obviously more restraint was in order. But how much more?

As recently as 1966 the Federal Reserve System had tightened up, abruptly and briefly, and had caused something approaching a money panic. So the Federal Reserve this time moved much more gradually. In fiscal policy the Administration also opted for the gentle approach—budget surpluses, but not very big ones.

Now the execution of the plan has left something to be desired. The Fed probably tightened money too much and for too long in 1969. And the Administration, together with Congress, has managed to convert those small budget surpluses into deficits.

Yet progress is surely being made. The economy is cooling, and before many more months pass the trend will show clearly in the price indexes. Those who looked for price declines earlier forgot that such developments are usually the last signs of an ebbing inflation, not the first.

Some companies, institutions and individuals are being hurt; no one has invented a painless way to restore a shaky economy to stability. Many more would have suffered much more, though, if the inflated economy had been allowed to roar on into eventual disaster—or had been halted suddenly by slamming on the fiscal and monetary brakes.

Everyone may wish that the Government's plans were producing results more swiftly and smoothly, but most of the public appears to be adjusting to a changing situation with considerable aplomb. One of the more interesting features of the sharp plunge of the stock market in April and May was the scarcity of anything resembling panic selling.

Volume on the New York Stock Exchange in recent weeks has usually tended to rise when prices rally and to subside as prices decline. The mood of investors and traders certainly is not overwhelmingly optimistic, but it does appear to be hopeful. When prices turn downward there generally is a reduction in orders to buy—but no evidence of deep pessimism.

Thus gradualism does seem to be working, even if it isn't delighting everybody. Businessmen should realize now that to make plans on the basis of never-ending inflation is only to invite serious trouble.

The Administration fortunately seems to realize that wage-price controls or other crash programs against inflation would not only accomplish nothing constructive. They would also undo much that has been done—by persuading the public that monetary-fiscal restraint is a failure, that inflation will indeed persist.

In the circumstances the Government's course still should be to move slowly, steadily, avoid shocks. Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns indicates that is what he has

in mind—providing enough money for the nation's needs, not enough to fuel more inflation.

There may be more spectacular ways to play the game, but somehow we feel safer with four yards and a cloud of dust.

ROTC PROGRAM AT FURMAN UNIVERSITY

HON. STROM THURMOND

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, June 23, 1970

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in recent years ROTC programs all over the Nation have come under a great deal of unjust criticism and abuse. In the main, this criticism has come from misguided students and campus radicals. A few colleges in the country which have bowed to this criticism have abolished the ROTC programs from their campus curriculum.

Mr. President, on June 19, the Greenville News, a leading newspaper published in Greenville, S.C., published a very fine editorial assessing the ROTC program at Furman University, one of the outstanding institutions of higher learning in the Nation. Furman University has met this criticism headon and has revamped its ROTC curriculum to make this experience more meaningful to the individual cadet. This, of course, means that the ROTC graduate at Furman will be better qualified to serve as an officer and leader in the service of his country.

Mr. President, I wish to commend Furman University for the fine work that it is doing.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial, entitled "A New Look for ROTC," from the Greenville News be printed in the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

A New Look for ROTC

An experimental ROTC program at Furman University appears to have bridged the military-civilian gap that has plagued the program in other institutions. It is worth close examination as an example of constructive compromise.

The key to the program, which is ending a two-year trial at Furman and 10 other colleges and universities, is integration, rather than segregation, of civilian and military elements. Proof of the program's success, at least locally, is Furman's decision to continue it past the trial period.

The program is the Army's answer to long-standing complaints from students that ROTC courses are boring, non-academic and a waste of time. Under the experimental plan, freshmen are allowed to take military history courses for four hours credit and sophomores take political science and national security courses instead of the traditional military courses which come in the junior and senior years.

Civilian professors are utilized through appropriations from the Army. The new program underlines the fact that strictly military subjects are taught better outside the Furman classrooms. Students go to summer camp to learn about the "nuts and bolts of the Army," according to officials.

Other changes at Furman include complete revamping of the curriculum from the two-semester system and the shift from mandatory ROTC to optional. Previously a student who signed up for ROTC had to complete two years. Now he can enroll and then drop the program if he finds it not to his liking.

The new system is a compromise in the sense that it is a break with the old ROTC traditions of march and drill and a leaning toward allowing students more individualization.

But at the same time it still operates on the theory that the military is an integral part of society and—whether it is good or bad—this is a fact. The new program continues to offer the college man who is faced with meeting a military obligation the best way to utilize his talents, rather than be drafted and serve as a private.

HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

HON. HOWARD W. ROBISON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 23, 1970

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, the sixth article in the Christian Science Monitor series on narcotics traffic traces the route of narcotics through Southeast Asia. One of the difficulties in stopping the flow of narcotics from this area is that some of the producers are mountain fighters who are friendly to the U.S. efforts against the North Vietnamese and who in turn are keeping the Communists out of Laos.

Additionally, in this geographic area there seems to be significant involvement by high government officials in the opium trade and, therefore, a firm governmental policy to stop the illegal production of that narcotic is difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, it is an area at which we must direct our attention because as European sources of supply are dried up, these sources in Southeast Asia may pick up the slack. In view of the American presence in these nations, we ought to be able to exert pressure to curb the production of these illegal narcotics.

The article follows:

THAILAND: FOUR-LANE DRUG HIGHWAY (By John Hughes)

BANGKOK, THAILAND.—For the junk merchants of Southeast Asia, Thailand is the corridor through which their illegal merchandise must pass to Hong Kong and the lucrative markets of America.

But to many, Thailand seems less a corridor than a four-lane highway down which narcotics shipments roll with ease.

Of course, there are tolls. The police must be paid off. Experts in the business say the going price is \$5 per kilo of opium at each of five checkpoints between the opium-growing borderlands of the north and the capital city of Bangkok. But \$25 a kilo in payoffs is small enough overhead in a business where the profit rolls in by hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Some Thai officials are clearly in this business up to their elbows. One recent incident illustrates the point.

Thai residents of a Bangkok suburb noted suspicious activity at a godown (warehouse) in their neighborhood. A helicopter kept fluttering down. There was furtive unloading. They told the police and the police, suspecting an illegal liquor racket, raided

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Marquis Childs

Union Leaders' Swing to Right Is Bad News for the Democrats

FOR THE FIRST time in more than three decades the power bloc that has been the solid base of the Democratic Party is cracking. For Democratic strategists looking ahead the split in the trade union movement is like the initial tremors of an earthquake, with the worst still to come.

George Meany, the venerable boss of the AFL-CIO, with his gray eminence and secretary of state, Jay Lovestone, at his elbow, gave President Nixon blank-check support for Cambodia. The outpouring of the hard hats in New York and St. Louis followed. The President invited the New York padawans to the White House and the embrace was ratified with a hard hat for the smiling chief executive.

When Mr. Nixon made the pilgrimage to the handsome AFL-CIO headquarters a block from the White House for an appearance before the executive council, Meany had harsh things to say about rising prices and the wage gap. But this was obscured by Meany's benediction for the Nixon war policy, a blessing that he had given to Lyndon Johnson in the years of the escalation.

Having gone so far out for the Nixon policy and if that policy proves at least partially successful, the trade unionists on the right will vote for Mr. Nixon in 1972. This is the dismaying prospect that more aware Democrats see as they peer into the future.

WHAT IS MORE, there is a strong quid pro quo in the Meany-Lovestone position. For several years the AFL-CIO has been getting considerable sums from the Agency for International Development to promote Meany-Lovestone foreign policy in Latin America, Asia and Africa through "free trade unions."

A year ago Chairman J. William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the terms of the partnership

between AID and the AFL-CIO's subsidiaries, the American Institute for Free Labor. Meany, as witness, shouted angrily as Fulbright questioned the wisdom of turning over funds—more than \$30 million at that point—to a non-governmental organization. Conceding the right to hold a different opinion from his on the war, Fulbright added:

"But that is a different matter from supplying large sums of money to you to be used with the freedom that this record shows you use it."

"MR. CHAIRMAN," Meany responded, "they were not supplying money to me. This money is used to carry out U.S. Government foreign policy. Now you may not agree with that policy. But the people who approve the use of this money in this way agree that it is a good thing to develop free trade unions, that the free trade unions can play a part in developing viable democratic societies, and the development of viable democratic societies in Latin America is in the interest of the United States of America."

AID continues to supply funds to the AFL-CIO subsidiaries. Formerly this money came directly from the Central Intelligence Agency. AID Administrator John A. Hannah recently said that as of today it is only in Laos that some AID funds go for CIA operations.

The unions that are the core of support for the President's policy in Indochina—the hard hats in the construction industry—have reason to be grateful to the administration if only because of its hands-off attitude on wages and prices. Nor are they likely to be alarmed by the President's economic message and the promise of an "inflation alert." The alert is many months too late.

THESE UNIONS have led the wage increase parade. The careful figures prepared by the Labor Statistics show that contracts recently negoti-

ated in the construction industry average a 15.5 per cent jump the first year and 39 per cent over three years. This compares with an average in manufacturing of 5.5 per cent for the first year and slightly more than 15 per cent for three years. Needless to say, these increases are passed on by the construction industry in the cost of large-scale building. It does not have an appreciable effect on individual home building, as was erroneously stated in this space recently, since this is for the most part a non-unionized field.

But the strong upward pull of such big wage boosts is obvious. The construction unions until quite recently have had the narrowest apprenticeship restrictions and the most restrictive control over productivity in relation to manhours of work.

"The inevitability of the election of a Republican candidate for President in 1968 was universally conceded," the head of a white-collar union writes. "One force, and one force only, came within an eyelash of reversing that outcome, the AFL-CIO. Maybe there was a place here or there where we could have strained a little harder but it is difficult to give such consideration to such questioning . . ."

The questioning points to 1972 and the Meany-Lovestone stand on the Vietnam war. The Meany front is not entirely united—Jacob Potofsky of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers filed a dissent. But the ideological shove to the right is powerful.

STATINTL

The Secret Team and the Games It Plays

STATINTL

L. FLETCHER PROUTY

"The hill costumes of the Meo tribesmen contrasted with the civilian clothes of United States military men riding in open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and pistols. These young Americans are mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA contract to advise and train Laotian troops. Those matter-of-fact, almost weary

L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air Force colonel, is now vice president of a Washington, D.C., bank. While in the Air Force, he was a liaison man with the Secret Team. His article is from The Washington Monthly, May 1970

sentences, written late in February by T. D. Allman of the Washington Post after he and two other enterprising correspondents left a guided tour and walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe a situation that today may seem commonplace to anyone familiar with American operations overseas, but that no more than 10 years ago would have been unthinkable.

To take a detachment of regular troops, put its members into disguise, smuggle them out of the country so that neither the public nor Congress knows they have left, and assign them to clandestine duties on foreign soil under the command of a nonmilitary agency—it is doubtful that anyone would have dared to suggest taking such liberties with the armed forces and foreign relations of the United States, not to say with the Constitution, to any President up to and especially including Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Indeed, the most remarkable development in the management of America's relations with other countries during the nine years since Gen. Eisenhower left office has been the assumption of more and more control over military and diplomatic operations abroad by men whose activities are secret, whose budget is

secret, whose very identities as often as not are secret—in short a Secret Team whose actions only those implicated in them are in a position to monitor.

How determinedly this secrecy is preserved, even when preserving it means denying the U.S. Army the right to discipline its own personnel, to say the opportunity to do justice, was strikingly illustrated not long ago by the refusal of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide witnesses for the court-martial that was to try eight Green Beret officers for murdering a suspected North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the Army to drop the charges.

The Secret Team consists of security-cleared individuals in and out of government who receive secret intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the National Security Agency and who react to those data when it seems appropriate to them with paramilitary plans and activities, e.g., training and "advising"—a not exactly impenetrable euphemism for "leading into battle"—Laotian troops. Membership in the team, granted on a "need to know" basis, varies with the nature and the location of the problems that come to its attention.

At the heart of the team, of course, are a handful of top executives of the CIA and of the National Security Council, most notably the chief White House adviser on foreign policy. Around them revolves a sort of inner ring of presidential staff members, State Department officials, civilians and military men from the Pentagon, and career professionals in the intelligence services.

And out beyond them is an extensive and intricate network of government officials with responsibility for or expertise in some specific field that touches on national security, think-tank analysts, businessmen who travel a lot or whose businesses (e.g., import-export or operating a cargo airline) are useful, make sure that their technical subject or geographic re-

gion, and, quite importantly, alumni of the intelligence service—a service from which there are no unconditional resignations.

Thus the Secret Team is not a clandestine super-planning board or super-general staff but, even more damaging to the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a bewildering collection of temporarily assembled action committees that respond pretty much ad hoc to specific troubles in various part of the world, sometimes in ways that duplicate the activities of regular American missions, sometimes in ways that undermine those activities, and very often in ways that interfere with and muddle them.

One source of the team's power is the speed with which it can act. The CIA's communications system is so extraordinarily efficient, especially by contrast with State's, that the team can, in a phrase that often gets used at such times, "have a plane in the air" responding to some situation overseas while State is still decoding the cable informing it of that situation.

A few years ago, for example, while the strongest member of an Asian government that the United States was strenuously supporting (call him Marshal X) was lying sick in a Tokyo hospital, word came that a group of discontented young officers was planning a coup in his absence. In a matter of hours, thanks to the team, Marshal X was on his way home in a U.S. Air Force jet fighter; he arrived at his office in plenty of time to frustrate the plotters.

The power to pull off feats like that is more than operational power; it is in a real sense policy-making power. In this particular case it was the power to commit the United States to the protection and support of Marshal X.

Another source of the team's power is its ability to manipulate "need to know" classifications. One way to make sure that there is full opposition to your proposed activities is to fail to tell those who might oppose

continued

INTERPRETIVE REPORT

Red Gains Peril U.S. Policy in Laos

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — The American policy in Laos of supporting Lao neutrality and trying to stop Communist military expansion is in deep trouble, diplomats and other sources say.

The sources base this assessment on dramatic military gains the Communists have made in southern Laos in the last six weeks and the gradual shift to the right under rightist pressure of neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma.

Since the end of April, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces have taken and held two provincial capitals in southern Laos — Attapeu and Saravane — knocked out seven other Lao Government positions and one American position and are now well on the way to trying to take over Sithandone and Champassac Provinces on the west bank of the Mekong River.

Such a move would give Hanoi complete control of the Lao-Cambodian border.

In the same period, Souvanna Phouma — under strong rightist political pressure — has delegated the Defense Ministry to a rightist, agreed to consult with rightwingers on important policy decisions and is now agreeing to a reshuffle of the cabinet which would favor the rightists.

These sources blame U.S. diplomats for these developments.

U.S. Criticized

"The Americans have done half of one thing and half of the other and succeeded in neither," the sources said.

The United States has supplied close air support for Lao forces, logistics, arms, money and ground advisers in an attempt to stop the North Vietnamese. This has severely weakened the Lao government's neutrality.

On the other hand, the United States has been unable to give the Lao military sufficient help to stop the Communists because massive aid would destroy Laos' neutrality completely.

Tracing events back to 1964 reveals the contradictions of U.S. policy with a continual

tendency of successive American ambassadors to lean more toward military aid to the rightists than toward the neu-

trality. Between 1962 and 1964, then Laos Ambassador Leonard Unger agreed to give Laos fuel, ammunition and equipment and to provide jet reconnaissance over the country.

In 1964, Ambassador William Sullivan seriously weakened Laotian neutrality by agreeing to a merger of the rightists and neutralist armies.

The small neutralist army of less than 10,000 men was swallowed up by the 60,000-man rightist force, putting Souvanna Phouma in the position of having to depend on the rightist generals.

Since 1961, Hanoi has been trying to force a pro-Communist but officially neutral government on the Laotians.

Finding Souvanna and his neutralist commander Kong Le would not play ball, the Reds attacked them, triggering U.S. aid to the rightists. As the rightists became more powerful, the North Vietnamese launched stronger attacks.

Successive U.S. ambassadors did nothing to stop disruption and poor leadership which weakened the Laotians. They could think only of more military aid.

Charge d'Affaires Robert Hurwitch and the present Ambassador, G. McMurtrie Godley, greatly worsened the situation by escalating American military help to the rightists.

Admittedly, the move was made in the face of increased North Vietnamese attacks, but much of the North Vietnamese success was due to weaknesses in the Lao army which aid could erase.

Support Missions Flown

Under Hurwitch and Godley, the United States, flew close air support missions for the Lao army, put in additional military advisers and distributed M16 rifles.

The North Vietnamese continued to throw in their infantry and the Laotians remain as they are now—in deep military trouble.

The Lao military merely used the U.S. money to build new houses and invest in businesses.

The Laotians refuse to advance now unless there is a U.S. Air Force strike or, at the very least, Lao air and artillery support.

The new equipment supplied by the United States, goes no where near the battlefield. Military police and general's bodyguards carry M16s in Vientiane while front-line troops still have carbines.

And new U.S. jeeps are used to drive high-ranking Lao officers' wives to the Vientiane market.

The Lao soldiers often are not even paid.

Pay officers steal the salaries and widows' pensions to build villas.

Death Reports Delayed

For example, if a soldier is killed, there is no record of his death made until two or three months later. The pay officer pockets the dead soldier's salary for that three months while his widow and family get nothing.

This has resulted in some cases, according to soldiers' wives, of them having to enter prostitution to stay alive.

Other wives say that after their husbands go into action, they never receive any salary.

With no money despite the U.S. largesse and with his wife and family left to fend for themselves, the Lao soldier naturally does not feel like fighting and taking risks.

U.S. officials have tried to get around this by running a separate army and having U.S. accountants pay the troops.

The snag is that these soldiers are in the forefront of the fighting in guerrilla teams in North Vietnamese rear areas and take heavy casualties.

CIA Tactical Failures

Asked why he did not join this force, one Lao officer said: "I don't want to get killed."

Many casualties are due to tactical failures by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operatives.

They put their troops in fixed positions, which are not camouflaged, so that they can be resupplied by air.

The North Vietnamese find the positions easily and snuff them out or watch the guerrillas leaving and ambush them. U.S. air support in terms of enemy killed or trucks destroyed is just about useless.

The North Vietnamese have built a network of routes like veins in the human body. When one is hit, they switch to any one of a dozen others.

The serious military situation in southern Laos is a result of all these factors.

The U.S. Air Force did not stop Hanoi's troops.

The Lao guerrilla positions are falling like ninepins, Communist troops run checkpoints on the main road with impunity.

Lao troops don't even attack Communist positions in the forest, even when they know exactly where the enemy is hiding.

Failure Wins Promotion

In southern Laos, there is no pro-government organization in the villages. Failure is rewarded with promotion.

Col. Khong, the man who lost Attapeu, was immediately made a general.

Despite all this, Godley's policy remains the same. According to American sources, he is agreeable to putting U.S. military advisory teams into the Lao training command in such places as the artillery school.

The only reason this has not been done is he cannot find funds following actions by the U.S. Senate to curb Laos activities.

Godley's subordinates say he has okayed the supply of ammunition to Laotians which has not been budgeted yet.

He is willing to provide air support as much as the Lao need them, American sources say.

But these methods neither stop Hanoi, as events in South Laos prove, nor do they help the officially neutral stance of Souvanna Phouma, an avowed U.S. policy objective.

Hanoi Not Stopped

Yet at the same time, Godley is protecting Souvanna from the rightists and preventing the Laotians from forming an alliance with South Vietnam and Thailand.

When the rightwingers wanted to topple Souvanna recently, Godley warned that the United States would not support them. This apparently prevented a military improvement in the situation in southern Laos.

To confuse things further Godley has implemented a press policy ostensibly to protect the last vestiges of Souvanna's neutrality.

U.S. and Lao officials are instructed to stop American newsmen going into combat areas whenever possible, to prevent them from seeing U.S. involvement in the fighting.

The result is that the press writes about American activities it can observe without going to combat areas and writes little about North Vietnamese attacks on the peaceable Laotians which the press can't see and which is heard about only in sanitized versions from Lao government spokesmen who omit Lao defeats and are more interested in propaganda than information.

19 JUN 1970

STATINTL

Hanoi Assails U.S. Role in Laos

at Paris Peace Talks

Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, June 18—North Vietnam charged today that there are more than 12,000 U.S. military personnel, 10,000 Thai soldiers, plus an unnamed number of Central Intelligence agency operatives now active in Laos.

The numbers came from Nguyen Thanh Le, Hanoi's press spokesman at the Vietnam peace talks here. The U.S. press spokesman, Stephen Ledogar, cited recent White House announcements in support of lower figures: A total of 616 American citizens directly employed, plus 424 on contract. The White House also claims there are no U.S. "ground combat troops" in Laos, although Hanoi has never charged that there were. Its accusations refer to airmen, military advisers, training officers, political, security and intelligence agents.

The Laos numbers quarrel was one of the few new elements which emerged from the 71st session of the deadlocked peace talks. Observers had the impression that whatever diplomatic action might be in progress was being conducted elsewhere, and the delegates here were marking time by repeating well known positions.

○ Cambodia: Why the Generals Won

Peter Dale Scott

President Nixon's ground operations in Cambodia with US troops will likely be over, as he promises, by June 30, 1970. The long-range strategy by which the Cambodian adventure was undertaken almost certainly will not be. For though the invasion itself was unprecedented, all of the prior elements in the scenario were often repeated clichés, from the initial military overthrow of a popular leader by a right-wing pro-American clique, to the announced response to an enemy "invasion" at a time when the prospects for ending the war seemed to be increasing. Most characteristic of all is the likelihood that Nixon was pressured by the Joint Chiefs to authorize the Cambodian adventure in great haste, and in such a way as to bypass or overrule most of his civilian advisers, as a response to an "emergency" for which US intelligence agencies and perhaps the Joint Chiefs themselves were largely responsible.

Even if terminated by June 30, the Cambodian adventure has confirmed yet again what some of us have been saying for years: that at present the US military apparatus in Southeast Asia will work to reject a new policy of de-escalation as certainly as the human organism will work to reject a transplanted heart. The formula to neutralize this rejection process has unfortunately not yet been discovered.

In other words one cannot understand what has happened recently in Cambodia without understanding the whole history of the Second Indochina War. One cannot for example appreciate Lon Nol's expectations in overthrowing Prince Sihanouk on March 18 without recalling the anti-neutralist military coups of late 1960 and April 1964 in Laos, or of January 1964 and June 1965 in Saigon. US personnel were involved in (or at the very least, cognizant of) every one of these coups.

Each coup was followed by, and helped to facilitate, an escalation of the US military effort which the overthrown regime would not have tolerated. As my colleagues and I tried to demonstrate in our book, *The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam*, the result (if not the intention) of every one of these escalations was to nullify a real or apparent threat of peace at the time. (I would now add that we failed sufficiently to emphasize the role of our civilian and military intelligence services in bringing about all of the crises in question, as well as the present one.)

The second cliché of the scenario was Lon Nol's deliberate breach of the accommodation hitherto established between the NLF troops in Cambodia and the troops of Phnompenh, followed by a precipitous retreat, in the face of what seem to have been only light enemy probes, back to the outskirts of Phnompenh itself. This gratuitous provocation of a much stronger enemy has been treated as irrational by several well-established American analysts, but it will be seen to have its own Machiavellian logic when compared to similar events in the Second Indochina War. By the same combination of absurd provocation and precipitous withdrawal in previous springs, Laotian troops (and/or their American advisers) secured the first commitment of US combat troops to Thailand—the first in Southeast Asia, for that matter—in May 1962, and the first bombings of Laos—which *Aviation Week* correctly reported to be "the first US offensive military action since Korea"—in May 1964.²

Thus Lon Nol's actions, far from being irrational, followed a recipe for US support which by now has been tested many times and never known to fail. The exigent realities of the monsoon season and the US budgetary process encourage an annual cycle of escalation which by now can be not only analyzed but predicted.³

The third and most frightening cliché is the phenomenon of the artificially induced "crisis" used as a pretext for hasty executive actions which

policy. The military pressure on Nixon to escalate hastily in Cambodia recalls the pressure on Kennedy to escalate in 1962 and on Johnson to escalate in 1964, first in response to Laos and later in response to the alleged Tonkin Gulf "incident" of August 1964. In all cases, including the present one, a key role was played by our intelligence agencies, who first helped to induce a crisis which they subsequently misreported to the President.

Furthermore, all but the most rudimentary forms of civilian review within the executive branch were suppressed. When the first US arms shipment to Cambodia was announced on April 22 by White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler, his counterpart Robert McCloskey at the State Department admitted that he "knew nothing about it" (*New York Times*, April 24, 1970, p. 3). On April 23, the very day that "emergency" meetings of the Special Action Group began to consider the Fishhook invasion, Secretary of State Rogers told a House Appropriations subcommittee that if US troops went into Cambodia "our whole (Vietnamization) program is defeated," and that "we have no incentive to escalate into Cambodia" (*Washington Post*, May 6, 1970, A1). In the wake of the Fishhook decision ("Operation Prometheus") it was suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

... pulled an end run in their effort to get the attack against the border areas approved. . . . Some believed Mr. Laird found himself in the final stages of planning for the invasion without being fully consulted and informed during the preliminary planning stages [*Christian Science Monitor*, May 14, 1970].

Perhaps the most embarrassing plight was that of Senate Republican leader Hugh Scott, who was

... cut adrift with White House-inspired statements that renewed bombing of the North was a remote contingency at the very time a hundred American planes were dropping bombs across the demilitarized zone.⁴

Constitutional procedures under Nixon, the rights of Congress to declare wars and advise on foreign constructionist," have clearly deteriorated a long way since 1954, when Dulles had

STATINTL

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Certified Public Accountant

The Modern Corporation and Private Property
by Adolf A. Berle
and Gardiner C. Means.
Harcourt, Brace & World, 380 pp., \$9.75

Power
by Adolf A. Berle.
Harcourt, Brace & World,
603 pp., \$10.00

K. W. Wedderburn

In 1932 Berle and Means published a major work of the New Deal era, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. Through or from this book flowed many concepts of corporations and corporation law, once thought maverick, but now fashionable, even conventional: the inability of thousands of stockholding "owners" to govern, often even to influence, the managers actually in charge of giant companies; the emergence of modern management in large self-financing corporations which reflects this "separation of ownership and control"; the growing concentration of capital in these legally personified aggregations to a point where they dominate modern capitalist societies. Since the book was written, Berle has been prominent not only in academic and legal circles but also in political and diplomatic life.

During the New Deal Berle was a pioneer in the debate about the nature of corporate power and for that he is likely to be best remembered. For instance, in 1932 he engaged in a famous exchange in the *Harvard Law Review*, on the question—then revolutionary in itself—"For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?" Traditionally, directors' duties relate to the interests of the corporation and especially of the stockholders. Professor Merrick Dodd in the *Review* argued that it was appropriate by then to recognize wider duties to the community at large. Berle was attracted by this view, new in 1932, but, as a lawyer, could not adopt it. The various corporation laws in the United States

did not then (and still do not) go much further than to permit management to devote corporate assets to philanthropic purposes, and the interests of stockholders still dominate the rhetoric of its legal duties.

Yet, as usual, social organization moved on, paying scant regard to legal rhetoric. By 1954, Berle asserted that in practice the argument had been settled "squarely in favor of Professor Dodd's contention" (*The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution*). Managers, he argued, say they consider, and do consider, the corporation's interest in a very wide setting. The managers of the giant corporations have become, Berle claimed, imbued thereby with a social "conscience." By 1959 he doubted even the desirability of stockholder control, which he held to be little more than ritualistic (*Power Without Property*).

To those traditionalists, then, for whom "control" by stockholders exercised through corporation meetings and the stock market is an integral part of the model of capitalism, Berle is a maverick; but he has withstood their attacks. The criticism of Professor Henry Manne in 1962, for example, he called an attempt to describe twentieth-century institutions with "nineteenth century economic folklore." Three years later he replied to the economist, Professor Shorey Peterson, that classical economics just did not account for modern corporate capitalism: "A vast sector of the American economy is not, even theoretically, within the classical economic system." Supply and demand are not what they were; prices are widely fixed, not competitive; large enterprises with guaranteed markets do not behave like the classical entrepreneur in the market place. If the profit motive is still "regnant," the giant corporation's managers, Berle argued, are influenced today by many new considerations, not least government policies and contracts.

One turns eagerly, therefore, to the new edition of *Modern Corporation*—which contains a new Preface by Berle and a new Appendix by Means—and to Berle's recent, more general work on *Power*. In his new Appendix Means carefully documents the evidence for

increased concentration of capital and growing managerial control in the mid-Sixties. But Berle's Preface reveals little new. He restates his political thesis: corporations are essentially "political constructs"; their operations are "like" operations carried on by the state. The 1932 text of *Modern Corporation* concluded:

The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modern state. . . . The future may see the economic organism now typified by the corporation not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the dominant form of social organization.

Today, there are more corporations in the world than there are nations with incomes greater than the gross national product of Ireland. In the US some 10 percent of corporate entities control two-thirds of the non-farm economy (what Berle elsewhere calls "the highest concentration of economic power in recorded history"). The perception of Berle and Means has been justified for America. For the rest of the world, their conclusion was prophetic. The dominant organization of the next decade will be the multinational or international corporation. National governments, said a British cabinet minister in 1968, "including the British Government, will be reduced to the status of a parish council in dealing with the large international companies which will span the world."

One in nine of the industrial workers in Scotland today is employed by an American enterprise. In 1966, 22 percent of Britain's "exports" were transactions between branches of multinational corporations. Trade unions throughout Europe are disturbed by the new multinational faces behind the masks across the bargaining table. As a commentator in the *London Times* wrote in April, "[I]nternational corporations have now a massive power, not only financial but industrial, and no one really has the first idea how they exercise it." When and if we do know, what can we do about it?

Berle and Means summed up the program of the *Modern Corporation*: "[T]he 'control' of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy balancing a variety of

Reds Smash Laotian Effort To Retake Provincial Capital

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

PAKSE, Laos—North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces have smashed Royal Lao army and U.S.-led guerrilla forces trying to retake the provincial capital of Saravane which the Reds captured June 9.

Lao military sources here said the government forces fled and split up into small groups after the Communists hit them Tuesday night at the village of Bangkok, 3 to 4 miles northwest of Saravane.

"There is no hope of retaking Saravane," the source said.

In the Saravane fighting, 350 Lao troops were listed as dead, wounded and missing.

U.S. Base Hit

Now an American base, Nong Bua, 10 miles east of Saravane, has come under Communist fire. Nong Bua is used by the Americans for watching the Ho Chi Minh trail to the east. The Americans work for the Central Intelligence Agency.

"The annex personnel have been withdrawn," informed sources said. CIA men have been posing as employees in the "annex" of the U.S. Agency for International Development in Pakse.

American aircraft today were picking up refugees from Nong Bua and flying them to this Mekong River town.

The military sources said there is only a small group of North Vietnamese inside Saravane itself. Most of the North Vietnamese are hiding in forests around the town.

U.S. F4 jets have been hitting North Vietnamese positions on Saravane's perimeter without much success. They have been encountering heavy ground fire. The town itself has not been bombed.

Pincer Attack Stopped

Last weekend, a special guerrilla unit with American advisers entered Saravane as a prelude to a pincer assault by regular Lao troops. The pincer move, however, was broken up by Communist forces dug in outside the town.

The Lao were regrouping at Bangkok when North Vietnamese forces overran their position.

Col. Suchai, the commander of the guerrilla units, and his men have now fled to another U.S. base, Site 39, between Saravane and the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

With Saravane now tightly

within their grip, the North Vietnamese are expected to concentrate on picking off airstrips which resupply the government forces East of Saravane.

If Site 39 and Nong Bua, fall, the government presence in the Saravane area will practically be ended.

Hanoi's Fear Seen

The Reds' reason for the takeover in Saravane Province is believed to be their fear of South Vietnamese intervention against the trail sanctuaries east of Saravane.

To observers, the North Vietnamese success at Saravane demonstrated once again the incompetence of the Lao army, although it is backed by U.S. air power and ground advisers.

Lao army defenders at Saravane reportedly fought for only 10 minutes, though the civil home guards fought against the Vietnamese for five hours until they had run out of ammunition.

Morale is low in the Lao army because of what critics say is poor leadership, corruption in the general staff (particularly non-payment of the troops), no leave facilities, and dependant cars.

Thailand

'Four-lane' drug highway

Opium pours through Thailand. It is grown in unreachable and little-controlled areas of Burma, Laos, and Yunnan province in Communist China. Some also is grown in Thailand. In these countries narcotics trafficking involves people in high places.

By John Hughes

Staff correspondent of
 The Christian Science Monitor

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Bangkok, Thailand

FOR THE JUNK MERCHANTS OF Southeast Asia, Thailand is the corridor through which their illegal merchandise must pass to Hong Kong and the lucrative markets of America.

But to many, Thailand seems less a corridor than a four-lane highway down which narcotics shipments roll with ease.

Of course, there are tolls. The police must be paid off. Experts in the business say the going price is \$5 per kilo of opium at each of five checkpoints between the opium-growing borderlands of the north and the capital city of Bangkok. But \$25 a kilo in payoffs is small enough overhead in a business where the profit rolls in by hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Some Thai officials are clearly in this business up to their elbows. One recent incident illustrates the point.

Thai residents of a Bangkok suburb noted suspicious activity at a godown (warehouse) in their neighborhood. A helicopter kept fluttering down. There was furtive unloading. They told the police and the police, suspecting an illegal liquor racket, raided the warehouse. Instead of liquor, they found it stocked with fresh opium.

The embarrassing point of the story is that in Thailand only the border police and the Army operate helicopters.

In earlier years, the opium traffic in Thailand was practically a monopoly of the police. Involvement in the trade extended into the Cabinet. But where it is now, it is difficult to state. Says one Thai official warningly: "There's a line above which we cannot investigate the business."

Publicly the government has set itself against the opium traffic. Thailand has 200,000 drug addicts of its own. Heroin addiction is increasing sharply, particularly among young Thais. The government is, as a United Nations report puts it, "alive to the problem."

It has cut back imports of acetic anhydride, a necessary agent for processing heroin. An Anti-Narcotic Drugs Association has been set up to combat addiction. There are drug seizures by the Thai police. But the UN report concludes gloomily that the "situation has not materially improved" in recent years and has even been "exacerbated."

Thai output rated low

The Thais argue that their country is a transit route for illicit narcotics and that their neighbors are much bigger opium producers than they are.

The argument is valid. Of the 400 to 600 tons of opium which comes out of Southeast Asia each year, Burma and Laos grow the bulk. Thailand produces only between 15 and 50 tons. In Burma the government is incapable of halting production, while in Laos the Army is engaged in the opium traffic and the Air Force helps transport the crop.

For much of this production, Thailand is the conduit. Some Thais are profiting handsomely from the passage of opium through their country. Law-enforcement officers elsewhere in Asia are divided as to how much more the Thai Government could do to pinch off the traffic. Some credit Thai authorities with increased effort.

Others are harsher in their judgments. Says the narcotics chief of one Southeast Asian country:

"There are only three main routes running down Thailand. If they really wanted to, the So far as the United States is concerned, Southeast Asia till now has been a minor



The
 junk merchants:
 International
 narcotics traffic—6

continued

TRENTON, N.J.
TIMES
E - 81,855
TIMES-ADVERTISER
S - 102,422
JUN 16 1970

Can Congress Regain Control?

While the U.S. Senate is trying to reassert the role of Congress in American military actions overseas through Cooper-Church and other resolutions, the extent of secret, undercover operations illustrates the difficulty of exerting real control.

There is, for example, the recent admission of the Agency for International Development director, Dr. John A. Hannah, that his economic assistance agency has been used since 1962 as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos. Not only does such long-term secret involvement bring suspicion on the AID activities, but it raises questions about how the effective direction of the CIA is exercised by regularly constituted governmental authority.

Another "secret" that recently became known to Congress and the American public is the U.S. payment of \$50 million a year since 1967 to Thailand for sending a combat division to Vietnam.

A few months back, CIA secrecy

compelled the Army to abandon the trial of eight Green Berets on charges of murdering a North Vietnamese spy. And Congress learned only long after the fact that the Tonkin Gulf incident, upon which American military escalation in Vietnam was based, involved an electronic spy ship, not a routine patrol.

L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air Force colonel who describes in "The Washington Monthly" some methods by which the CIA uses and outflanks other government agencies, concludes that "more and more foreign-policy decisions are being made in secret, in response to immediate crises rather than in accordance with long-range plans and all too often with very little consultation with professional foreign-policy or military planners."

The record suggests that Congress has its hands full in any effort to make American power overseas accountable to the public in line with professed American goals.

BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

M - 237,067

S - 500,377

June 15 1970

Foreign aid and the CIA

President Nixon has said he places "a high priority" on the foreign aid program. His special Peterson Task Force on aid for the 70s agreed and recommended greater emphasis than in the past on funneling aid through multilateral agencies. Yet, as usual, the foreign aid appropriations bill took a shellacking in the House.

This led Rep. Donald Fraser (D-Minn.) to comment: "I am unable to understand how so many members are able to follow our President into a war, and defend them in the war, all solidly lined up behind the President, both Democrat and Republican, and yet be unwilling to follow our President in his request for peaceful works in the world."

That in a nut is what's wrong in this topsy-turvy era — unlimited billions for military ventures, only a handful of peanuts for peaceful economic endeavors and, even then, the peanuts are given on condition that most are bought in the United States.

The President had requested a total of \$2.7 billion. The House ap-

proved \$2.2 billion. Left untouched, of course, was the \$350 million for the sale of military arms on credit and the estimated \$470 million earmarked for Vietnam assistance not included in the Defense budget. The House cut \$537 million from the amount the President asked for economic assistance to some 70 other countries and \$37 million from the technical assistance funds distributed on a multilateral basis by several international organizations.

Some of these cuts can and should be restored when the money bill is considered by the Senate. But the Administration and the Agency for International Development (AID) are only making their appeals for funds more difficult by the admission this week that the economic aid mission in Laos has been used since 1962 and still is being used as a cover for CIA operations. Similarly, the speculation that in the future military personnel will run the AID operation in Vietnam is disturbing. If troops withdrawal and a political solution is the correct avenue for peace in Indochina, any move to militarize economic aid missions subverts and discredits this program even before it begins.

COLUMBUS, OHIO
DISPATCH

E - 223,673

S - 318,040

JUN 15 1970

Another Superspy Cover

CHALK UP another fumble for this government's most necessary evil, the Central Intelligence Agency. It has belatedly and reluctantly admitted what thousands have known for a long time — that it has been using the Agency for International Development, a placid and peacefully oriented help-the-innocents quasi-charity group, as a cover for its operations in Laos.

This fumble was multifaceted. In the first place, we previously have argued that if the CIA is necessary, let it be a completely separate government function operated solely for its intended purpose — to spy on friend and foe as part of our national security.

SECONDLY, we have argued there is little distinction to be gained by the CIA in being the only spy agency in history to admit it even exists, let alone outlines its various successes and failures.

England can be credited with seniority in the espionage business and it has yet to admit what the U.S. State Department knows to be a fact — that during the Revolutionary War, Benjamin Franklin's English-French-speaking translator in Paris when he sought

French aid was planted by London's spy agency.

But now comes John Hannah, head of the CIA, to confess that the CIA has been operating under the AID cover in Laos since 1962.

SINCE THIS is no news to either the Laotians or the Communist Pathet Lao seeking control of that miserable Asian country, the taint of Mr. Hannah's confession will not harm the CIA.

But there is every probability that AID's efforts in helping Laotian peasants and mountain tribesmen will suffer for the Communists now can be expected to capitalize on the clandestine activity.

We have voiced objections before to the CIA's use of legitimate programs as skirts behind which it can hide. We have been appalled by the CIA using uniformed American servicemen to do its dirty, albeit necessary, work.

THIS nation's foreign aid efforts have been shot through with enough troubles, waste and inconclusive results to be burdened with covert intelligence missions which should have enough tools of their nefarious trade to stand on their own feet.

DES MOINES, IOWA
REGISTER

M - 246,841

S - 514,496

JUN 15 1970

Foreign Aid Dwindling

THAT the Vietnam war is testing America internally is painfully evident. What has not been so clear is the devastating imprint the war is making on one of the nation's finest endeavors, its foreign assistance to have-not countries. America's world reputation as a generous, humanitarian, peace-loving nation is a casualty of both the war itself and its effect on foreign aid.

The Nixon Administration this year submitted the smallest budget request for the Agency for International Development (AID) since the program began. The House Appropriations Committee last week reduced this record low request by 25 per cent to \$1.645 billion. War costs, postponed domestic needs and inflation were cited for the decrease.

In the Senate, where funds have been restored in the past, foreign aid has lost its champions. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (Dem., Mont.) has said he will vote against any foreign aid appropriation, charging that aid leads only to foreign military involvements.

Mansfield's charge need not be true. The United States has provided economic assistance to developing nations where the dominant goal has been to provide food, shelter, jobs, medicine, not to "buy" political converts.

But the AID program has been smirched by political "strings" (often tied by Congress) and by being used as an instrument of military operations. AID Director John A. Hannah admitted last week that the program is being used as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in Laos. Hannah, who was critical of the Laos operation, said CIA agents have not infiltrated the AID program in any other countries; but the result is a deepened suspicion of the use made of aid activities.

The House cuts in the AID budget

reflect a military priority. All of the reduction came in the economic assistance work of AID in 77 countries. The program of military assistance to 50 countries was untouched.

Not included in the AID budget is economic and military assistance in Southeast Asia, largely to South Vietnam. This aid, set at \$2.3 billion, is contained in the defense appropriation. By comparison, then, the United States would spend \$3 in aid to South Vietnam and its neighbors next year for every \$2 it provides in aid for the rest of the world.

★ ★ ★

This reduction and military focus of AID is occurring at a crucial time in the world-wide struggle for higher living standards. The record of performance of the developing countries is clearly promising.

Yet, the United States is falling farther behind the pledge which it and other aid-giving nations made in 1964 to contribute 1 per cent of their gross national product to the development of the third world.

Commenting on this crisis in aid, Lester Pearson, a former Canadian prime minister and author of a study of foreign aid said: "A planet cannot, any more than a country, survive half slave, half free, half engulfed in misery, half careening along toward the supposed joys of almost unlimited consumption. Neither our ecology nor our morality could survive such contrasts. And we have perhaps 10 years to begin to correct the imbalance and to do so in time."

An early end in the war is essential so that the United States can find the resources and the enlightened spirit necessary to begin to heal the divided world which Pearson describes.

BUFFALO, N.Y.
COURIER EXPRESS
JUN 14 1970

M - 154,829
S - 307,693

Aid Concept Stands at the Crossroad

Based upon a number of distressing revelations in the past few years, there is little doubt but that the United States foreign-aid program needs a thorough administrative overhaul. In this regard, the Nixon administration's reorganization proposals have been awaited with more than ordinary interest.

While the presidential message, due later this month, is expected to embrace the general idea set forth in the task force report from a survey headed by the retired president of the Bank of America, Rudolph A. Peterson, some of the indicated changes are quite controversial. The Peterson study recommended clear separation of economic-development assistance from military-support aid. This obviously derived from repeated instances of abuse of foreign-aid projects by the military or intelligence agency strategists.

But under the Nixon plan, the Defense Department apparently would take over the financing and operation of economic programs such as the South Vietnamese military budget, public health, refugee care and the training of police. These are programs which have been under the wing of the Agency for International Development (AID), the chief foreign-aid agency, with some co-operation from defense agencies. Would this change be a redress of power? Although the clear-break concept between military and civilian functions is eminently valid, the question here—as in other areas—is how far the military is to be permitted to go into programs that properly should be under civilian control. The recent admission, by Dr. John A. Hannah, AID director, that the Central Intelligence Agency

has been using the AID project in Laos as a "cover" for intelligence operations is indication enough of how paramilitary activities have subverted civilian authority in foreign policy functions. There is no reason to believe that Laos is the only place where this has happened.

It seems almost unbelievable that such a thing could occur anywhere without as much as a mild challenge from the State Department. It is equally revealing that in his March 6 report on aid to Laos, Mr. Nixon failed to mention any CIA role there, a role which has been a fact since 1962, according to Dr. Hannah. Of course, maybe the president didn't know about it.

Although the House has passed a foreign-aid appropriation totaling \$2.3-billion—of which an estimated \$750-million appears to be for military assistance—the Senate has the obvious option of holding back on this funding. And it should, until the president's aid-revision plans are submitted and studied. We can think of no other program, financed with tax dollars, that has come into such ill-repute—partly because of some shady, last-minute deals under which millions of dollars have been sent to dictators such as Chiang Kai-shek so that they may buy more warplanes. Other reasons for the program's bad reputation lately included its gross failure to realize the esteemed goals set for it, such as in Latin America, and the fact that funds for economic development have been trimmed frequently while military portions were either unchanged or increased. Both the philosophy of and proposed operational changes in the aid program need a relentless examination.

EDITORIAL

RADIO STATION

WDIX

IN DIXIE

FM 94,000 WATTS

AM 5,000 WATTS

THE AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY
ORANGEBURG, SOUTH CAROLINA 29115

Your opinion is welcome--
for or against these views



Title: No Help from AID to the CIA

June 14, 1970
(Broadcast Date)

"Well I just have to admit that is true." Newsmen had asked U. S. foreign-aid chief John A. Hannah if funds of the Agency for International Development were being used "as a cover for CIA operations in Laos" (AP 6/8/70). Foreign-aid chief Mr. Hannah told newsmen that Agency for International Development funds were being used "as a cover for CIA operations in Laos" and added that President Nixon may propose divorcing such intelligence work from overseas assistance in the future. Why? Soviet cultural ballet dancers are trained intelligence experts. Every Soviet and satellite representative to the United Nations is a trained intelligence expert. But, when the United States spends the taxpayers' money on AID funds, we just have to give it away with "no strings attached". Now, we learn from Mr. Hannah, a CIA agent who might serve two ways - help the underdeveloped people and at the same time help his country - may not serve the United States. AID chief Mr. Hannah's revelation comes as a by-product of a Senate inquiry led by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) into U. S. and CIA activities in Laos. AP reports that it is "rare for an executive branch official to acknowledge that his organization is being used for undercover work." AID chief Mr. Hannah does not like CIA men doubling as AID agency men to provide U. S. intelligence. Mr. Hannah states, quote "Certainly, our preference is to get rid of this kind of operation," end quote. Mr. Hannah may be overlooking U. S. interests in his dedication to AID interests. AID chief Mr. Hannah might have told newsmen, "That is CIA business. I have no comment."

On a U. S. State Department radio program which the State Department tapes for broadcast (WDIX 6/7/70), the State Department explained that AID funds are spent in each country as each country sees its need. Whatever that country thinks it wants to spend the AID funds for, that was the way the funds are spent. Some of these ways might not make much sense to the U. S. taxpayer. But, that is not the purpose of AID. The purpose of AID is to satisfy a social or economic need of an underdeveloped people which would make sense to them even if it did not meet the logic of the U. S. taxpayer. If the U. S. taxpayer is going to spend money anywhere to make friends and stop the Communists, what's wrong with the person who is handling the project being an employee of the United States government both as an AID man and a CIA man, to do whatever is in U. S. interests? AID interests are CIA interests and they both are U. S. interests - or, so the rest of us hope.

PITTSBURGH, PA.
PRESS

E - 346,090
S - 744,732
JUN 14 1970

CIA And Foreign Aid

Any country running a big-league foreign policy has "clean" and "dirty" activities overseas. The trick is to keep them separate so the second does not rub off on the first.

Dr. John A. Hannah, head of our foreign aid program, has officially disclosed that agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are posing as aid workers in Laos.

This regrettable practice started under President Kennedy in 1962 and has continued under the Johnson and Nixon administrations.

Dr. Hannah would like to "get rid of this kind of operation," and Mr. Nixon would do well to free foreign aid from association with espionage and clandestine warfare.

Professional CIA-baiters will quarrel with the operation itself. But however distasteful, it is essential.

At great personal risk, CIA agents have been recruiting and training anti-Communist guerrillas, observing enemy movements and acting as ground controllers for air strikes. Their activities are in response to North Viet-

nam's illegal invasion of neutral Laos and its threat to South Vietnam.

What is objectionable is the foreign-aid cover for the operation.

The U. S. aid program and the Peace Corps are two of this country's most idealistic, unselfish efforts.

The Communist bloc has long recognized them as such and has sought to discredit them. Now, by mixing aid with secret-agency, we have foolishly given the Kremlin a stick to beat us with.

The two are incompatible and should be divorced as promptly as possible.

13 JUNE 1970

State**Diplomatic notes**

• John A. Hannah, director of Agency for International Development, admitted during radio news program that AID programs in Laos were a cover for operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Hannah said Laos was the only such case, and that CIA use of AID was authorized by a Presidential decision in 1962. June 7.

STATINTL

STATINTL

Soft Sell Used to Communize Laos

By Jack Anderson

Behind the battle smoke in Laos, the Communists are quietly taking over the countryside with the sickle instead of the sword. Indeed, the Americans might pick up some pointers on pacification by studying the Communist methods.

Such a study has been conducted by the U.S. AID mission, which provides the cloak if not the dagger for the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos. The hush-hush report, written by AID specialist Edwin T. McKeithen, has been made available to this column.

For the first time, it discloses how the North Vietnamese rule the countryside by applying the soft sell. In Laos' large Xieng Khouang province, for example, the report states that "virtually all important policy decisions are made by the North Vietnamese cadres, but in a way that the decisions appear to be the work of Lao officials."

Penalties Downplayed

The communizing of the placid and passive Laotians, according to the document, has met with "reluctance of the Lao population to participate in the radical social revolution."

The Laotians would much rather sit under a tree and twist strands of plants into

colorful ropes than engage in war or politics. Recognizing this, the North Vietnamese have had to set priestly examples and have bitten off their tendency to use the scourge instead of the lure.

The document notes that "personal involvement with local women seems to be rare (and) result in a one-way ticket back" to North Vietnam. Communist policy texts are also softened when they are translated from Vietnamese into Lao.

"The section on incarcerating people for treason, profiteering, subversion and other political crimes was stricken out. Similarly, the passage on universal military conscription for men and alternative service for women was deleted," reports the document.

Answer to AP

The Associated Press has accused this column of careless reporting in the case of Aly Mahmoud, the AP's No. 2 man in Cairo, who was acquitted by an Egyptian court of espionage charges a year ago but is still languishing in an Egyptian concentration camp.

The AP said we could have obtained the straight facts if we had bothered merely to pick up a telephone and check with AP.

It is the Associated Press that neglected to make the right telephone calls and check the facts.

Les Whitten, a reporter for this column, not only made full use of the telephone but visited the AP's office in Cairo to get the facts.

If the AP had bothered to check, it would have learned that Whitten discussed the Mahmoud case in detail with the AP's Cairo bureau chief.

It would have realized our story was based solidly upon the answers that the Cairo bureau chief gave us. He not only knows more about the Mahmoud case than anyone else at AP, but he answered our questions reluctantly but honestly.

If the AP had bothered to check, it might have discovered that Whitten talked to other sources about the Mahmoud case. Among them was the Washington Star's distinguished foreign correspondent Andrew Borowice, himself an AP alumnus, who had been in Cairo during the Mahmoud affair. Borowice felt that Mahmoud's outspokenness about the Nasser regime, not any espionage, got him in trouble with the Egyptian authorities.

The point of our story was that AP, rather than jeopardize its news service to Arab countries, failed to raise a public clamor for Mahmoud's release. AP has done nothing to organize an editorial drive for his freedom. Instead, as we said, it has "pussyfooted around" to the Egyptian foreign office instead of howling with outrage.

The best evidence as to whether the Associated Press or this column is telling the truth, meanwhile, is the AP's own file on the Mahmoud case. We challenge the AP to make public all their documents and communications relating to Mahmoud.

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Statement Issued by AP

The Associated Press issued the following statement:

The new attack on the Associated Press handling of the case of the imprisoned Egyptian staff member, Aly Mahmoud, renews charges that have no base.

Andrew Borowice, the foreign correspondent mentioned in the second column, has made the following comment: "I know from long experience in the Arab world that the AP is doing all it can under the circumstances in Cairo. In my opinion, the AP simply cannot do any more to secure Mahmoud's release."

Borowice said it would be totally incorrect for anyone to infer that the AP was not attempting to secure Mahmoud's release because of the AP's business interests in the Middle East. Joseph E. Dynan, the AP bureau chief in Cairo, has been out of reach for the past 48 hours because of communications difficulties.

CIA 702 AID

STATINT

ATLANTA, GA.
JOURNAL
E - 257,863
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION
S JUN 12 1970

Congress Comes Alive

THE U.S. Senate has failed to approve the so-called Byrd amendment which clarifies the authority of the President to take action he considers necessary to protect U.S. troops in Vietnam.

The defeat of the amendment was a defeat for the administration.

The vote may have been political and it may have been punitive. But it also reflects national disillusionment with the Indochinese war, including our hiring of Thailand troops and the apparent free hand given to the CIA in Laos. ✓

The vote was a victory for antiwar forces in the Senate, and for those who disapproved of the thrust into Cambodia to protect our position in South Vietnam.

It forecasts future congressional strictures on the ability of the President to conduct such major wars as the Indochinese one without the advice and consent of Congress.

If this is the way it works out, then the long term result of this vote may be a victory for Congress and the American people.

Congress has been the silent partner in the executive - legislative - judicial triumvirate which is supposed to ruin this country. The power of Congress has been declining as the power of the executive and the judicial branches of the government has increased.

This is neither right nor good.

The federal system is based on a division of power. Congress, as the legislative branch, has seemed content in recent years as the passive partner of the trio.

If this little rebellion means Congress is tired of its passive role and intends to assert itself again, fine. If it intends to act as a strong check on the growing powers of the President and the unknown people who surround him and seem to be making the major decisions for this so-called republic, mighty fine.

Congress did not get us into this war, but it can help us get out, and we believe the country will be grateful if it does.

TOLEDO, OHIO
TIMES

M - 31,347

JUN 12 1970

The Mercenaries

THE DISCLOSURE that since 1966 we have subsidized Thailand troops in South Vietnam to the amount of \$200 million re-emphasizes the extent of our entanglement in southeast Asia. This subsidy is in addition to our financial support of Korean and (now departed) Philippine units and, of course, is in addition to the substantial underwriting of the Thai military establishment in Thailand itself, through direct military and economic aid. Incidentally, it is not inappropriate to observe while on this subject, that the American aid program acknowledgedly has been used as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos.

It may be a little too strong to say, as some have, that the United States is employing "mercenaries" in Vietnam, for the countries from which these other troops come do have an interest, of one sort or another, in what happens there. But the picture still is far from one of southeast Asian countries outside Vietnam freely joining us, at great sacrifice, in the defense of liberty and freedom in that part of the world.

How fully we are going to subsidize the Thai "volunteers" now getting ready to move into Cambodia, and what other support we are prepared to give them, is the question immediately at issue. But it also is part of the longer range question of how much support—financial and otherwise—we are prepared to give the South Vietnamese troops that apparently will remain in Cambodia after the scheduled departure of our troops at the end of this month.

It will be difficult, indeed, to deny these forces any help that they may be considered to need since, in fact, they will be fighting by proxy a war that actually has become our war—American combat withdrawal from Cambodia or not.

CHARLESTON, W.VA.
GAZETTE
M - 63,294
GAZETTE-MAIL
S - 106,775

JUN 11 1970

Editorials—

Blood of 43,000 Crying For Sane Foreign Policy

There appears to be no end to the United States' penchant for getting involved in the affairs of other countries under the guise of building military dikes against the expansion of communism. This is how we originally got ourselves into the intolerable mess in Vietnam when, as Sen. Aiken put it, "We invited ourselves in."

Now, some 15 years and some 43,000 American war dead later, recent disclosures bring to light new aspects of our meddling tendencies in Southeast Asia:

►Under a secret agreement entered into in 1967, the United States has been paying Thailand \$50 million a year for sending a combat division to South Vietnam.

►Foreign Aid Chief John A. Hannah acknowledged that the U. S. aid-administering Agency for International Development is being used as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos.

The broad outlines of the hitherto secret arrangement involving Thailand

were made public in testimony of State and Defense department officials published by a Senate foreign relations subcommittee. The testimony, taken last November and made public only after State Department censorship, traces the deepening American military involvement in Thailand in the past 20 years as well as the increasing commitments and assistance demanded by Thailand.

In a further effort to encourage Thailand to assign the 11,000-man military unit to South Vietnam—obviously to give an Asian complexion to what is basically a civil war—the U. S. also agreed to increase military aid to Thailand by \$30 million over a two-year period and to supply the Thais with a battery of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles.

This adds up to something in excess of \$65 million a year to support a mercenary division under the guise of "volunteers"—and all of it done without the knowledge of the American people, who are footing the bill. Furthermore, Thailand's Premier Thanom Kittikachorn is

quoted as saying that Thai "volunteers" in our new Cambodian adventure "will be armed and equipped from aid supplied by the United States."

But, perhaps even more outrageous, is Hannah's admission that the U. S. AID program is being used as a cover for the CIA's spying activities in Laos.

The purpose of the AID program is to assist underdeveloped nations in reaching a stage of economic development in which deprived people can find a better life in peace. Ostensibly, the United States is to benefit by winning friends through our help in bringing about such desirable pursuits.

The intermingling of CIA and AID operations in Laos was described by Hannah as stemming from a 1962 decision that such activity was in the U. S. national interest. Certainly it is anything but that. Rather, it is a prostitution of the AID program from a mission of peace to a device of war—and when we allow this to happen, all of our humanitarian efforts will become suspect in the eyes of the world.

The United States government soon should awaken to the folly of its meddling in Southeast Asia. We go in the name of peace only to foment wider wars. We cannot seem to profit from past mistakes—for, even as President Nixon acclaims his Cambodian gamble as a "most successful operation," the enemy forces score new gains in both Cambodia and South Vietnam.

The demand for sanity in our foreign policy is written in the blood of nearly 43,000 Americans dead in Southeast Asia, but our leaders lack the capacity to grasp it. They just go on making more of the same mistakes.

STATINTL

DETROIT, MICH.
NEWS

E - 592,616
S - 827,086

JUN 1 1970

Work of CIA hampered by 'leper' image

By COL. R. D. HEINL JR.
News Military Analyst

WASHINGTON — The Agency for International Development (AID) is a cover for the CIA in Laos and wishes it weren't.

Since 1962, according to its administrator, John A. Hannah, the mission in Vientiane has maintained a "rural development" division which is in fact a CIA front for training individuals and units in counter insurgency and other military skills.

Expressing the hope that the relationship between AID and CIA could be severed by legislation now pending, Hannah expressed distaste for working with the CIA. "Our preference is to get out of this kind of operation," he said.

If Hannah succeeds in divorcing AID and CIA, his agency will then make common cause with the Peace Corps, which has always held itself off-limits to the murky —but vitally necessary—game of intelligence.

THE ATTITUDE taken by Hannah, as well as by two former Peace Corps directors, Sargent Shriver and Jack Hood Vaughn, and the present director, Joseph H. Blatchford, is that their agencies are or ought to be too pure to dirty their hands with intelligence matters. It infers that such work should be left to the CIA which, in the inference, comes through as a crew of amoral tricksters and warmongers.

The increasing desire of various agencies of the government to turn their back on the CIA (AID and the Peace Corps are not alone) hinders and obstructs the CIA in performing crucially important functions on which the survival of the United States literally depends.

Like Hannah's AID and Blatchford's Peace Corps, Richard Helm's CIA is a statutory agency of the United States, provided for by Congress and paid for from the public treasury. Whether or not given individuals, or even other government agencies, applaud the kind of work CIA sometimes does, the fact remains that CIA business is government business—no less than AID business — and usually a good bit more important.

Yet the stance of AID and the Peace Corps suggests that there is a kind of pousse-cafe stratification of government functions: some at the top above-board, pure, disinterested, moral in the Wilsonian

view of international relations being suitable and "respectable." Others in the dark depths disingenuous, amoral if not immoral, covert, and selfishly pro-American, being "disrespectable."

Obviously, AID would not want its acronym tarnished by disrespectful associations inside our government — and that is why Hannah withdraws the hem of his garment.

IN ITS EARLY DAYS as Col. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services (OSS), during World War II, our pre-CIA intelligence organization planted representatives at any point in the governmental structure where results could best be attained. Since World War II was a patriotic, "moral" war, no objections were raised. Nor, for the same reason, during the Korean War, was there any tendency on the part of U.S. government agencies to shun CIA.

It is only because of the domestic unpopularity of Vietnam and a simplistic view of government and its interests and their defense, that organizations like AID and the Peace Corps conclude that they should be allowed to refuse government business that some internal opinion disapproves.

This notion — that government agencies paid for by the taxpayer can pick and choose the kind of work they take in — is a philosophical sibling to the doctrine so popular in intellectual and even some judicial circles: that people enjoy the "right" to choose which wars they will fight and which they will sit out.

As a practical matter, it hardly requires a manpower expert to recognize that the "right" of selective service (in which the individual selects his own wars), means that the day the bugle blows will never be the day for a lot of high-minded young men to go to that particular war. Strictly on principle, you understand.

IN THE SAME WAY, if various government agencies acquire the discretion to cold-shoulder the CIA for the sake of convenience, or because agency of image, administrative considerations are lukewarm on a particular tenet of defense or foreign policy, then some fine morning when the President

needs an answer badly, the CIA may not be able to produce.

Such a situation would be pleasing in Moscow, Peking, Cairo, Damascus, and very likely in Berkeley or Cambridge, but perhaps not so much so to high-minded, decent men like Hannah, who has served as an assistant secretary of defense and should know better.

Before he disdains the CIA and its work, Hannah might look back to an earlier American, Nathan Hale, who, when reproached in 1775 by a friend for "dirtying himself" by spying within the British lines, replied: "Every kind of service, necessary to the public good, becomes honorable by being necessary."

STATINTL

11 JUN 1970

Disclosure Of CIA Work To Help AID

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.
A Washington Correspondent
Of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, June 11—It has long been reported unofficially that the Agency for International Development's program in Laos was being used as a cover for the Central Intelligence Agency. Last Sunday AID Director John A. Hannah officially confirmed the report.

"Well, I just have to admit that that is true," Hannah said in an interview on a Metromedia radio news show called "Profile." Actually he did not have to admit it unless he thought best. He could have declined comment.

Not only did Hannah concede that his agency has been fronting for the CIA, but he said he did not like this role and that only in Laos was it true. He said the nation's economic assistance should be divorced from its political and military operations.

No thunderbolts struck Hannah, the former president of Michigan State University, when he left the radio station. He is reported to have consulted with nobody before making his revelation, and to have been glad afterwards to have made a clean breast of the Laos involvement.

"I had the direct question," he is said to have remarked later, "and I wasn't going to lie about it."

The interview gave Hannah a chance to argue for an expanded economic assistance program in the less developed parts of the world, and to call attention to President Richard M. Nixon's plans for a new approach.

President Nixon is expected to ask Congress in a week or so to look at the recommendations of the task force headed by Rudolph A. Peterson, president of the Bank of America. The task force reported to Mr. Nixon in March.

As to AID's being involved with the CIA in Laos, American correspondents have been reporting it for months. The situation was disclosed in hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee late last year and this year. Until then, it had been cloaked in government-imposed secrecy.

The inquiry on Laos presided over by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, chairman of the subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad, delved into the activities of the foreign assistance mission but the responses were deleted for security reasons.

In March, Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, chairman of the full committee, tried to put the AID-CIA relationship in Laos on the public record during the confirmation hearing of Robert H. Nooter of St. Louis, the new assistant administrator for AID in Vietnam.

Nooter had no authority to comment, and did not. He had formerly been deputy assistant administrator for the agency's East Asian bureau, which included Laos. He told Fulbright that he would file a secret memorandum covering the subject, if the committee requested it.

From the colloquy, it appeared that the Agency for International Development would spend about \$50,000,000 this year in Laos. This included help in the agriculture, education and health fields as well as relief for war refugees and assistance in stabilizing the Laotian economy.

Fulbright asked about two small airlines that, among other things, perform services for the American foreign assistance mission in Laos. The airlines have been described in newspapers as financed, directly or indirectly, by CIA money.

One of the difficulties, of course, is that Congress each year appropriates hundreds of millions of dollars for intelligence work. These sums are hidden in the budget and their presence causes trouble, as Fulbright pointed out, when the various committees try to call federal agencies to account.

"There are enough problems with AID without it being a front for the CIA," Fulbright told Nooter.

A Washington official familiar with the way the intelligence apparatus operates told the Post-Dispatch that the CIA had "a tremendous operation in Laos" but that details about it are hard to get.

"I don't say it was wrong," the observer said. "It was secret. I do say that was wrong."

The same source pointed out that the CIA reports directly to the National Security Council, an advisory body to the President. He said that the CIA was run by a competent professional, Richard Helms, and did nothing without instructions.

Hannah expressed confidence Sunday that President Nixon would go along with the Peterson task force recommendation for a new approach that will divorce economic help from military assistance.

"I am certain," he said, "from the standpoint of the attitude of the American people and the long-range well-being of the foreign assistance program ... that these political-military operations ought to be handled by the Department of State and the Department of Defense rather than through AID, under whatever name."

Nixon reported planning deeper move into Laos

By JOHN PITTMAN

(Excerpts from this article were used by Pittman in his broadcasts over radio station WBAI June 9-10.)

News items about Laos last week suggested President Nixon's administration may be moving toward deeper military involvement in this country of Indochina. United Press International's bureau in Vientiane, capital of the one-third of Lao territory and one-half of its three million population ruled by the Royal Lao government, reported several important announcements in Parliament by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.

First, the prime minister said he is determined to bring back into the government the Neo Lao Haksat. That is the Lao Patriotic Front party that governs two-thirds of Lao territory and half of its three million people. At the same time

Souvanna Phouma rejected proposals to oust from low level government posts a few officials whom rightwingers allege to be members of the Lao Patriotic Front. These officials are said to have remained in office when rightwingers six years ago broke up the National Union government and forced representatives of the Patriotic Front to flee for their lives.

Wants no more 'aid'

Second, the prime minister said he would not ask for more foreign troops to defend Lao territory of the Royal government, and he would not ask for additional military supplies and equipment. He said he felt such supplies were already flowing into the country in adequate amounts from the U.S.

Third, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma rejected a proposal to give an amnesty to a former rightwing strongman, Phoumi Nosavan, and bring him into the government. Nosavan was tried in absentia five years ago and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment on charges of corruption and theft. He has been living in Thailand, where he fled to escape punishment.

These developments suggest a number of similarities to the situation in Cambodia before the rightwing coup last March 18. That coup ousted Prince Sihanouk, prime minister of the Royal Cambodian government, and offered President Nixon a pretext for invading Cambodia and expanding the war to all of Indochina.

In retrospect, these similarities are striking. We know that Prince Sihanouk had held firmly to a position of neutrality in the Indochina conflict, despite the mounting pressure of many years by Washington administrations to force him to side with the Saigon regime against the Vietnamese guerrillas and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Traitor linked to CIA

We also know that Phoumi Nosavan, the rightwing strongman and convicted thief now living in Thailand, is a longtime stooge of Washington administrations whose notoriety as a traitor is a commonplace throughout Southeast Asia. Foreign newsmen have compiled much evidence showing that Nosavan has worked hand-in-glove with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. In 1959, with the help of U.S. Embassy officials in Vientiane and about \$16 million of U.S. taxpayers' money, generously supplied by the Eisenhower administration of which Richard M. Nixon was vice president, Phoumi Nosavan organized an armed secessionist movement, captured Vientiane, and forced Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma to flee to Cambodia.

When another coup Nosavan attempted in 1965 was abortive, he fled to Thailand where his uncle, Sanit Thanarat, was dictator. The London Observer on Feb. 7, 1965 estimated that his stolen loot included a monopoly of imports of gold, wine and spirits, and the biggest opium den in Vientiane. Now his patrons are demanding that Souvanna Phouma forget all this and bring him back into the Royal government.

No innocent

In retrospect we know also that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is no innocent schoolboy in these matters. He also has used his several appointments as the King's first minister to line his pockets with 6,000 shares of various companies also financed by American taxpayers. He has named himself president of the Laos Bank of Commerce and of the airplane transportation company now called Air of the Kingdom of Laos. He played footsie with French colonialism and has been Washington's willing frontman whenever needed to give the Vientiane administration a coating of moderation and conciliation.

In his statements in Parliament last week he kept silent about the 6,000 or more Thai troops already in Laos, the Philippine, Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek mercenaries. And of course he said nothing about the thousands of Americans serving as Green Beret officers and trainers and as "advisers" of the "special warfare" puppet forces now attacking areas under the Patriotic Front administration.

But several times in the past Washington thought it no longer needed Souvanna Phouma, and promptly replaced him with more dedicated stooges like Nosavan. This happened in 1954, in 1958, in 1964 and it almost happened in 1965. As a matter of fact, Souvanna Phouma denounced the United States government for betraying him and double-crossing him.

York Times report of this on Jan. 20, 1961, said the Prime Minister accused Washington of consistently opposing the only possible solution of the Laos question, the formation of a government of national union as required by both the Geneva agreements of 1954 and the Geneva accords on Laos of 1962, although the U.S. government had signed this latter agreement. Souvanna Phouma accused Washington of having tried to overthrow his Royal government in favor of a government with "strong anti-Communist policies."

In the light of this background last week's developments suggest Souvanna Phouma's accusation may soon have to be updated. They certainly provide substantial ground for the report in the Washington Post last week that a new coup may be in the works in Laos. It will be a coup to oust Souvanna Phouma once again and install a military regime in Vientiane, headed by Nosavan or one of his accomplices.

DOTHAN, ALA.
EAGLE

E - 28,355

S - 30,344

JUN 10 1970

High Level Decisions

That the American people aren't always fully informed of what their government is doing to and for them has been underscored twice in recent days. Whether the government should maintain such secrecy is another question.

A heavily censored summary of a Nov. 9, 1967 agreement between the United States and Thailand—made public in a 310-page transcript of hearings conducted by a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee—revealed that the United States has secretly paid Thailand more than \$200,000,000 to send 12,000 troops to fight in Vietnam.

Under the agreement, the United States absorbed the costs for sending a Thai combat division to Vietnam and maintained and improved the defense capability of Thai forces remaining at home. Absorbing the costs for the combat division included equipping the division, providing logistic support, paying overseas allowances, assuming the expenses of preparing and training, and distributing a muster-out bonus. Improving the capability of forces on duty at home came through a modernization program which involved an increase in the military assistance program by \$30,000,000 for the years 1968 and 1969.

At almost the same time this agreement was disclosed, John A. Hannah, head of the United States' foreign aid program, revealed under questioning on a news program that the program is being used as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency activities in Laos. Hannah emphasized that he disapproved of the CIA's use of his organization and added that Laos was the only place where this is being done and that such activity was deemed in 1962 as in the

national interest.

Whether the government should act in this fashion brings to mind an article by the United Press International of several months ago. The article dealt with a book by William J. Bards, a former official of CIA. In the book, Bards said that the people's right to know is a basic element of a free and self-governing society. "If a people are to rule themselves," he went on, "they must be adequately informed to know what they are doing" but "in a world such as this, complete openness and candor on the part of any government is impossible."

Bards agreed that "the government must as a general practice conduct an honest dialogue with its citizens" and argued that "there are situations when it seems to even the most intelligent and conscientious statesmen that the price of telling the truth, or not lying, is greater than can be borne."

Situations in which government officials may have "not only the right but the obligation" to lie, according to Bards, are:

1. To mislead an enemy about wartime operations.
2. To protect covert intelligence activities in peacetime.
3. To avoid a financial panic when currency devaluation is pending.
4. At times such as the Cuba missile crisis, when officials fear that telling the truth might lead to the danger of nuclear war.

The sad part of the foregoing, of course, is that public officials are only human and could be hard put not to use the obligation to lie for reasons other than security. And, too, there's always room for honest error, but error nevertheless.

LONG BEACH, CAL.
INDEPENDENT

M - 49,632

JUN 10 1970

Our policy: (deleted)

AMERICANS ARE A TRUSTING PEOPLE who want to believe their government, but their confidence has been sadly shaken so many times it will be hard to restore.

In the Eisenhower administration there was the lie that the U2 shot down over Russia was a weather plane. President Eisenhower was denounced at the time as politically naive because he cleared that one up by telling the truth. He said candidly that he had authorized the spy plane flights. Khrushchev was angry. So were many American liberals, who contended that the president had strayed from sound traditions by telling the truth.

In the Kennedy administration, Defense Department official Arthur Sylvester contended the government had a "right to lie" to its citizens. Mr. Sylvester's title, so help us, was assistant secretary of defense for public affairs.

NOW PREVIOUSLY SECRET testimony before a Senate subcommittee reveals that the Johnson administration agreed to pay \$200 million to Thailand so that country would send "volunteers" to fight in South Vietnam. U. S. and Thai officials denied at the time that any such deal had been made. It now develops not only that the deal was made but that it included a plan to use American troops if needed to protect the Thai government from a Communist takeover.

And John A. Hannah, the foreign aid chief in the Nixon administration, now concedes that the aid program in Laos is being used as a cover for operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Hannah says he disapproves.

— Even that sketchy information is more than the public has been allowed to find out until now about U. S. involvement in the Laotian civil war.

AN INDICATION of how much information the administration previously felt the American people were entitled to on the subject is given by this excerpt from the Congressional Record of Jan. 21:

"Mr. Fulbright: Nearly everyone who has spoken here has said that they think it was a mistake to become involved in Vietnam or, in this instance, Laos. (Deleted) This is a major operation. (Deleted)"

"Mr. Fulbright: (Deleted)

"Mr. Ellender: (Deleted)

"Mr. Fulbright: (Deleted)

"Mr. Ellender: (Deleted)

"Mr. Fulbright: (Deleted)

"Mr. Ellender: (Deleted)

"Mr. Fulbright: (Deleted)

"Mr. Ellender: (Deleted)

"Mr. Fulbright: (Deleted) I think we should know how much we are spending for this operation, which is beginning to be a major war."

Aside from the question of the American government's credibility in the rest of the world, the credibility of the government at home requires that it answer a few questions: Who ordered the foreign aid program used as a CIA cover? By what authority was that done? Who authorized the Thailand deal? How can the making of that commitment without Senate advice, consent or even knowledge be justified?

Essentially, these questions concern not military but political secrets. The taxpayers who pay the bills and the young men who pay with their lives if the government strategists err are entitled to answers.

STATINTL

NEW BEDFORD, MASS.
STANDARD-TIMES

JUN 10 1970

E - 71,238

S - 62,154

Repeal the Tonkin Resolution

President Nixon is trying to work out a legislative compromise with his Senate critics.

He has said he might accept the Cooper-Church proposal to restrict future U.S. operations in Cambodia if it were amended to let him send troops back into that country to protect American forces in Vietnam.

This is precisely the kind of weakening of the legislative prerogative that has led to our present situation in Southeast Asia. It is incredible to us that Nixon would ask for such a blank check to invade Cambodia again after the crisis he has just gone through over his first invasion of that country.

Consider the fact that:

1. Although the President of the United States is committed to extricating this country from the Vietnam war, recent developments for which he is willing to take personal responsibility have so widened the conflict that it now must be called the Indochina war.

2. Having been dislodged from some of their eastern hiding places, the Vietnamese Communists now are harassing and attacking Cambodian government troops in two-thirds of that country. They now actually control one-third. Before the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk on March 18, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had generally avoided staging attacks against Cambodians.

3. The fighting since American and South Vietnamese troops were sent in five weeks ago has severely damaged Cambodia's economy. Many of the rubber plantations have been destroyed, and rubber represents 40 per cent of the country's foreign-exchange earnings.

4. Dr. John A. Hannah, director of the Agency for International Development, has acknowledged that the U.S. aid program is being used as a cover for operations of the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos. The CIA has been accused of having had a hand in the ousting of Sihanouk in Cambodia, and has been charged by Sen. J.W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Rela-

tions Committee, of exceeding its authority in supporting U.S. military activities in Laos. This Laotian arrangement stems from a 1962 White House decision that such a setup was in "the national interest."

5. Although existence of such an accord was denied at the time of signing (Nov. 9, 1967), it now has been revealed there exists a secret money-for-troops pact between the United States and Thailand. Bangkok sent 10,000 men to Vietnam in exchange for \$200 million. The role of Thailand in other Southeast Asian nations, and the part played by the United States, has been a subject of growing controversy in the U.S. Senate.

These related factors that each day are getting us deeper in the Southeast Asian quagmire are inextricably linked to the thinking that produced the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

That resolve, approved by Congress in frantic fashion on the basis of administration-supplied information of questionable accuracy, states that "the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as commander-in-chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression . . .

"The United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

With that mandate, who needs Congress, the Constitution, or a declaration of war?

The Cooper-Church proposal, even undiluted by Nixon's offer, is no more than piecemeal action. It is insufficient to quarrel with the way in which the President gets us involved abroad as long as the Congress has given him carte blanche to get involved.

Congress should do its part in getting us out of Southeast Asia by repealing the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

Many U.S. Civilian Roles In Asia May Go to Military

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 9—The Nixon Administration is drawing up plans for the shift of numerous American economic and social programs in South Vietnam and Laos from civilian to military control.

Under the plans, the United States Defense Department would gradually take over, wholly or in part, the financing and operation of such programs as the balancing of the South Vietnamese defense budget, pacification of rural areas, public health, the training of the police and the care of refugees.

Those programs are financed and administered alone or in cooperation with the Defense Department by the Agency for International Development. In many instances the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Information Agency also participate.

During the fiscal year ending on June 30, the aid agency, it is estimated, will have spent \$365-million in Vietnam.

The Administration plans to incorporate some of the changes in its revision of the foreign-aid program, which is expected soon. Part of the program will require Congressional approval.

The plans are expected to generate considerable controversy in and out of Congress because they deal with the subject of civilian vs. military control of policy. The contemplated shift could transfer the responsibility of Senate review from the Foreign Relations Committee, which has generally been critical of American operations in Southeast Asia, to the Armed Services Committee, which has generally been sympathetic.

Civilian officials have been citing private remarks by high-ranking officers involved in policy planning for Vietnam, to the effect that civilian leadership is failing and that well-trained Army men should be increasingly assigned to positions of responsibility in the administration of wartime and postwar programs.

A major argument among Administration officials favoring an increase in the military role in Asian and other support

assistance programs is said to be that the Defense Department is expected to have an easier time getting funds from Congress, where opposition to foreign-aid appropriation has been growing in recent years.

Indications are that the new approach has support in the White House staff as well as among many though not all civilian and military officials in the Defense Department. Top officials in the aid agency are described as resigned to the change, partly because A.I.D. as an entity would disappear under the projected reorganization of the foreign-aid program.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers has participated in the discussions only to a limited extent. The whole question is expected to be reviewed by the National Security Council.

Dr. John A. Hannah, the aid administrator, discussed the problem with President Nixon at the White House May 25 in one of their rare meetings.

In recent public statements Dr. Hannah has made it clear that the "support assistance" programs would be divested from the agency that would be set up to handle overseas economic development under the reorganization, expected to take effect in about a year. He has recognized that some of the support functions would be turned over to the Defense Department.

Other aid officials foresaw a tug-of-war between the Pentagon and civilian agencies over the extent to which the military establishment would assume responsibility for the activities now performed by the aid agency.

They said that the State Department, which is to coordinate the support assistance under the reorganization blueprint, does not have "enough clout," funds or experienced personnel to run the programs.

Larger C.I.A. Role Foreseen

The officials also foresaw that the C.I.A. would seek to increase its role in the support programs. They noted that in a radio interview last Sunday Dr. Hannah conceded that the intelligence agency had been using A.I.D. as a cover for its activities in Laos since 1962. In Vietnam, the C.I.A. is an active partner in the pacification program, which it created eight years ago, and is engaged in many other operations.

While there is resistance among civilian officials to what is viewed as military encroachment, A.I.D. recognizes its inability to obtain sufficient funds and personnel to finance and operate some programs in Vietnam.

Early this year, for example, the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, turned down insistent proposals from the United States Military Assistance Command in Saigon that he accept 135 Army officers as advisers to the aid agency's public-safety program, which seeks to build up the South Vietnamese civilian police.

The Defense Department plans to finance several projects that have been administered and funded by the aid agency, among them the supply of high-protein food to the South Vietnamese Army. Tentative estimates are that in fiscal 1971 the Defense Department will finance up to \$50-million in programs that previously were paid for from aid funds.

In many recent situations, officials said, A.I.D. had to turn to the military for administrators and physicians to run refugee and public-health projects because of a shortage of civilians willing to serve in Vietnam.

Rapidly Growing Ability

Such developments indicate the rapidly growing capability of the military, especially the Army, to administer typically civilian programs.

This month the newly reorganized John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, N. C.—originally established by the Army to teach antiguerrilla warfare—will graduate the first class of Army officers trained in the political, social, economic, cultural and linguistic aspects of overseas military activities.

Commenting on the trend, a civilian official said that "the realities of the situation" would increasingly force the Administration to turn to the military for the financing and management of certain programs because of the inability of civilian agencies to muster adequate funds and personnel.

The major institutional changes are expected to come in the message that President Nixon will send to Congress later this month.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 JUN 1970

Subversion by C.I.A.

The disclosure that the American economic aid mission in Laos is being used as a cover for intelligence operations in Laos is nothing less than a body blow to the credibility of the peaceful presence of the United States in neutral and friendly nations. The decision to allow the Central Intelligence Agency to subvert an important foreign mission was made during the Kennedy Administration in 1962. The fact that it has thus persisted under three Presidents dramatizes the extent to which the debasement of national and diplomatic ethics has become a non-partisan evil.

John A. Hannah, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, has special reason to recognize the harm done by these undercover games. He knows from bitter experience that they undermine the universities and their scholars who, as keys to the success of both AID and the United States Information Agency, become the unwitting accomplices to the shady business. Dr. Hannah was president of Michigan State University when it became known that one of its foreign task forces had been infiltrated by the C.I.A. in South Vietnam between 1955 and 1959.

Although Dr. Hannah's candid admission is to his credit, his claim that the situation in Laos is a unique transgression strains credulity. To say, as he did, that "our preference is to get rid of this kind of operation" is an understatement that raises serious questions. What arrogance of power is it that resists "our preference," the preference of decent Americans? What are the limits of a usurpation of such power by the military and the C.I.A.?

Unless these questions are frankly answered, the nation's friends abroad and its youth at home will become increasingly cynical about all American claims and goals. It is the road to alienation and isolationism. This is a price this country cannot afford to pay.

PROVIDENCE, R.I.
JOURNAL

M - 66,673

S - 209,501

June 10, 1970

Beneath the Cloak

So secret are most of the operations of the CIA that normally when a government official admits his agency has served as a cover for clandestine work, he creates a sensation—but not when the agency is the Agency for International Development and the place is Laos.

John A. Hannah, A.I.D. administrator, admitted somewhat reluctantly, on a TV interview, that the CIA has used the A.I.D. program in Laos as a cover for its operations in Laos ever since 1952. He was unhappy about it, and hoped that the connection between the two programs could be severed. But apparently the pattern is too old and well established in Laos to be changed at so critical a time as the present.

The strange thing about all this is that Dr. Hannah, former president of Michigan State University, saw no point in denying or ducking the question. There wasn't any use, because the facts are so well known, not only to Americans but to the Communist forces in Indochina.

Dr. Hannah insisted that Laos was the only country in which A.I.D. has cloaked the operations of the CIA. He may be right. Unfortunately, many Americans will be skeptical about A.I.D. missions in other countries because the operations of the CIA have become so pervasive and so many official statements about operations in Laos and elsewhere have proved to be less than the whole truth. Officials in many foreign countries go to the other extreme and suspect most Americans, regardless of their work or titles, of being CIA agents. There's no easy way of remedying the situation. The CIA will continue to plant agents wherever it feels necessary, with or without the knowledge of those administering other agencies.

If the work of the foreign aid agency is to be effective, though, the people in the countries receiving the aid must have some confidence that the aid program is genuine, that it is not merely a mask to cover up espionage work and that its workers are really interested in helping the underdeveloped country to achieve economic or cultural growth. Separation from the CIA is essential to credibility.

10 JUN 1970

STATINTL

Buying Our 'Allies'

What the American public has learned so far about the policy of paying for Asian allies is shocking enough, yet it seems to be only part of the story. That part had to be dragged out of Administration officials fearful of letting either fellow-Americans or the world know the full price of allegiance in the Southeast Asian venture.

With diligence and persistence Senator Symington and his Foreign Relations subcommittee found that the cost of getting Thailand to send troops to Vietnam has been \$200,000,000. That is for training, equipment and allowances and does not include far larger sums spent to build vast American air bases inside Thailand.

Since Thailand has already announced it would send troops into neighboring Cambodia at American expense, the Symington group naturally wants to know how much the United States is supposed to pay for that. The subcommittee has already discovered a 1965 contingency plan which commits this country to defend Thailand whatever Thailand does for America.

A few months ago the Senators learned that the United States paid the Philippine government \$38,600,000 for sending 2200 noncombat troops to Vietnam. Part of that money went to the Philippine defense secretary, and the committee never did learn how much actually went to the troops. Meanwhile, South Korea has the

largest "allied" force in Vietnam, and the full price of that to American taxpayers has not been publicly determined.

Not only American, but also Filipino and Thai and Korean leaders, have tried to keep the facts secret and with good reason. The money is being spent to demonstrate that Washington's war policy has tremendous support in Asia. But when this support has to be bought the illusion collapses into what Senator Fulbright rightly called the "ultimate in corruption."

The corruption is not so much in the payoffs as in the policy that promotes them and hides the truth. Not even King George III was that deceitful when he hired Hessian mercenaries to fight American revolutionists, and it might be expected that American governments would have learned something from that early experience.

Deceit has, however, become the cloak for the expansion of American military policy in Southeast Asia. John A. Hannah, administrator of the Agency for International Development, has conceded to the Symington committee that CIA men work in Laos disguised as AID agents.

Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam. As facts creep to light, it is plain that the United States is fighting and buying its influence across Southeast Asia. There is no longer simply the Vietnamese war. There is the war in four states.

STATINTL

ST. PAUL, MINN.
PIONEER PRESS

M - 104,387

S - 223,806

JUN 10 1970

Getting the War Facts

If a good many Americans keep their fingers crossed while listening to glowing predictions of coming "disinvolvement" in Southeast Asia after U.S. combat troops leave Cambodia, they can hardly be blamed.

Evidence continues to pile up regarding withholding of war facts from the public by the Lyndon Johnson Administration. The Nixon Administration of course was not responsible for this. But a disquieting feature is that the Nixon Administration, through the State and Defense Departments, has shown only reluctant cooperation with efforts of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to uncover and make public significant hidden activities of its predecessors. Such a course does not increase confidence.

Senator Stuart Symington's subcommittee has only now been able to make public a partial and heavily censored report showing how the Johnson Administration made secret agreements to pay Thailand more than \$200 million for sending some troops to Vietnam. Johnson gave Americans to understand the Thai contingents were voluntary, but it was evidently a bought and paid for deal.

Similarly, it has previously been disclosed that the United States paid someone in the Philippine government \$39 million to have a small non-combatant force go to Vietnam. A comparable deal was made with South Korea and there are rumors of something similar in connection with Australia, although this is unproved.

Under cover of U.S. foreign aid

programs, supposed to be nonmilitary, the Central Intelligence Agency has maintained a mercenary army in Laos, and still does. The U.S. also has had hired Cambodian mercenaries fighting in Vietnam, and some of these have now been sent into Cambodia to support the Lon Nol government there.

Now Symington and other senators are trying to get from the State Department the facts about American payments to Thailand for use of Thai troops in Cambodia. Also being sought are answers to questions about present U.S. commitments to Thailand, Cambodia and Laos in connection with their role in providing replacements for American forces when the latter pull out for the June 30 Nixon deadline.

The fear in the Senate is that new agreements since the Cambodian incursion will tie the United States to future support of "proxy" military operations in Cambodia, Laos and possibly Thailand. A report by staff employees of the Foreign Relations Committee says the Cambodian invasion has permanently changed the character of the Vietnam war by widening its geographic area, and concludes that peace is now more distant than ever, despite the Administration's contrary views.

No one can be sure at this time what the eventual results of Cambodia will be, but the Senate committee members are well justified in seeking answers now to significant questions about the dangers of future broader involvements.

STATINTL

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
CHRONICLE

M - 480,233

JUN 10 1970

Another CIA Venture

THE PUBLIC CONFIRMATION that Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos for the past eight years have been masked as foreign-aid projects will not startle anyone who has attempted to study that most shadowy of Government agencies. The CIA track record is one of frequent duplicity, and the American people and their elected representatives have been as often the victims as friendly or hostile foreign governments.

It is the long-range effect of later disclosure that is the most damaging and harmful result of many CIA masquerades. Because of its corrupting courtship with private foundations, and student and trade union organizations, it has made American university, student and union programs abroad suspect. Many of its quietly financed ventures wore the disguise of humanitarian causes, but with finances mysterious and true sponsorship concealed. When sponsorship was revealed, the programs came tumbling down and, with them, much of the belief in and support for all foreign aid programs.

NOW JOHN A. HANNAH, administrator of the Agency for International Development, has confirmed the CIA's use of AID in Laos but has also insisted that the deception is not going on in any other nation. Officials of other underdeveloped areas receiving American assistance are not apt to accept Hannah's assurance unquestioningly. Thus the CIA may have damaged American programs to build friendship in many nations because it damaged credibility in one.

It has been Moscow's repeated accusation, for instance, that the Peace Corps, one of this country's more magnanimous and hopeful contributions, represents only an extension of CIA meddling. The Laos disclosure tends to lend support to this Soviet view. The CIA's expediency may thus have harmed a totally innocent victim in the Peace Corps and, with it, the long-term national interest.

TALLAHASSEE, FLA.
DEMOCRAT

E - 29,035

S - 29,006

JUN 10 1970

Trouble for Aid Program

✓ It may have been a real mistake for the head of our foreign aid program to admit publicly that the U.S. program is being used as a cover for CIA operations in Laos.

In the light of an open admission of this clandestine use of the aid program for intelligence work, other nations may take a different attitude toward American efforts to help them.

How will a foreign nation be able to tell an AID worker from a spy? Obviously it can't, and that statement from Foreign Aid Chief John Hannah may get a lot of foreign aid people in trouble during the coming months.

There may be instances — like Laos — where use of the foreign aid program as an undercover for intelligence operations might be justified. There is ample room for argument on this issue. But such arguments may be academic now because Hannah's open admission may have impaired the effectiveness of his program to a point where it no longer will be useful to the U.S. or the nations we have been trying to help.

Of course, if foreign nations become too mistrustful of their major helping hand, they can always say "no thanks." It wouldn't make a whole lot of our taxpayers unhappy.

RIGHTIST PRESSURE

Souvanna Threatened By Fall of Saravane

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — The neutralist government of Premier Souvana Phouma has been dealt a severe blow by the Communist capture of the provincial capital of Saravane in Southern Laos, diplomats here say.

The problem now is whether Laos will continue its official neutral policy or swing to an anti-Communist alliance with South Vietnam and Thailand, the source said.

This assessment came as rightist National Assembly deputies and politicians attacked Souvanna's neutralist stance.

They said that Saravane — captured yesterday — was recognized as a rightist town by the Geneva accords of 1962 which guaranteed the neutrality of Laos.

The rightists said that prior to the Saravane attack, the Lao government had made reported requests for action by the International Control Commission charged with overseeing the accords. But the ICC did nothing to prevent the North Vietnamese from taking the town.

Discussing the Communist attack and the rightist pressure on Souvanna, a top diplomat said, "The crunch has come."

If Souvanna stands firm for neutrality, observers believe he will invite a rightist takeover.

If he makes concessions to right, he runs the risk of bringing down more Communist attacks on Laos.

Souvanna previously made concessions to the rightists following the fall of another provincial capital, Attapeu, in

April under the same circumstances as Saravane.

He gave the key Defense Ministry post to a southerner, Sisouk Nachampassac, and promised to consult the rightists on any major political decisions.

Has a "Ghost" Army

Souvanna is in process of falling off his "neutrality" tightrope to the right just as Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia fell off his tightrope to the left.

Souvanna depends on a rightist army to fight the North Vietnamese and Pathelao.

The neutralist army, a scant 4,400 men, exists only on paper. The Laotians call them "ghosts."

The U.S. Air Force flies close support for the Laotians. The Central Intelligence Agency employs a small army of Americans and Thais in ground combat with Souvanna's approval.

Aimed at Souvanna?

Souvanna, is being forced to the right by constant North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao attacks. But just why the Reds took Saravane is not clear.

Diplomats speculate the Red aim could be Souvanna's downfall.

Another theory is that the Communists are preparing to talk and, for bargaining purposes, are seeking to control a sufficient number of provincial capitals.

Reliable sources said that possibly the Reds are continuing to improve their new reinforcement routes to Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Meanwhile, military sources reported that a Lao air force T28 divebomber was downed over Saravane and its pilot was killed.

A U.S. Air Force light aircraft reportedly was badly damaged by ground fire at Saravane.

The Saravane airstrip is littered with bodies of Lao defenders. U.S. ground combat teams conducting trail reconnaissance near Saravane were not attacked.

9 JUN 1970

CIA cover in Laos reported

Washington

The United States Central Intelligence Agency uses the U.S. foreign-aid program as a cover for its operations in Laos, U.S. foreign aid chief John A. Hannah said in an interview. "Certainly, our preference is to get rid of this kind of operation," Mr. Hannah said, adding that Laos is the only place where the program is used in such a way.

officials

STATINTL

CLEVELAND, OHIO
PLAIN DEALER

M - 409,414
S - 545,032

JUN 9 1970

Secrecy Strains U.S. Confidence

By secret agreement the United States has paid \$200 million in four years in order to have Thailand send a 10,000-man combat division to fight as an ally on the side of South Vietnam.

This was abruptly disclosed in Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony Sunday. At the same moment Dr. John A. Hannah, head of the Agency for International Development, or AID, embarrassedly confirmed that his AID mission in Laos is used by CIA agents as a cover for their spy work.

Secrecy is needed, of course, in the big international game of power poker. But how much secrecy? Should President Johnson have laid open the U.S.-Thai agreement when it was made in 1967? Or would that have hurt the allies, or tipped off the enemy to such a big military surprise?

Americans have become wary of diplomatic secrets which lead to military involvements. Americans would tolerate a good deal of secrecy if they could feel more confident of their leaders in the White House, Pentagon and State Department.

That confidence dwindled as commitments grew deeper and losses grew heavier in Vietnam from 1965 on.

That confidence suffered another severe shock when President Nixon suddenly marched America into Cambodia. Not just the plain citizens were jolted by this widening of the war. Even Mr. Nixon's own party leaders on Capitol Hill were taken aback. What ever became of Mr. Nixon's pledge of "an open presidency?"

Now every new exposure of an agreement not passed upon by Congress, not discussed before the public, rouses suspicions.

The Thais are determined to remain independent and noncommunist. But time and again Red Chinese leaders proclaim that all Indochina will become, country by country, a united communist peoples' revolutionary sphere.

Without aid from the United States, neither the Thais nor Laotians any more than South Vietnamese can withstand the determined China-backed and Soviet-supplied drive to overturn their present governments.

If Mr. Nixon's Guam doctrine is to become realized, so Southeast Asia can defend itself, American money and arms will have to be contributed.

Those countries cannot go it alone. Their adversaries aren't going it alone. Their adversaries from Vietnam to Burma have help from Red China and Russia.

Therefore U.S. help will be needed, and agreements will be negotiated between American and Southeast Asian diplomats. That should not surprise anyone. America is not an isolationist country, and it has obligations in the area.

What is needed is more openness. Our objections stem from the worry of Americans that hidden agreements lead to deeper commitments, commitments that take America further than the people expected.

True, the President should not be forced to lay open his hand in the global poker game. But if he is to count upon Congress and the citizens to back him up, he must inform them and consult with them as openly as he can, and never give them the feeling that they have been euchered into a war they don't fully believe in or understand.

June 9, 1970

Commander in Chief. Without question, the President has a responsibility to protect U.S. troops in Vietnam—and no doubt he will do so. He does not need a mandate from the Congress for this purpose. Thus, the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia is both superfluous and unnecessary.

The point that Senators should bear in mind is that the Senate has constitutional responsibilities also—both in the making of foreign policy and in deciding how public funds are to be spent. President Nixon, as a former Member of this body, knows that very well. I remind my colleagues of what he said in this Chamber last November 13 during a short visit to the Senate:

I find, looking back over this period of time, that this administration has been subjected to some sharp criticism by some Members of this body, both from the Democratic side and from the Republican side. I want the Members of this body to know that I understand it. I recognize this as being one of the strengths of our system, rather than one of its weaknesses, and I know that, in the end, out of this kind of criticism and debate will come better policies and stronger policies than would have been the case had we simply had an abject Senate—or House of Representatives, for that matter—simply approving whatever ideas came from the executive branch of the Government.

This does not mean that we do not feel very strongly about our proposals when we send them here. It does mean that I, as a former Member of this body, one who served in it and who presided over it for 8 years, recognize this great tradition of independence, and recognize it as one of the great strengths of our Republic.

We in the Congress have been derelict far too long in placing adequate restraints on the executive branch in the commitment of our men and dollars abroad. As Senators we should concern ourselves primarily with seeing that Congress carries out its responsibilities, not with the duties of the President. We should worry, not so much about preserving the President's powers which he will faithfully uphold—let there be no doubt about that—but preserving our own. This debate should be focused, not on whether this proposal ties the President's hands—it does not—but on whether it will help to untie the knots by which Congress has shackled its own powers. The Cooper-Church amendment is a step in righting the imbalance in our system. While the Senator from West Virginia's amendment would not add to the President's legal or constitutional powers, it would have the practical effect of tipping the scales of political power even further toward executive domination.

Passage of this amendment would also be a retreat from the principle established by the 80 to 9 vote of the Senate last year, which prohibited the use of American ground troops in Laos or Thailand. No Senator raised a question during the debate on the Cooper-Church amendment last December concerning the need to spell out the President's authority to protect our forces. I remind my colleagues on the other side of the aisle that the language of that amendment was worked out in consultation with, and was fully endorsed by, the White House.

The issue is no different today than it was then. On the day following the Senate's action the junior Senator from Michigan said:

The intent and the plain meaning of the amendment ultimately adopted by the Senate yesterday was to reaffirm the existing role and existing policies of the United States with respect to Thailand and Laos.

And he went on to say that—

Following a meeting with the President and others at the White House this morning, I can report that the President was pleased with the amendment, and he recognizes that it is in accordance with his announced policies.

The President saw no need then for a provision concerning the protection of American troops in South Vietnam. The sanctuaries just across the border in Laos have been expanded since that amendment passed and the Administration still has seen fit to follow the restriction laid down by the Congress.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, following my remarks, a statement by the junior Senator from Michigan that appears on page S16809 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for December 16, and a news article from the New York Times for December 17, 1969, covering that event.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, what has been the experience under this restriction? Secretary of Defense Laird told a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 18 that—

I have been one who has been insistent all along that we live up to this particular amendment, and the rules of operation that were in existence at the time this amendment was adopted are the same rules that are being followed today . . . the rules (are) tied to the protection of the (South Vietnamese and American) forces that are engaged in those (Laos-South Vietnam) border areas with the enemy . . . this amendment has not endangered the lives of American soldiers in Vietnam . . . protective reaction which I am referring to in Laos has to do with our air interdiction campaign, the rescue of survivors, and also has to do with on-going combat operations within South Vietnam.

The Secretary went on to say that use of American ground combat troops or American advisors with South Vietnamese forces on an attack upon the territory of Laos for the purpose of destroying a sanctuary "would certainly not be in accordance with the amendment which was passed by the Congress last year."

Thus the Secretary of Defense found that the Laos-Thailand amendment, passed by the Congress and signed by the President—without restrictive language on protecting American troops—did not endanger the lives of the troops, since it does not prohibit minimal actions across the border defined by the President as "protective reaction." But, it did prohibit in Laos, without the prior consent of Congress, the type of action that was undertaken in Cambodia.

The principle that was approved so overwhelmingly by the Senate last December as applicable to Laos should also

be applicable to Cambodia. There is no doubt in my mind that the prohibition concerning Laos could have been extended to Cambodia as well—if the sponsors had only thought that there was even a remote possibility that U.S. troops might be sent into Cambodia.

On May 8, President Nixon told the American people that—

What we've also accomplished (in Cambodia) is that by buying time it means that if the enemy does come back into those sanctuaries, the next time the South Vietnamese will be strong enough and well trained enough to handle it alone.

The Senator from West Virginia's amendment would have the Senate go beyond the President's own stated intentions, by giving him our consent in advance to going back into Cambodia after all.

If the Senator's amendment were approved and the Cooper-Church amendment subsequently adopted, the Senate would have said, on the one hand that we should get out of Cambodia and stay out and, on the other hand, that we really do not mean it—that the President can go back in whenever he chooses.

Instead, Mr. President, of taking a historic step in the process of beginning to restore the Senate to the role the Constitution intended, we would have acted, not like a great forum, but like a fudge factory, and rendered the Cooper-Church amendment so largely meaningless that it would then be questionable whether we should proceed to adopt it, in its modified form, at all.

I say to the Senate in all sincerity that the adoption of the Byrd amendment would blow a hole in the Cooper-Church amendment large enough to drive a whole new war through, without the President ever having to return to Congress for authority or consent.

In summary, Mr. President, the pending amendment would repeat the errors of the past and give the President a blank check to go back into Cambodia. It would tip the political balance of power still further in favor of the executive branch. And it would fly in the face of the Senate's action on Laos only 6 months ago. I hope that it will be defeated.

EXHIBIT 1

THE BIPARTISAN AMENDMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON LAOS AND THAILAND

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, particularly in the wake of Vice President's Agnew's criticism of some of the news media, there has been considerable discussion of, and focus upon, the objectivity of news reports. It will be recalled that some particular concern was indicated earlier with respect to the New York Times and the Washington Post.

Although I hesitate to single out these particular newspapers again, I wish to indicate my considerable displeasure with the coverage this morning in both the New York Times and the Washington Post of an action that took place yesterday on the floor of the Senate.

A headline in the Washington Post this morning reads, "Senate Acts To Curb Asia Role." The story under that headline refers to the amendment cosponsored yesterday by the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) and the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) relating to policy with respect to the introduction of United States combat troops in Thailand and Laos.

DAILY WORLD
9 JUN 1970

Truth breaks out

Little by little the truth about Washington's involvement in Indochina is breaking out of the straitjacket of official secrecy and lies.

The admission June 7 by Dr. John A. Hannah, director of the Agency for International Development (USAID), that the U.S. aid program is a cover for Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos points up President Nixon's failure to mention CIA operations in his March 6 statement about Laos.

Undoubtedly Vice-President Agnew and other administration alibi artists will find words to explain this lack of candor by the President of the United States in his statements to the American people.

It will be more difficult, however, to rationalize the outright lying about Washington's barbarous extermination bombing of Lao towns and villages.

STATINTL

KANSAS CITY, MO.
STARE - 325,351
S - 396,682

JUN 9 1970

Aid Will Suffer From That CIA Tie

The fact that the U. S. economic aid program in Laos is a cover for the financing of clandestine CIA military activities in that Southeast Asian country may have been an "open secret" for years in the embassies and among the press corps in Vientiane. But that does not lessen the damaging reaction that official acknowledgment is likely to provoke, at home and especially among aid-recipient countries.

Dr. John A. Hannah, head of the U. S. Agency for International Development, says that he was aware of the situation, inherited from two previous administrations, and considers it unfortunate and unwise. The decision to end the deception, however, is not his.

All major countries (and quite a few smaller ones) find the maintenance of an intelligence network one of the unpleasant necessities of getting on in the world. Spying is an unpopular business. The covert involvement in political and military affairs of other nations is more unpopular still. But that, alone, is not a rational case against the CIA. What sometimes amazes the agency's friends and foes alike is its propensity in recent years for getting presidents and the State department in embarrassing public jams.

For the U. S. aid program, already a victim of declining congressional and public favor, the embarrassment could be deeply damaging. Hannah said in an interview that the Laos situation is unique—that it is the only country in which U. S. foreign aid is being used as a spy-agency front. How does he know? How do we know? How do the countries receiving aid know? It will apparently have to be taken on faith.

In many of the more sensitive capitals in Latin America, Africa and Asia, this country's enemies make a profession of seeing U. S. subversion lurking as the motive behind every loan for development—even behind the activities of the U. S. Peace corps. The propaganda has had effect. Instead of gratitude, these programs now often are met with rancor and suspicion. Which, in turn, makes the task of maintaining consistent domestic support for them more difficult.

The Laos revelation is bound to stir new innuendo, and American diplomats abroad can expect to be asked for assurance that all is above-board in the local U. S. aid office. It would be remarkable indeed if all of them managed to make themselves believed. The credibility of the program has been compromised.

THE KANSAS CITY STAR
9 June 1970

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MANFIELD, OHIO
NEWS JOURNAL

E - 37,320
S - 42,500

JUN 9 1970

Another Brigand In the Tent

THE MORE Americans learn about the secret aspects of the Indochina war, the less savory it becomes.

Just now we find out about a pact signed back in 1967 which used U. S. tax dollars to pay Thailand \$20,000 per soldier for 10,000 Thai mercenaries who served in Vietnam.

That fee included training, equipping, and supporting the men as well as paying them a bonus if they lived to complete their foreign service.

This was nothing short of paying Thailand to participate in the war. The fact that it was kept secret indicates both the Pentagon and the White House — and no doubt a number of members of the Congress — felt the hiring of mercenaries would not be approved by the American public.

EQUALLY TRICKY was the use of the Foreign Aid Program to cover up spying operations by the CIA in Laos.

Activities of the CIA repeatedly demonstrate the danger of giving an agency a quantity of money to spend without having to account for it. Several years ago the CIA was discovered to be subsidizing college students in activities questionable enough to be stopped when the facts were revealed.

Spying is a part of war; it has to go on even in times of peace. It has to be accepted. It has to be secret. It has to be paid for.

that it has become an agency devising and carrying out phases of foreign policy that actually have little relationship to espionage. The CIA acts as a separate and secret force carrying out projects the enemy probably uncovers but which are reported to Americans only when someone stumbles on them.

★ ★ ★

IF OUR government has for three years been secretly hiring mercenaries and using the foreign aid program as a spy cover, what else has been going on that we know nothing about?

There was the Green Beret execution. Then came My Lai. Efforts had been made to conceal both affairs.

No doubt much of what has gone on in Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia financed by U. S. dollars is publicly unknown. Maybe it never will be known. Maybe it's better for American consciences that it isn't.

The people of this nation are not children. They know war is grim and grubby. They know the machinations behind it are often perfidious. They tend to accept it as better than blowing up the world with hydrogen bombs.

But the sad fact is that with all the secrecy and money and the open killing and wounding we have not been able to win the Indochina war. Nor would it be worth anything if we did win it.

We squeeze a few Communists out of Cambodia like water out of a sponge. The President declares a victory. Then the water comes right back into the sponge. That's

the ultimate story of all Southeast Asia.


Unless we want to subdue it and occupy it permanently, which we have no intention of doing, we ought to get out, taking our smelly mysteries with us.

The Communists are probably playing a far more false and vicious game than we. But the anguished jest is that if they won, they wouldn't win anything either. Moscow and Peking, sleeping under the same Marxist tent, can deal with each other only on terms of suspicion and fear. A Red conquest of Southeast Asia would put another brigand in the tent hailing from Hanoi.

MIAMI, FLA.
NEWS

E - 93,538

JUN 9 1970



POST

E - 708,180

STATINTL

JUN 9 1970

Tales of Indochina

1. VIP HOUR IN CAMBODIA

Naturally eager to impress the visiting members of the President's Indochina "fact-finding" team, U. S. officers in charge of one Cambodian sector staged a camouflage demonstration for the VIPs last Sunday. It was really no contest; they were dealing with experts in concealment.

Not that the Army men didn't try hard. They ordered haircuts and shaves for the sweating, bone-weary GIs on the "Shakey's Hill" firebase and saw to it that new uniforms were issued to some. Shirts and steel helmets were donned as directed, despite the steaming jungle heat. Cake and cookies were baked and, as a special

exhibition of concern for the visitors' comfort, a new latrine was constructed.

The piles of captured ammunition were duly inspected, the precision of a fighter-bomber raid on a nearby hill was politely admired. And before long, with final smiles and handshakes all around, the White House delegation departed. They are now enroute home where, with the possible exception of one or two skeptics, they are expected to testify that the Cambodia operation was a military masterstroke. The GIs on "Shakey's Hill" were well aware that a cheap fraud was being committed. How many Americans will be misled into believing that the White House task force is really to be believed?

2. FOUND AND LOST DEPT.

WASHINGTON, June 8 (CDN)—They've invented a new game at the Pentagon which might be called the "Cambodian Cache Game . . ." The reported totals for [captured] antiaircraft rounds are also bouncing around. At one time, the total in official reports reached almost 160,000. But a few days later it dropped back to 127,000—

and now has risen again, to 133,721.

—from yesterday's news pages

* * *

The proposed name for the game is not bad, but perhaps, in view of the skillful deception and shiftiness required to fake artillery ammunition figures, it could just be called the Old Shell Game.

3. THAILAND'S BONUS ARMY

Since the official announcement last week from Bangkok, there has been some uncertainty as to why "volunteers" from Thailand would be willing to enlist for military duty in Cambodia. The explanation may simply be that the pay is better.

Take the case of Thai volunteers in Vietnam. Their base pay, as ascertained by a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee in secret hearings last fall, ranged from \$26 monthly for a private to \$98 for a major to \$370 for a lieutenant general—all at the expense of the Thai government. But there were also much more rewarding "overseas" allowances—\$39 per month, additional, \$180 and

\$450 for the three ranks respectively—furnished entirely by the United States.

Beyond this, according to the subcommittee hearing transcripts just released, a secret agreement between Washington and Bangkok specifies that Thai officers and men be provided rations, quarters, transportation, ammunition, death or disability benefits and mustering-out pay by the U. S. The cost to date: more than \$200 million.

In the circumstances, it is easy to understand why Thai fighting men might be eager for the Cambodia campaign—and why investigating Senators are demanding to know what further deals have been made.

4. UNVEILING IN LAOS

The subcommittee also pursued further inquiries on Laos. The heavily censored transcript cited one report that 5000 Thai troops were engaged there "disguised in the uniform of the Royal Laotian Army." More recent data indicates a more elaborate masquerade; Administrator John A. Hannah of the U. S. Agency for International Development has just publicly conceded that the Central Intelligence Agency's operatives pose as AID staff in Laos. The

Senate might find that disclosure worth exploring at greater length—regardless of Washington's apparent assurance that it has the best Asian allies money can buy. If it has taken this long to obtain acknowledgement of the CIA presence in Laos, who knows what other surprises are still being held in reserve? Sadly enough, it is the American people who seem to be most frequently confounded by the CIA's ubiquitous legions.

STATINTL

RALFIGH, N.C.
NEWS & OBSERVER

M - 130,652

S - 148,247

JUN 9 1970

So Many Ways In

America's clandestine entanglement in Laos and her secret troop deal with Thailand became matters of settled fact over the weekend. They form a most instructive lesson on how to mire up in Southeast Asia, and they indicate how very difficult a true extrication is going to be.

Given a choice of several alternatives for involvement in a foreign conflict, most citizens undoubtedly would prefer the direct method followed in Vietnam. We began with "advisers" and went on to place hundreds of thousands of soldiers there. It has been tragic involvement, but at least it has been visible. It will not be as intricate to unravel as some of the snarls elsewhere.

For instance, we got involved in Laos in a way nobody was supposed to know about. Using the Agency for International Development as a smokescreen, the CIA has been training, fighting, sometimes dying on the side of Premier Souvanna Phouma in what is basically a Laotian civil war. Yet, when President Nixon addressed the nation in March concerning Laos, he didn't mention one word about this CIA venture. Now that Foreign Aid Director John Hannah has confirmed what long was suspected, our negotiators in Paris will just have to reconcile

as best they can their previous claims about our respect of Laotian neutrality, and the manner in which we have violated it.

It is hard to tell which party could get in more hot water from the Thailand deal — the U. S. or Thailand. The commitment of Thai troops to Vietnam was supposed to be evidence of great enthusiasm for U. S. policy in Southeast Asia. But it was canned enthusiasm, costing us an estimated \$200 million. Furthermore we bought it at the risk of weakening Thailand's native defenses, at the same time inviting North Vietnamese wrath upon a nation getting into the fray on the U. S. side.

It must be said on President Nixon's behalf that these dangerous deals were made before he took office. But he has become a party to them by helping to keep them concealed. And that gives him all the more responsibility for sparing us the possibly disastrous consequences of these deals by getting us out of Vietnam, out of Cambodia, out of Laos, out of Thailand — in short, out of Southeast Asia. Withdrawal should be feasible within months — not years. And it ought to proceed at a pace accelerated enough to prove that complete — not partial — withdrawal is, indeed, the President's goal.

SAN ANTONIO, TEX.
EXPRESS
M - 78,032
EXPRESS-NEWS
S - 117,132

JUN 9 1970

AID as Cover on American Spying? **Only the Naive Were Surprised**

If anybody believes Foreign Aid Chief John A. Hannah, no harm's done. Hannah, Agency for International Development administrator for nearly a year, said he was displeased to learn that the CIA was using AID as a cover in Laos, a neutral country by legal definition.

The Central Intelligence Agency has been blamed for many things, some of them rightly so, but intelligence-gathering (spying, if you please) is a part of the necessary work in a world in open conflict that is frequently deadly dangerous to the country without good intelligence.

If AID was a good cover, give our people some credit for resourceful-

ness . . . assuming the CIA work was deemed necessary for our best interests (and a lively debate erupts on that score occasionally). For many years, foreign aid was mainly military. President Eisenhower tried hard to get Americans to think of it in terms of "mutual assistance," but few could find very much of a "mutual" nature in it. If it covered intelligence operations in the tense, treacherous coldest part of the Cold War, then there might have been a bit of mutuality about it.

The relevant point today is whether our government is adequately monitoring the involvements of intelligence agents for appropriateness and effectiveness of their information gathering and commitments abroad. Ideally our diplomatic missions would handle intelligence operations but the nature of some of our involvements precludes that.

It is a disconcerting fact that the program we advertise as humanitarian helpfulness has masked the work of our spies. We assume that most of the host countries were sophisticated enough not to be surprised.

9 JUN 1970

The CIA and foreign aid

STATINTL

ANY country running a big-league foreign policy has "clean" and "dirty" activities overseas. The trick is to keep them separate so the second does not rub off on the first.

S: Dr. John A. Hannah, head of our foreign aid program, has officially disclosed that agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are posing as aid workers in Laos.

This regrettable practice started under President Kennedy in 1962 and continued under the Johnson and Nixon Administrations. Dr. Hannah would like to "get rid of this kind of operation," and Mr. Nixon would do well to free foreign aid from association with espionage and clandestine warfare.

Unlike professional CIA-baiters, we do not quarrel with the operation itself.

At great personal risk, CIA agents have been recruiting and training anti-communist guerrillas, observing enemy movements and acting as ground controllers for air strikes. Their activities are in response to North Vietnam's illegal invasion of neutral Laos and its threat to South Vietnam.

What we object to is the foreign-aid cover for the operation. The U.S. aid program and the Peace Corps are two to this country's most idealistic, unselfish efforts. The Communist bloc has long recognized them as such and has sought to discredit them. Now, by mixing aid with secret-agentry, we have foolishly given the Kremlin a stick to beat us with.

Do CIA agents really need a cover in Laos? In Vientiane every newsman, communist diplomat and barkeep seems to know what the CIA is up to. If the agency insists on a story, they could claim to be scientists studying the sex habits of elephants or the life style of opium smugglers.

This would be as believable as and less harmful than calling them rural development workers.

STATINTL

AID Chief Admits Tie with CIA

Washington, June 7 (AP)—John A. Hannah, foreign-aid chief, acknowledged today that the United States aid program is being used as a cover for central intelligence agency operations in Laos. He said President Nixon may propose divorcing such intelligence work from overseas economic assistance in the future.

"Well, I just have to admit that that is true," Hannah said when asked if the program of his agency for international development is being used as a cover for CIA operations in Laos.

Appears on Radio Program

Hannah was questioned on the Metromedia radio news program Profile.

CIA and other United States activities in Laos were investigated recently in a Senate inquiry headed by Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) but it is rare for an executive branch official to acknowledge publicly that his organization is being used for undercover work abroad.

Nixon spelled out United States aid to Laos in a March 6 statement which did not mention the CIA. United States activities there had previously been kept hush-hush to avoid impairing the Vietlens government's neutral status.

Hannah made plain he disapproves of the CIA's use of his agency. He said Laos is the only place this is being done, and that it stems from a 1962 decision that such activity was in the national interest.

Hopes to Shed Program

"Certainly, our preference is to get rid of this kind of operation," he said.

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Hopes to Shed Program

"Certainly, our preference is to get rid of this kind of operation," he said.

Hannah said he is sure that Nixon will include such a recommendation in the foreign-aid reorganization ideas the President plans to present soon for congressional discussion.

"I hope it is going to be in the new aid legislation once that is submitted," Hannah added.

Hannah generally favored splitting economic foreign development activities from "these political-military operations" which he said "ought to be handled by the state department and the defense department."

loses money" is a subjective interpretation of some old, over-generalized figures that the Post Office Department has publicly declared to be obsolete and invalid. Postmaster General Blount has stated on numerous occasions that Third Class Bulk mail is a desirable, positive contributor to the economic efficiency of the postal operation. This statement is supported by the Department's Revenue and Cost Analysis report issued on April 6 of this year. The report shows that revenue from Third Class Bulk mail exceeds its handling cost by 98% whereas the revenue from First Class mail exceeds its respective handling cost by only 85%. The same report also shows that Third Class Bulk is the most profitable major class of mail handled by the Post Office.

To go a step further, Assistant Postmaster General James W. Hargrove stated on April 13 of this year that, if Third Class Bulk mail did not exist, then the 296 million dollars in gross profit which it produced in fiscal 1969 would have had to come from some other source. He added that there are only two alternatives for "that other source"—either a congressional subsidy or an increase in First Class postage rates.

With these thoughts in mind, I certainly hope that you will reconsider your present position on this subject. When I served as one of your county chairman in the 1968 Senatorial Campaign, I had complete conviction of your unquestioned integrity, objectivity, and tireless effort to seek out and weigh all of the facts before acting on any issue. I'm sure that this personal involvement with your past efforts tends to heighten my awareness and concern in regard to some of your more recent activities. However, I certainly hope (and must assume) that these inconsistencies do not represent your considered personal position but are simply over-zealous campaign efforts which were produced by well intentioned supporters.

The voters of Iowa's First District rightfully look to both you and your opponents for information and interpretation on vital issues. I am sure that you constantly strive to fulfill this obligation in the most straight forward and unbiased manner possible and hope that the information which I have offered will be of assistance to you in this effort. Enclosed you will find some further details which may be of interest in exploring the subject of Third Class postal economics.

Sincerely,

MIKE MCSWEENEY.

U.S. POLICY IN LAOS STRENGTHENS THE COMMUNISTS

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 8, 1970

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, in the midst of public concern over President Nixon's invasion of Cambodia, we must not forget the quiet war of escalation the administration has been conducting in Laos throughout 1969 and 1970.

I wish to bring to the attention of the Congress excerpts from four articles from the Far Eastern Economic Review which describe how Vietnamization, a reduction in U.S. ground troops in Vietnam, has resulted in an escalatory use of weapons of mass destruction in Laos.

As these articles point out, massive devastation of civilian life and property has drastically altered the fragile politics of neutrality in Laos. The Pathet Lao

has become the only viable indigenous political force capable of providing leadership for thousands of dislocated and poverty stricken peasants.

I ask, Mr. Speaker, is this the course the President will now take in Cambodia after the withdrawal of U.S. troops on June 30? If so, he must be warned that indiscriminate bombing, use of chemicals, and other forms of massive civilian destruction create the social conditions which invite resistance and the growth of communism.

The excerpts from the four articles follow:

WASHINGTON'S DILEMMA

(By Arnold Abrams)

Ironically, those most in the dark about Laos are the American people. More than simply being unaware of the scope of U.S. operations here, they have yet to be told by their government that their nation is militarily involved in Laos. American officials still seek to officially conceal U.S. violations of the 1962 Geneva Accord, which bars all forms of foreign military intervention in Laos. They contend that Hanoi's refusal to concede the presence of North Vietnamese troops here makes it diplomatically unfeasible for Washington to act otherwise.

Consequently, everyone in Vientiane, from the Russian ambassador to the *mamasan* of the legendary White Rose, knows what the Americans are doing here. But the American public remains ignorant of the fact that their government is arming, training, supplying, transporting and directing approximately 70,000 Laotian troops in a war which threatens to get out of hand.

Instead of setting the record at least partially straight, U.S. officials here do things like allowing Vang Pao to declare recently, before a sizable contingent of visiting journalists, that his Meo forces fight with antiquated weapons, inadequate communications and inconsequential American support. As he was speaking, American F-4 Phantom jets roared overhead, several American observation planes were parked nearby and three cargo-laden American transport planes landed in quick succession at his official Sam Thong base. After denying he even received indirect U.S. military support, Vang Pao calmly climbed into an unmarked American helicopter, guarded by Laotians carrying American-made M-16 automatic rifles, and was flown back to his secret Long Cheng headquarters by a three-man American crew.

Vang Pao and official verbiage notwithstanding, American involvement in the Laotian conflict takes the following principal forms: In addition to 75 military advisers listed as embassy "attaches," about 300 men are employed in a variety of clandestine military activities supervised by the CIA. Although technically civilians, many CIA agents in Laos are former Special Forces soldiers recruited because of military expertise and Vietnam experience.

These ex-Green Berets train government troops, assist wide-ranging reconnaissance teams and plan guerrilla and psychological warfare operations. They wear combat fatigues and work out of three main camps, where they administer rigorous training in jungle warfare, guerrilla tactics, communications handling and weaponry.

The CIA also maintains and largely controls Vang Pao's army of approximately 15,000 fulltime troops. Official instructions to the contrary, CIA personnel occasionally accompany these forces on combat forays. More than 20 agents have been killed in Laos. Among the most recent CIA casualties was Phil Werbiaky, a former Special Forces captain widely known for his exploits during the

early days of Vietnam. He was killed in the government's late-summer offensive.

"These guys are tigers," says an American personally acquainted with many CIA agents in Laos. "They're tough, intelligent guys who know how to handle themselves. They're not afraid to mix it up out in the jungle." The American is a civilian engineer who befriended many agents while helping to build airstrips on several of their remote outposts. "They came to Laos because they were fed up with having their hands tied in Vietnam," he says. "Here they're doing things the way they want to, and getting better pay for it as well."

An important CIA adjunct in Laos has the innocuous title of "Requirements Office". It is staffed by about 90 men, most of whom also are ex-military types. Their function may be inconspicuous, but it is not innocuous. Stationed at field level, requirements officers—called ROs—handle the distribution of arms and ammunition, as well as general logistics. They are vital to any military operation mounted by the government.

Learning about these activities prompted Senator Fulbright to raise a key question about the CIA's role here: since its function ostensibly is to gather information, why is this agency running a war in Laos? "I don't approve of this kind of activity at all," Fulbright said. "But if it is in the national security interest to do this, it seems to me it ought to be done by regular US army forces and not by an intelligence-gathering agency." He added that the National Security Act, which created the CIA, "never contemplated this function" for the agency.

The CIA mission chief in Laos is Lawrence Devlin, listed as a "political officer" in the US Embassy. Unlike most political officers, however, Devlin flatly refuses to see reporters. For all anybody knows, he might agree on that last point with Senator Fulbright, who stressed that he was not criticising the CIA. "The agency is just following orders," Fulbright said.

Cargo and military supplies—as well as personnel—are ferried throughout Laos by Air America and Continental Air Services, private charter firms under contract to the US government. They are better known as the "CIA Airlines", and most of their pilots are ex-air force officers. Reporters are allowed to accompany flights involving rice drops to refugee camps, but are banned when military cargoes are carried.

"Why do you guys always ask about weapons and ammo shipments?" pilot Jim Walsh asked me. Walsh, 38, is an ex-air force officer who has worked in Laos for Air America since 1962. "You know we're not allowed to talk about such things," he said.

Another form of American air service in Laos constitutes the most direct US involvement in the fighting. Under the euphemism of "armed reconnaissance flights", Thailand-based American jets and bombers have mounted aerial bombardments equal to the pounding taken by North Vietnam prior to the bombing halt in 1968. The Ho Chi Minh trail in southeast Laos has been the prime target of American air attacks, but enemy encampments and troops on the Plain of Jars came under heavy fire during the recent government offensive.

Money for many US operations in Laos is cloaked in the budget of the mammoth Agency for International Development, or channelled through other unobtrusive conduits. The scope of American financial support of the neutralist Royal Lao government testifies to the effectiveness of such cover. Total American assistance here is reliably estimated at between US \$250 million and \$300 million per year. Of that, only the technical aid budget—about \$60 million—is made public. The rest, undisclosed, goes almost entirely for military purposes.

Official Confirms Aid Unit Conceals C.I.A. Role in Laos

WASHINGTON, June 7 (AP) —Dr. John A. Hannah, director of the Agency for International Development, acknowledged today that the United States aid program was being used as a cover for operations of the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos.

He said President Nixon might propose divorcing such intelligence work from overseas economic assistance in the future in proposals on foreign-aid reform to be sent to Congress.

"Well, I just have to admit that that is true," Mr. Hannah said when asked if his agency's economic aid "is being used as a cover for C.I.A. operations in Laos." He was questioned on the Metromedia radio news program "Profile."

Mr. Hannah made it clear that he disapproved of the C.I.A.'s use of his agency. He said Laos was the only country in which this was being done and that it stemmed from a 1962 decision that such activity was in the national interest.

Central Intelligence Agency provision of logistical support for the neutralist Government in Vientiane was reported in the past and Senator J. W. Fulbright, the Arkansas Democrat who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has accused the C.I.A. of exceeding its authority in supporting United States military activities in Laos.

Mr. Nixon described United States aid to Laos in a statement March 6 but did not mention any Central Intelligence Agency role.

It is unusual for an executive-branch official to acknowledge publicly that his organization is being used for undercover work abroad.



Associated Press

REVEALS C.I.A. ROLE: Dr. John A. Hannah, foreign aid director, disclosed use of program as a cover for intelligence work in Laos.

RALEIGH, N.C.
TIMES

E - 25, 179

JUN 8 1970

More Reasons to Get Out Now!

Two developments reported in this morning's newspapers emphasize the importance of America getting out of Southeast Asia at the very first possible moment.

One was the revelation of a secret agreement with Thailand, dated Nov. 9, 1967, under which the United States has paid that country more than \$200,000,000 to send up to 10,000 troops to fight in Vietnam.

✓ The other was revelation of the fact that the U. S. aid program has been used as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos.

The payment of \$200,000,000 to Thailand for sending its troops into Vietnam underscores the lonely role America is playing in that Indochina war. If Thailand had been heart-and-soul convinced of America's role there, it no doubt would have sent its troops there without such heavy payment for what seems to be mercenary troops.

On March 6, President Nixon spelled out U. S. aid in Laos, but didn't mention the CIA. The heavy involvement of the CIA in that country can only underscore the widening circle of American problems in Indochina.

President Nixon undoubtedly will keep

his promise to have American troops out of Cambodia by the end of this month. But, during recent days, South Vietnam officials have made it perfectly plain that they will do in Cambodia just what they please. If they keep their troops in that country, American will be in the continuing position of having to be ready to bail them out at any time. And, American air power and American supplies will have to help them.

These developments simply make plain the fact that Southeast Asia is a bottomless pit so far as American presence there is concerned. The first mistake was becoming involved in what really was a civil war in all of Vietnam. Another mistake was attempting to fight a traditional military war in a perfect setup for guerrilla warfare. Still another mistake was the constant American military escalation, seeking a purely military victory. That just hasn't worked.

President Nixon has begun American withdrawal. The sooner he can accomplish it completely, the better off America will be. Until it is accomplished in full, there will be the terrifying danger that the involvement in the bottomless pit will suddenly become greater and greater.

* * *
FOREIGN AID is being used as a cover for CIA operations in Laos, Hannah conceded.

President Nixon may propose divorcing such intelligence work from overseas economic assistance in the future, according to John A. Hannah, head of the Agency for International Development. Hannah made plain he disapproves of the intelligence agency's use of AID, saying, "Certainly, our preference is to get rid of this kind of operation." Appearing on Metro-media's "Profile," Hannah said Laos is the only place where such activity is under way.

Nixon didn't mention the CIA in a March 6 statement on U.S. aid in Laos. But CIA activity there was aired in a Senate inquiry headed by Sen. Symington (D., Mo.).

8 JUN 1970

STATINTL

AID Confirms Its Use As CIA Cover in Laos

By William N. Curry
Washington Post Staff Writer

The head of the U.S. foreign aid program confirmed yesterday that CIA agents use the civilian aid mission in Laos as a cover for anti-Communist operations, much to his displeasure.

But he asserted that Laos "is the only place in the world" where CIA operatives masquerade as field workers of the Agency for International Development (AID).

AID Administrator John A. Hannah, asked if the CIA uses the mission in Laos as a cover, said: "Well, I just have to admit that this is true. This was a decision that was made back in 1962 and by administrations from now until then,

and it is the only place in the world that we are."

He said, "We have had people that have been associated with the CIA and doing things in Laos that were believed to be in the national interest but not routine AID operations."

"Our preference is to get rid of this kind of operation."

Previously, the aid agency has declined to comment on published reports that CIA agents pose as AID rural development workers but actually recruit and train anti-Communist guerrillas, detect enemy movements and act as ground controllers for air strikes.

The 1962 Geneva Convention declared Laos a neutral country.

Hannah's remarks were made on the Metromedia radio news program "Profile."

Hannah said he hopes the connection between the two agencies could be eliminated in a proposed revamping of AID. The separation was one recommendation of a recent task force that studied AID.

"I am sure that it is going to be in the President's recommendations for discussion," he said. "I hope it is going to be in the legislation once that is submitted."

Hannah conceded that the AID role in Laos, plus its war-related activities in Vietnam, "might" have an adverse affect on the AID programs to other nations. "It certainly has not helped . . . It distorts the role of AID," he said. But he defended the original decisions to involve AID as being correct when they were made in 1962.

Hannah was president of Michigan State University when it agreed to train South



JOHN A. HANNAH
... defends '62 decision

Vietnamese police officers for the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. The program turned out to be run by the CIA.

Hannah, who joined AID in 1969, said President Nixon "places a high priority" on the foreign aid program and expressed hope that the Senate will restore recent House-made cuts in AID's budget request for the coming fiscal year.

8 JUN 1970

Agency Is 'Cover' for CIA In Laos, Aid Chief Confirms

The director of American aid operations has confirmed that his agency has been used as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency agents in Laos.

"Well, I just have to admit that that is true," said John A. Hannah, director of the Agency for International Development, when asked yesterday on televi-

sion about recurring reports of CIA use of his organization in Laos.

For months the correspondent of The Star in Laos, Tammy Arbuckle, has been reporting that CIA agents pose as AID officials on the ground to recruit anti-Communist guerrillas, to transmit intelligence on enemy

force movements, and to act as ground control for air strikes against enemy installations. Hannah's was the first official confirmation.

"Associated With the CIA"

"We have had people that have been associated with the CIA and doing things in Laos that were believed to be in the national interest," Hannah said yesterday on the Metromedia radio news program "Profile."

He said the decision was first made in 1962 for Laos, and that such use of AID personnel is now confined to Laos. He also made clear his desire to end the relationship there with CIA.

"Certainly," he said, "our preference is to get rid of this kind of operation. He added that he thought President Nixon will include such a recommendation on splitting foreign economic aid operations from "these political-military operations" in his promised message to Congress on reorganizing the aid program.

Military-Aid Link

The administration has already admitted using the AID mission in Laos to cloak its outright military aid to the Laotian government. The transcript of hearings last October before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on U.S. security commitments, released April 20, outlined how a "special deputy" was set up in the AID mission in the embassy in Laos to coordinate U.S. military contacts with the Laotian army and air force.

Hannah said yesterday that all these "political-military operations ought to be handled by the State and Defense Departments rather than through aid under whatever name."

Asked if the economic assist-



JOHN A. HANNAH

ance program in Laos had been hurt by U.S. military operations in Indochina, Hannah replied that "it certainly has not helped."

The AID director also noted that drafting of specialists in his agency for a year's duty in Vietnam had hurt his operations all over the world. He said he would "welcome" separation of the Vietnam operation from the rest of AID duties.

"Increasingly, with Vietnamization, more and more of what AID will be doing," he said, "will be legitimate aid and less and less of it will be the kind of thing that we should not be doing."

STATINTL

ELMIRA, N.Y.
STAR-GAZETTE
D - 51,075
TELEGRAM
S - 55,644

JUN 7 1970

/Awaiting White House action is a task force report on the U.S. Agency for International Development AID which recommends, in so many words, that aid no longer be a front for CIA and other military-political operations in foreign countries. An AID economic adviser just back from Laos says he and other advisers saw the dozens of CIA agents assigned to AID, but actually carrying out political and military missions in the field. The cover is fine for the CIA, but it badly damages AID's credibility and usefulness, he said. ✓

CIA Reportedly Maims Its Dead on Lao Patrols

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — Bodies of American Central Intelligence Agency operatives killed in ground combat operations in northeast Laos are maimed as much as possible to prevent the North Vietnamese from using them as tangible proof of U.S. ground presence in the area, well informed Lao sources say.

"The Americans have orders they must not be captured. If they are killed, other members of their patrol put a grenade on their face or shoot them up with their machine guns till they can't be recognized," the sources said.

There are 10 American commando teams of 8 to 10 men each operating in northeast Laos, the sources said. The teams operate behind North Vietnamese lines.

Encounter Laotians First

"When the North Vietnamese launch a big attack, they come against the Laotians first. The Lao escape around the flanks to the rear leaving the North Vietnamese facing Thais or Meo tribesmen," the sources said. "American and Thai teams infiltrate the rear, hitting enemy headquarters and communications."

The Americans and Thais operate from a small, secret and tightly guarded airfield near the U.S.-supported guerrilla headquarters at Long

Chien, 75 miles northeast of here.

There are now 1,800 Thais, including artillery and infantrymen, in northeast Laos operations, according to the sources.

U.S. sources refuse to say how many Americans are involved in the military operations.

Sources Become Edgy

They become extremely edgy when asked if the number of American military personnel in Laos has increased since the U.S. Senate subcommittee hearings on Laos last October.

Lao military sources say a further increase in U.S. military aid is coming.

The United States is being asked to supply helicopters and U.S. crews for a new "elite" airmobile unit to be formed from Lao paratroops and other units.

The Lao request follows a worsening in the over-all military situation here.

"Militarily, the Lao are in the worst position they have ever been since 1964," reliable sources say.

In northern Laos, the Plain of Jars is ringed by North Vietnamese units offering a tight defense against the guerrillas.

The North Vietnamese still are pressuring the guerrilla bases at Long Chien and Sam Thong and are to launch new attacks when the monsoon rains begin, probably this month.

MT. VERNON, N.Y.
ARGUS

E - 19,256

JUN 5 1970

Washington Marginalia

WASHINGTON (GNS) — Don't hold your breath waiting for final congressional approval of the Nixon Administration though already passed by the House, it probably won't make it through the Senate before next year. Administration sources say they are running into serious problems rewriting it to meet objections from the Senate Finance Committee that it isn't comprehensive enough.

Awaiting White House action is a task force report on the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) which recommends, in so many words, that AID no longer be a front for CIA and other military-political operations in foreign countries. An AID economic adviser just back from Laos says he and other advisers never saw the dozens of CIA agents assigned to AID, but actually carrying out political and military missions in the field. The cover is fine for the CIA, but it badly damages AID's credibility and usefulness, he said.

Former President Lyndon Johnson apparently is still smarting from the rough reviews his recent television appearances were given. Visiting here last week, he told friends he was working on a book and, although it won't be finished for months, "I've already received six unfavorable reviews of it."

When Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart last week voted exactly the opposite as he had eight years before on a labor decision, he took refuge in a quotation from the late Justice Felix Frankfurter: "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late." From the bench, 84-year-old Justice Hugo L. Black quipped that if Stewart had become wiser with age, he had done it "inconspicuously," because he didn't look any older.

Students may know how the Vietnam War should be resolved, but they don't know how to reach their congressman. Rep. John Hunt, R-N.J., received nine letters from residents

testing the Cambodian invasion, and all addressed to the "Hon. Sam Rayburn." Not only was former Speaker Rayburn a Texas Democrat, but he has been dead for nine years. Hunt got the letters because the Post Office Department forwards improperly addressed mail to the congressman representing the place on the postmark.

The defeat of Gov. David F. Cargo in the Republican State primary in New Mexico is a mixed blessing for the Administration. White House political strategists had favored conservative Anderson Carter, but concede the liberal Cargo would have been a stronger candidate against Democratic Sen. Joseph Montoya.

In Mississippi, where Democratic congressional candidates inevitably run unopposed, Rep. Charles H. Griffin will have a Republican opponent in November — Dr. Al-

bert Ray Lee, 36-year-old physician and leader in the Mississippi private school movement. Lee makes it clear that his hopes rest on the popularity in the South of President Nixon and especially Vice President Agnew, whom he praises unstintingly.

Sen. Lee Metcalf, old foe of the utilities, inserted in the Congressional Record a list of privately-owned power companies and their "percentage of profit." His point: they're making enough money, don't need rate boosts. However, many would quarrel with the Montana Democrat's figures. They list net profit as a percentage of gross income; most state regulators, the utilities themselves, and people familiar with ordinary business practices would figure profit as a percentage of money invested, a much lower figure.

Sen. Charles E. Goodell, R-N.Y., appears to be pulling back from his proposal to allow preventive detention of certain dangerous criminal defendants. Goodell, best known for his views against the Vietnam war, put in the proposal as part of his law enforcement

program. Instead of appealing to the law-and-order people however, it has only angered some of the suspicious liberals whose votes he has been courting.

Clarence McKee, Sen. Jacob Javits' staff expert on hunger and nutrition, is making a political bid of his own this spring. McKee, 27, is running for the board of trustees of Hobart and William Smith College in Geneva, N.Y., and trying to become the first black alumnus, as well as the first under 30, to get elected. A 1965 graduate of Hobart, McKee comes from Scottsville, near Rochester.

OSSINING, N.Y.
CITIZEN-REGISTER

E - 9,179

JUN 5 1970

WASHINGTON MARGINALIA

WASHINGTON (GNS) — Don't hold your breath waiting for final congressional approval of the Nixon Administration Family Assistance Plan. Although already passed by the House, it probably won't make it through the Senate before next year. Administration sources say they are running into serious problems rewriting it to meet objections from the Senate Finance Committee that it isn't comprehensive enough.

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BUY BONDS REGULARLY

June 4, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 5123

Our foreign assistance program was instrumental in spreading the Green Revolution across the fields of the needy nations. But the job is nowhere near finished. There is still much hunger in the world.

The initial task of helping to provide the fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, irrigation and know-how must continue. But the Green Revolution is also taking on new directions. High-yield varieties of rice and wheat have helped boost overall food production in the developing countries by 14 percent in just 3 years. As a result, new problems of grain storage and shipment have emerged. The bountiful harvests have tended to benefit large landholders more than the subsistence farmers.

There is an additional problem. When we talk about hunger, we are not talking about starvation alone. Relatively few people are presently starving to death, but one person in every five in the developing countries is malnourished. The result is people physically and mentally below par—unhappy people who are unable to contribute fully to the development of their countries. One of the pillars of our aid program is research into ways to provide the kind of protein-rich food to minimize malnutrition. This program has helped develop the corn, soya, milk blend known as CSM, which eased the suffering of victims of the Nigerian civil war. The program also helped develop WSB, a wheat soy blend of high protein content. U.S. foreign aid is financing research at the University of Nebraska which seeks wheat varieties which will contain more of the amino acids essential to a health diet. Already almost 11,000 wheats have been tested out of an expected total of 17,000. Research is also underway to find strains of corn which will supply similar basic dietary needs.

This research, solutions to the new problems resulting from the very success of the Green Revolution, and the escalation of the revolution itself depend in large measure upon our foreign aid program. It is up to us to see that the program is not emasculated.

Mr. Chairman, the bill before the House is not entirely adequate to meet the needs and challenges of helping ourselves through help to developing countries, but the funds which it will make available are important toward that end and I urge its passage by the House.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I urge a closer look at this bill which comes before us as a foreign assistance appropriation. I refer specifically to the \$350 million for military assistance and \$272,500,000 for foreign military credit sales in titles I and II of H.R. 17867. An examination of the committee report does not reveal much, but a study of the hearings held earlier this year brings out some alarming evidence of the uses to which these funds will be put.

In testimony on American military activity in Laos, Defense Secretary Laird claimed that our policies have not changed for the past 4 years. He further explained:

I want to make it clear we are not sending combat troops to Laos. We have a total of approximately — military personnel in Laos. They are serving there as military attaches and as military personnel who give military assistance. They are military assistants to the Royal Laotian Forces.

Secretary Laird went on to place the total number of U.S. personnel, military and civilian, in Laos at 1,040.

Mr. Chairman, I recently sent two of my staff members, one of whom was a military adviser to the Royal Lao Army in the early 1960's and the other a regional director of the U.S. AID refugee program, on a 10-day inspection trip to Laos. They reported back to me that at least half of the Air Force's 48,000 men now stationed in Thailand are directly involved in air strikes over Laos, and that an unknown number of U.S. military personnel are assigned to Laos on "temporary duty" from military base in Southeast Asia. Air America carries personnel and arms throughout Laos, American pilots are served as forward air controllers, and other American pilots fly missions over Laos from carriers in the South China Sea and from other Southeast Asia bases.

Mr. Chairman, these observations confirm that the administration is fully committing American personnel to the war in Laos and keeping the facts carefully concealed from the American people. The subterfuge of reporting a military unit as being assigned to Vietnam when it is actually operational in Laos can only be called a massive deception, one more example of executive usurpation of the congressional prerogative to declare where in the world American fighting men shall be committed. These activities are largely carried on under the auspices of the CIA, and the fact that many of our military "advisers" operate in civilian clothing instead of khaki does not lessen the implications of a massive American involvement in Laos.

Furthermore the estimated American air sorties over Laos are now placed at approximately 900 a day, seven times the level of 2 years ago, at a cost of billions of dollars to the American taxpayers. Since the administration by design refuses to disclose the exact costs of our Laos involvement, as well as the commitment of American troops, it becomes our role in Congress to turn back foreign military spending bills like this one until we have a full and complete disclosure as to where this money is going and why.

Furthermore, Secretary Laird testified before an Appropriations Subcommittee on March 10, 1970, that to the best of his knowledge there had been only one American military assistant killed in Laos to that date. If it is indeed true that this is the only combat death that the Defense Secretary knows about, then we must ask by what authorization and by whom is this clandestine war being waged. We must ask why the facts cannot be revealed to the American people. We must insist on being told what independent war-making body exists within the executive branch of our Government.

The pertinent information is either deleted from the hearings, or it is not

being presented to Congress, and yet we are expected to go on giving blank checks for military ventures without any congressional scrutiny as to the implications for our foreign policy vis-a-vis Southeast Asia. This has been the sorry story ever since our tragic and seemingly endless intervention in Indochina began, and it is finally time for us in the Congress to stand up and say "The buck stops here." If the American people are to be denied the facts about our foreign policies, then it is indeed a sorry day for representative democracy in this country. This appropriation bill and all others with military funds should be defeated until a full accounting is made to the Congress and to the American people.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, yesterday the House passed legislation to raise the ceiling on the national debt. I opposed this proposal because I believe what this Nation needs is sound financial management, not just more debt piled upon our existing indebtedness. As of the first quarter of 1970, the national debt totaled approximately \$373 billion, an \$11-billion increase over last year. The annual interest on this amount will cost the taxpayers \$18 billion.

To facilitate economic recovery Congress should cut unnecessary spending rather than raising the public debt. This is the surest route to national financial health.

Today, Congress has the opportunity to facilitate economic stability not by increasing tax liabilities, but by decreasing Federal spending. It can do this by refusing to appropriate additional money for foreign aid this year. This would not be fatal to our foreign aid program; it would, however, help flush out the foreign aid pipelines. Presently, in addition to the requests for authorizations and appropriations, there is approximately \$18.5 billion left from previous years lying unspent in the pipelines. These funds fall in the following general categories:

Unexpended balances in pipeline from prior years for selected aid programs

Foreign assistance (mutual security)	\$4,450,356,000
Export-Import Bank, uncommitted borrowing authority	4,454,200,000
Export-Import Bank, long-term credits	3,006,000,000
Export-Import Bank, Regular Operation	345,100,000
Export-Import Bank, Expansion Program	102,200,000
Inter-American Development Bank	2,259,494,000
Military Assistance (in defense budget)	1,330,000,000
Public Law 480 (agriculture commodities)	851,426,000
Permanent military construction overseas	448,000,000
Foreign Military Credit Sales Fund	406,215,000
International Development Association	350,000,000
Asian Development Bank	140,000,000
Overseas Private Investment Corporation	135,500,000
Peace Corps	27,157,000
Education exchange	26,706,000
International military headquarters	30,000,000

Our questions on Laos answered

By JOHN PITTMAN

(This is the third of a series of reports based on a fact-finding and good will visit to the liberated areas of Laos, April 28-May 5, by a World Peace Council delegation that included the author.)

A LIBERATED AREA,

Laos, April 29 (By air-mail) — After a few hours' sleep under mosquito nets in this cave, the World Peace Council delegates prepare for a briefing on the situation of Free Laos. We breakfast on omelet, toast and coffee in time to greet Sisane Sisan, a member of the Lao Committee for World Peace.

A gracious, patient and imperturbably cheerful man at such an unreasonable hour in the morning, Sisane is the father of seven, an intellectual and scholar, director of the radio and information services of Free Laos, a playwright and composer of songs. He is widely traveled and speaks a fluent French. We set upon him with questions.

1. What is the present situation in Laos?

"At present the liberated areas form two-thirds of the country with one-half of its population of roughly three million. That is to say, people's power is established in 638 of the country's 1,078 villages and probably now in 8,620 of its 13,063 hamlets — mostly in the jungles and mountains. The U.S. imperialists control through the Vientiane administration one-third of the country with half of the population, mainly in the plains and deltas, and with 1,235,000 of the country's 1,729,000 acres of arable land.

"As to the current relationship of forces, the enemy is on the defensive, although he is counter-attacking fiercely in an effort to change the balance.

"On April 16, our forces put out of action General Vang Pao, the American-trained commander of its 'special forces' puppet troops. We understand Vang Pao is hospitalized at Udon Thani, Thailand, the main headquarters from which the American imperialists direct the aggression against Laos.

"On April 24, our forces disintegrated seven battalions of 'special forces' at Sam Thong, but they escaped to Van Vang and Pak Sane. Our recent victory in the Plain of Jars put 6,000 puppet 'special forces' out and dealt a decisive blow to the enemy. But the U.S. imperialists are carrying out a round-the-clock bombing with B-52s in this entire area.

"In brief that is the current military situation."

2. When you speak of the 'enemy' whom do you mean?

"American imperialism in the first place. But also the compradore and feudal elements whom the U.S. imperialists have installed in the Vientiane regime. And of course the armed forces and political cadres carrying out their orders — including 12 Thai battalions, remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek troops, Japanese so-called 'aid' forces and Saigon puppet troops.

"Up to last November there were 147 battalions of puppet and mercenary troops operating against us, about 60,000 men. But after they were continuously defeated by our forces, President Nixon has reinforced and greatly strengthened them."

3. Why do you consider American imperialism, rather than the Vientiane compradore and feudal elements and their Royal Army and mercenaries, the main enemy?

"First, the U.S. imperialists provide all the arms, equipment, money for paying the enemy soldiers, supplies and training for

all the armed forces attacking the liberated areas. They draw up the plans for the attacks, provide the logistics and give the orders.

"Second, the U.S. imperialists are using American personnel as well as Asian forces in these attacks, and are solely responsible for the bombings and wanton destruction of our country.

"Third, the U.S. imperialists are using their so-called 'development aid' to expand and strengthen the compradore strata to restore and reinforce the feudal strata, to monopolize Lao trade and prevent the development of Lao economy, to sow dissension and hatred between the three main ethnic groups in Laos, and to set up so-called 'prosperity zones' and 'refugee camps' holding one-fifth of the Lao population for forcibly impressing our young men into the puppet army and our young women into brothels.

"Fourth, the U.S. imperialists alone have blocked and sabotaged every agreement reached between Vientiane and our side to sit down and negotiate a settlement of the Lao question. In doing this U.S. imperialism has violated the 1954 Geneva Agreement which it did not sign, the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos which it did sign, and the most elementary principles of international law."

4. Official U.S. sources deny Americans are involved in combat, yet you say they are. What are your grounds for such a statement?

"We consider our information reliable. We know that at least 1,200 U.S. Green Beret officers and men are actively directing and participating in operations of the so-called 'special forces.' In addition, no small part of the U.S. Airforce personnel in Thailand are directly involved. And we have grounds for believing U.S. Airforce personnel in South Vietnam, Okinawa, Guam and the Seventh Fleet are also participating in bombing attacks on Laos.

"Besides these combat forces, several thousand Americans are engaged in indirect combat, that is, in activities directly supplementing the military operations.

These include 2,000 trainers of the 'special forces,' 200 personnel for the CIA's Air America and Air Continental, and the 3,000 Americans working in USAID and USIS, the agencies for economic and psychological warfare. Even the 101st Air Corps people perform duties directly connected with military operations.

"The Vientiane administration has no control over any of these forces. They take orders solely from the U.S. headquarters base in Thailand. Royal Army troops are used mainly for police work in the Vientiane-controlled areas.

The so-called 'civilian' advisers take orders from the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, not from the Vientiane administration."

The WPC delegates ask more questions, but since we are now long past the lunch hour, Mr.

Sisan suggests that we put these off until another day, have lunch, and begin an on-the-spot survey of some of the accomplishments of people's power in the liberated areas.

4 June 1970

A Special Supplement

CAMBODIA

Noam Chomsky

I

In 1947, commenting on the rising tide of "anti-Communist" hysteria in the United States, John K. Fairbank made the following perceptive observations:

Our fear of Communism, partly as an expression of our general fear of the future, will continue to inspire us to aggressive anti-

Communist policies in Asia and elsewhere, [and] the American people will be led to think and may honestly believe that the support of anti-Communist governments in Asia will somehow defend the American way of life. This line of American policy will lead to American aid to establish regimes which attempt to suppress the popular movements in Indonesia, Indochina, the Philippines, and China. . . . Thus, after setting out to fight Communism in Asia, the American people will be obliged in the end to fight the peoples of Asia.

This American aggression abroad will be associated with an increasing trend toward anti-Communist authoritarianism within the United States, which its victims will call fascism and which may eventually make it impossible to have discussions like this one today. This American fascism will come, if it comes, because American liberals have joined the American public in a fear of Communism from abroad rather than fascism at home as the chief totalitarian menace.¹

These remarks have proved to be accurate. The events of the past few weeks reveal, once again, how the American policy of "anti-Communism"—to be more precise, the effort to prevent the development of indigenous movements that might extricate their societies from the integrated world system dominated by American capital—draws the American government, step by fateful step, into an endless war against the people of Asia, and, as a

inevitable concomitant, toward harsh repression and defiance of law at home.

The invasion of Cambodia by the United States and its Saigon subsidiary comes as no surprise, in the light of recent events in Southeast Asia. Since 1968, the United States has steadily escalated the war in Laos, both on the ground, as the CIA-sponsored Clandestine Army swept through the Plain of Jars in late 1969, and from the air. When the report of the Symington subcommittee on Laos was finally released on April 20, the Washington *Post* carried the front-page headline: *US ESCALATES WAR IN LAOS, HILL DISCLOSES*. The headline was accurate; other evidence, to which I shall return in a later article, shows that the subcommittee hearings seriously understate the scale, and the grim effects, of the American escalation. This American escalation provoked a response by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam, who now control more of Laos than ever before, and led to devastation and population removal on a vast scale.

The destabilizing event in Cambodia—assiduously ignored by President Nixon in his speech of April 30 announcing the American invasion²—was the right-wing coup of March 18 which overthrew Prince Sihanouk and drove him into an alliance with the Cambodian left and the mass popular movements of Laos and Vietnam,

which are dominated by left-wing forces. The coup, and the events that followed, must be understood as a further step in the internationalization of the Vietnam war. However, the coup should also be seen in the context of developments internal to Cambodia over the past several years. These factors are, of course, interrelated.

Since early 1964 the United States has been conducting its war in Indochina from sanctuaries scattered from Thailand to Okinawa. The bombardment of Laos, which appears to have

begun in May, 1964, and the intensive bombardment of North and South Vietnam that followed in February, 1965, make use of bases in Thailand, South Vietnam, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Guam, not to speak of the naval units that control the surrounding oceans. The control center for the bombing of North Vietnam and Northern Laos is in Thailand, presumably, at Udorn airbase. In 1968, the bombing of Laos greatly increased in intensity, when aircraft formerly employed against North Vietnam were shifted to the bombardment of Laos. In 1969, the bombing of Northern Laos was again greatly intensified as infiltration fell off on the so-called "Ho Chi Minh Trail." Most of this area has long been under Pathet Lao control.

As a glance at the map makes clear, the bombing of Northern Laos takes

place in a region far removed from the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" and has no direct connection to the war in South Vietnam. It is, in fact, directed against civilian targets and has resulted in almost total destruction of most settled areas and forced evacuation of much of the population. Where people remain, they live, for the most part, in caves and tunnels. According to American Embassy figures, the population remaining in the Pathet Lao zones is over a million, well over a third of the population of Laos. There may be as many as three-quarters of a million refugees in the government-controlled areas. The planes that attack Northern Laos are based in Thailand, whereas the bombing of Southern Laos (including the "Ho Chi Minh Trail") originates from Danang, Pleiku, and the Seventh Fleet. Now the Thai bases are also being used to bomb Cambodia.³

The American escalation of the war in Laos provoked a response by the Communist forces, which now control more of Laos than ever before. (I shall

THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS

4 June 1970

From the City of Lies

Murray Kempton

Washington

Mr. Nixon, who has his nightmares while he is wide awake, cannot sleep at four o'clock the morning of Saturday, May 9; telephones and arouses Helen Thomas, the United Press's White House correspondent, to talk about her predecessor, who committed suicide a month ago; leaves her at last in peace to lurch off to the Lincoln Memorial and a conversation with the young waiting, as he puts it, "to shout your slogans in the Ellipse."

Joan Polletier, a Syracuse University student, remembers the encounter: "Here we come from a university that's completely uptight, on strike, and, when we told him where we are from, he talked about the football team, and when someone said he was from California, he talked about surfing." (*The New York Times*, May 10.)

What was it he had said to the Negro trooper in Vietnam? Something to the effect that "I guess you miss those collar greens."

Memories keep intruding like uneasy ghosts—memories of *Six Crises*,¹ that curious confession which Mr. Nixon disguised as a memoir of prideful occasions and which went largely unattended in 1962 because then he had little place in history except as a national disaster that no one thought could ever happen.

"When a man has been through even a minor crisis," Mr. Nixon reflected then, "he learns not to worry when his muscles tense up, his breathing comes faster, his nerves tingle, his stomach churns, his temper becomes short, his nights are sleepless. He recognizes such symptoms as the natural and healthy signs that his system is keyed up for battle. Far from worrying when this happens, he should worry when it does not."

There had been the moment, during the pursuit of Alger Hiss, when he "... began to notice the inevitable symptoms of tension. I was 'mean' to live with at home and with my friends. I was quick-tempered with members of my staff. I lost interest in eating and skipped meals without even being aware of it. Getting to sleep became more and more difficult."

"I suppose that some might say I was 'nervous,' but I knew these were simply the evidences of preparing for battle. There is, of course, a fine line to be observed. *One must always be keyed up for battle but he must not be jittery. He is jittery only when he worries about the natural symptoms of stress.*"

So Mr. Nixon is most confident about himself when there stir in his interior those symptoms which can only alarm every sober person around him.

We are ruled then by a night mind of this sort. Its exegesis and explanation to the concerned are a major chore of Henry Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's assistant for National Security Affairs. Kissinger is supposed to have said recently that every war has its casualties and that he is resigned to being a casualty of this one; but he seems to bear his martyrdom with marked equanimity. The day after Mr. Nixon moved into Cambodia, Kissinger made his contribution to the public calm by lunching for two hours at the Sans Souci. It is natural that the journalists cling to him; he is a symbol of that continuity of our national policies, according to which the same advisers counsel an infinite variety of Presidents.

Kissinger's background briefings are instruments to support—if not often to comport with—Mr. Nixon's public speeches. His system seems to be to offer persons discontented with the public explanation the semiprivate alternative of its direct opposite. On April 30 we had Mr. Nixon presenting an enemy "concentrating his main forces in these sanctuaries where they are building up to launch massive attacks" on our troops in South Vietnam. The next day, Kissinger could describe this same enemy as one who, far from threatening South Vietnam, was actually "debouching" westward—which ought to suggest that he had fewer troops in this area of massive build-up than he had had two weeks before.

"Tonight," Mr. Nixon had said, "American and South Vietnamese troops will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam."

The next day, Kissinger had to answer the questions of journalists who won-

dered whether Hanoi might be aroused to reprisal by any such slash at its jugular. His reply, tailored to cover such alarms, did not remotely fit Mr. Nixon's immediately previous image of North Vietnam's "intransigence and belligerence." Instead he reminded his questioners of Hanoi's fidelity to our understanding that its troops will not cross the demilitarized zone, which "is, in fact, the only ground sanctuary from which they can threaten our forces in Vietnam."

The other monument to Kissinger's flexibility of response has been his establishment of a designation for the

Cambodian venture, which is not an "invasion" but a "technical incursion." This term became immediately popular with those few persons with whom the enterprise was popular. Senator Tower of Texas, for example, took at once to describing it as this "incursion," dropping Kissinger's modifier. It is curious that these two academicians should each have thought that this substitute would elevate the tone of the affair, "incursion" being a word rather more pejorative than "invasion," inescapably echoing the burglary statutes as it does. Higher civilizations invade while barbarians incur. The New Webster definition of "incursion" is: "a running in, into, or against; hence a hostile entrance into a territory; a sudden invasion; raid, in-

road." Dictionary instances of its usage run to expressions of outrage or contempt for the sort of creatures who do such things: the New Webster's example is a sentence of Justice Cardozo's from a tort opinion involving an incursion of pigs; the Shorter Oxford's is from Milton ("Against the Scythian, whose incursions wild / Have wasted Sogdiana...").

This is territory which is technically inside Cambodia, completely occupied by North Vietnamese forces, containing very little Cambodian population if any...

—Henry Kissinger, April 30²

Laos Could Become Second Cambodia

By Jack Anderson

The ouster of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk has stirred up plots in Laos to dump Prince Souvanna Phouma and set up a Cambodian-style military government. This could repeat the Cambodian crisis all over again in Laos, with dangerous consequences for the U.S.

Intelligence reports warn that rightist Laotian leaders have been encouraged by the Cambodian experience to attempt a similar takeover in their country. They are weary of the aging Souvanna Phouma who, like Sihanouk, has put on a show of outward neutrality. But just as Sihanouk permitted secret incursions by the North Vietnamese, Souvanna Phouma allowed the Americans to operate in Laos.

The Kremlin had promised both leaders that the North Vietnamese would leave their countries after the Vietnam War was settled. But as the encroachments increased, the two princes lost faith in the Soviet promise and concluded that the North Vietnamese would never clear out voluntarily.

Souvanna Phouma turned

increasingly to the U.S. to save Laos from the Communist crunch. But Sihanouk flew to Moscow and Peking to enlist support in getting the North Vietnamese out of Cambodia. While he was on this mission, he was deposed by the generals he left behind. Now he has joined the same forces, ironically, that he had tried to remove.

Secret Understanding

Washington and Moscow reached a secret understanding, meanwhile, to keep still about the U.S. intervention in Laos. As long as the U.S. didn't officially acknowledge its clandestine operations, the Kremlin agreed to ignore them.

The Russians, as they had promised Sihanouk and Souvanna Phouma, also guaranteed there would be no North Vietnamese takeover of Laos and Cambodia. Both the Soviet and Americans agreed to endeavor, at least, to confine the war to South Vietnam.

At no time did the U.S. wish to expand the Vietnam conflict into a full-scale Indochina war. Restricting the battlefield to South Vietnam, however, also had advantages

for the Communists. It meant that the U.S. could never really win the war. For it is impossible to defeat an enemy who can escape across the border into sanctuaries.

In 1964, the North Vietnamese began enlarging their sanctuary privileges in Laos by attacking the Plain of Jars and increasing the infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh spiderweb of trails.

The U.S. countered by stepping up its clandestine activities and bombing the infiltration routes. After the bombing of North Vietnam was halted in 1968, the U.S. simply moved the sorties across the border and concentrated the full fury upon Red targets in Laos.

CIA Secret Army

The Central Intelligence Agency, meanwhile, has subsidized a secret army in Laos under Gen Vang Pao, a vulgar ex-French Army sergeant, whose 14,000 fighting men have been recruited largely from the minority Meo tribes.

The secret army is headquartered at the multi-million-dollar CIA base of Long Cheng. A steady stream of Air America and Continental Air Services planes, under CIA

and AID contracts, haul food, munitions and the monthly payroll for Vang Pao's troops.

Stories have now leaked out about his clandestine army, describing it accurately as the only effective fighting force in Laos on the American side. Yet my reporter in Indochina, Les Whitten, reports from Vientiane:

"The sad fact is that all the millions expended upon Vang Pao's mercenaries have not convinced one responsible U.S. official in Saigon or Vientiane that this land of 2.8 million people can be defended for more than a few weeks by the secret army against a determined Communist attack.

"The Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese control half of Laos and clearly could take over the other half almost at will."

Whitten adds that "the fabled CIA forces, which liberal senators regard as some kind of powerful presence in Laos, are made up, in fact, of time servers, a few brilliant intelligence men and a larger number of ex-servicemen who are as harassed as any Washington bureaucrats simply trying to carry out routine duties."

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THE VIETNAMIZATION OF LAOS

ON MARCH 11, 1968, PATHET LAO troops overran the secret American radar base at Phou Pha Thi along the North Vietnamese border in north-eastern Laos. The base had been constructed in late 1964, shortly after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, to guide U.S. aircraft flying from Thailand to their targets in North Vietnam and to release their bomb loads electronically. Pha Thi was also used as a base for rescue helicopters, and according to the San Francisco Chronicle, "American Air Force and CIA personnel used the valley landing strip as the base for American-led teams of Meo mercenaries entering North Vietnam on special harassment missions." These teams were also used to attack the Pathet Lao administrative headquarters in Samneua province.

The existence of the base at Pha Thi, besides being a clear violation of the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos, demonstrates an essential aspect of the war which has long been understood by both sides (if not by the American public): the war in Vietnam and the war in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia are the same war. They cannot, as some U.S. senators have naively, or deceptively, suggested, be fought or resolved in isolation from one another. As early as 1955, the U.S. was organizing an all-Southeast Asian front against communist revolutions (SEATO). By the late '50s, there were U.S. armed and advised Thai and South Vietnamese troops fighting the Pathet Lao in Laos. For its part, the Pathet Lao had helped the Viet Minh in the struggle against French colonial rule in Indochina, and after the neutralist coalition broke down in Laos in 1958-59, the Pathet Lao once more turned to the North Vietnamese for aid as the U.S. pushed a war of extermination by the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) against the Laotian revolutionaries. While they are fighting for a revolution within the context of Laotian society, then, the Pathet Lao have historically also been engaged in an Indochina-wide struggle, by virtue of the very scale on which the war against them has been fought.

The U.S. has consistently justified its actions in Indochina by saying that it was defending Laos and South Vietnam from North Vietnamese aggression. This argument has no more validity in respect to Laos than it does to South Vietnam. The Pathet Lao is an indigenous revolutionary movement and North Vietnamese aid to the Pathet Lao has been

in direct response to American intervention in the Laotian civil war. Indeed, the real subversion in Laos has been the virtually complete take-over by the CIA of the Laotian government administration and army and the creation of an economy which is almost totally dependent on United States aid.

[A REVOLUTION IS BORN]

IN LAOS AS IN VIETNAM, an anti-French independence movement emerged immediately after the surrender of the Japanese, who had occupied Indochina during World War II. In coordination with similar moves in Cambodia and Vietnam, the Laotian resistance seized power in one provincial capital after another, starting in Vientiane. On September 1, 1945, Prince Phetsarath proclaimed the rupture of ties with France and declared the independent kingdom of Luang Prabang. He appointed a provisional national assembly, and an independent and unified Laos had a short-lived nominal existence.

On September 17, however, the King of Laos announced the continuance of the French protectorate, dismissing Phetsarath, who then set up a provisional government of Lao Issara (Free Laos), in which Souvanna Phouma—later to lead the "neutralists"—and Souphanouvong—later to lead the Pathet Lao—held important posts. Unwilling to lose their holdings in Indochina, the French began working their way up from the south (the Allies having agreed to let the Kuomintang occupy northern Indochina), decimating the Lao Issara troops and forcing the provisional government into exile in Bangkok. The French then resumed control of Laos and began to reorganize the Laotian units of the French army, instituting a draft of Laotians to aid the French in their fight against the Viet Minh.

Souphanouvong, Souvanna Phouma and Phetsarath were all brothers (Souphanouvong a half-brother of the others), and they had all received engineering degrees in France. Phetsarath represented the royalist, more traditionalist ideology and interests in Laos. Souvanna Phouma was the republican, the neutralist; and Souphanouvong was already a leftist.

Souphanouvong, future leader of the Pathet Lao, had been in France during the Popular Front in 1937, and had

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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

May 28, 1970

Europe; Egeberg returned, canceling a Russian trip.

Asked about reports that he was asked to resign, English said last week: "Number one, no comment, Number two, I don't deny (it)."

Immediately on his resignation, his job was removed from civil service and made appointive. A high-level official in the same agency said:

"The politics is getting more naked. I can assure you there has never before been the political check there is now—down to the GS-14 level." (GS-14s start at \$19,643 or more.)

The appointment of a new director of mental health services, Dr. Claude Thomas; the nomination of Dr. Morris Chafetz of Boston as director of alcoholism programs; the search for a new director of mental health training—all have received political checks.

"I've Voted on Both Sides"

So, of course, did the appointment last week of English's successor, Dr. Vernon Wilson, director of health affairs at the University of Missouri. Wilson says: "I don't consider myself either a Democrat or a Republican. I've voted on both sides. From my point of view, this is not a political appointment."

But Wilson was clearly found "acceptable," said a Missouri Democratic congressional aide. "He's a good man. He has no rockable politics. But he's not going to rock any boats."

The administration screening of health and scientific appointments is really no secret, according to Dr. Stanley Yolles, director of the National Institute of Mental Health. "It is the stated policy of this administration to appoint as many Republicans as possible. There is screening of scientific appointments throughout the department," he said.

According to repeated rumors, and many predictions by knowledgeable persons, both Yolles and Dr. Robert Marston, director of the National Institutes of Health, are currently being screened. Both are said to be " slated to go, inside months."

Report Denied

Marston is out of the country. An aide called the rumors about him "untrue."

"No one has said a single, solitary thing to me," Yolles said. "But I've heard the rumors. There's one that my successor has already been picked."

Yolles is on the bad books of HEW higher-ups for two reasons. He opposes much of an on-going decentralization of NIMH activities to regional offices. Opponents call this "the start of NIMH's dismemberment."

Yolles or his aides last year helped inspire both House and Senate to insert in NIMH legislation a veto power for the National Advisory Mental Health Council—a citizen and expert board—over regional decisions affecting one of NIMH's proudest programs.

This is the program to establish and partly support community mental health centers, which are local clinics to give emergency and day care to help keep mental patients out of hospitals. By July, 400 such centers will have been funded.

Early in his administration, President Nixon ordered that as many federal programs as possible be returned to "grass roots" control. An HEW task force under Deputy Under Secretary Fred V. Malek is trying to do so.

"POWER PLAY"

It sees putting the mental health centers under HEW's 10 regional offices as "better administration, closer to the people." The program's directors at NIMH see it as a "power play" to put what has been an \$90-million-a-year program under the real control of HEW's nonmedical regional directors—appointees close to state and local pressures.

In any case, mental health center construction decisions were regionalized March 31; staff matters are slated to be regionalized July 1.

The national advisory council—highly disturbed—is to meet with Under Secretary Malek in June. It also believes he intends to regionalize NIMH training grants, which support 65 percent of the training of all mental health professionals.

In a letter to Dr. Robert Stubblefield of the University of Texas, council secretary, Finch recently denied this intention. But a council member says: "That doesn't fit his directives."

"FUNDED LAST"

NIMH is an agency with a degree of independence and strength that mental health forces fought hard to create. Mental health, they claim, is commonly submerged under general medical or administrative direction, "funded last and least."

"Take away the mental health centers and the \$110-million training program, notes Yolles, and "about all you'd have left" is about \$87 million currently financing research and a few other small programs, hardly a strong NIMH.

NIMH as a whole is to be funded at just \$346.6 million in fiscal 1971 by the Nixon budget, well below 1970's \$360.3 million. There are to be no new community mental health center grants.

Narcotic and alcohol addiction programs are to rise a bit from \$29.4 million to \$35.5 million. But "for community treatment of narcotics in 1970, I have just \$4 million left," Yolles said, "and \$18 million in valid community requests." As it happens Secretary Finch—in a memo to editors last week—said, "President Nixon has designated May 24 through 30 as Drug Abuse Prevention Week."

Staff appointments are not the only place there has been HEW political pressure. A year ago Dr. Jack Weinberg, director of the Illinois Neuropsychiatric Institute, was asked to accept renomination for an advisory committee on aging. Then he was asked about his politics.

"I said, 'I worked for Sen. McCarthy,'" he reports. "I was not reappointed."

This happened "in some cases" but is no longer going on, said a department source.

Higher-ups forced the transfer of longtime civil servant Clifford Johnson as NIH public information director, presumably to make way for a political appointee. But last week Marston announced appointment of Storm Whaley, University of Arkansas vice president for health sciences—and a Democrat—as a new "director of communications" public and scientific.

"Since the news got out about Joe English," another source said, "people have been getting phone calls and tender care. We've seen appointments going through in the last few days after hanging fire since November."

The screening system, however, remains—this Republican administration's response, it seems, to the fact that a majority of mental health workers and academic research and health types happen to be Democrats.

Health Democrats and health doves are giving the administration still more problems. For months, there has been an NIH-NIMH clerk-and-professional Moratorium Committee opposing the Vietnam war—a bold move in a part of the government where there was rarely political expression before for fear of political retaliation.

Last week the movement spread to the NIMH-National Institute of Neurological Disease-National Eye Institute Assembly of Scientists—MDs and PhDs. They voted 164 to 23 to oppose U.S. involvement in Cambodia, the first time this group has ever taken a nonmedical political position.

"In every way," reported an Assembly doctor, "people here are getting more disturbed. 'I'd predict you haven't seen anything yet in the way of rebellion.'"

THE ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE TO LEARN FROM HISTORY

HON. ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 25, 1970

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, someone said that history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. It is hard to say whether with President Nixon's decision to invade Cambodia we are in the tragic or the farcical phase of the Vietnam war. Maybe we are in between, because as Mr. Nixon recited the worn arguments that have been used to justify so many mistaken actions one did not know whether to laugh or cry.

By now it is obvious to nearly everyone that our course in Vietnam has been based on demonstrably faulty political analysis, fallacious historical analogies, and outmoded perceptions of the international political landscape and our strategic interests within it.

I am inserting in the Record two articles that illuminate the tragicomic nature of the administration's failure to learn from history and its reliance on arguments and concepts that have been repudiated by events. The articles—one serious, the other satirical—are by Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau, who has been perhaps the most profound and prescient critic of the war from its beginning, and Robert H. Yoakum. They appeared in the May 23 issue of the New Republic.

The articles follow:

SAVING FACE IN INDOCHINA:

I—MR. NIXON'S GAMBLE

(By Hans J. Morgenthau)

It would be uncharitable, and redundant, to dwell in detail upon the factual deficiencies and logical inconsistencies of Mr. Nixon's April 30th speech. What shall one say of an authoritative exposition by the President of the United States of the Cambodian situation that manages not even to mention the source of the trouble, the overthrow of Sihanouk? Or what shall one make of the President's statement that we are after "the heart of the trouble," the enemy's headquarters for all of South Vietnam, while, when these headquarters cannot be found, both the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense assure us that of course they cannot be found since they are mobile? However, Mr. Agnew assures us on "Face the Nation" of May 3 that we found a "laundry facility" and large stores of "freshly laundered uniforms," and Bob Hope warns us on the "Tonight" show of May 4 that if Cambodia falls India will go and "before you know it we will be fighting in Staten Island." Ostensibly Mr. Hope was not joking, but neither were Messrs. Agnew and Nixon; or were all three of them trying to be funny with tongue-in-cheek?

Yet the farcical aspects of these presentations only serve to give poignancy to the tragedy present and impending. Mr. Nixon is caught in a dilemma caused by two irreconcilable impulses. On the one hand, he wants to disengage from Vietnam; on the other hand he wants to disengage only in circumstances which, if they don't carry the substance, at least convey the appearance, of a political victory. And political victory for him means the stabilization of the Thieu regime as the legitimate government of South Vietnam. But this conception of

27 May 1970

Laotian guerrillas cut Ho Chi Minh trail

By T. ARBUCKLE in Vientiane

SPECIAL Laotian guerrilla units with American advisers were yesterday cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail near Route 23, outside Tangvai village in Southern Laos.

The mission of the two battalions in Savannakhet province is to search for arms and food caches.

After the guerrillas swept through Tangvai before launching their operation, North Vietnamese troops who had earlier retreated re-occupied the village.

Laos warned North Vietnam yesterday that any attempt to capture an important government-held town could lead to the end of the 1962 Geneva accords guaranteeing the kingdom's neutrality.

Mr Sisouk Na Champassak, Minister of Finance and permanent representative of the Prime Minister at the Defence Ministry, told the official Lao news agency that any North Vietnamese plans to take the town of Saravane could have serious repercussions on the internal politics of Laos.

CIA leads units

In yesterday's operation were "special guerrilla units" from a secret army led and paid by the Central Intelligence Agency. American advisers with these units work for the Agency. They are armed and advise and carry out similar functions to American Army advisers.

This use of CIA employees permits the Nixon Administration to technically deny that American troops are in Laos. The Tangvai operation is in conjunction with other South Vietnamese and American operations in Laos and Cambodia.

The Americans and South Vietnamese are hitting a Communist base area in Laos close to the "triborder" where Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam meet. This is just north of recent American operations in the Se San river valley in Cambodia.

The operations in Laos are said to be necessary to prevent reinforcements and supplies reaching the Communists in Cambodia and to prevent the Communists rebuilding their sanctuaries there.

It is the CIA and through it America which bears the brunt of all military operations. The Royal Lao Army does nothing except hold defensive positions.

U.S. ADVISES ON MOVES

Lao Guerrilla Units
Attacking Red TrailBy TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE—Laotian special guerrilla units with American advisers are cutting portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos, informed sources said today.

Two battalions of Lao guerrillas are hitting Route 23 on the western flank of the trail outside of Tangvai Village in Savannakhet Province.

"Their mission is to hit Route 23 and search for arms and food caches," the sources said.

The guerrillas swept through Tangvai before launching their operation. North Vietnamese troops retreated, but then reoccupied Tangvai behind the guerrillas.

Advised by CIA

The units in this operation are "special guerrilla units" from the secret army led and paid for by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The American advisers accompanying these units work for the CIA.

They are armed. They advise and carry out other functions similar to American advisers with South Vietnamese units. Use of CIA employes permits the Nixon administration to deny there are U.S. combat troops in Laos.

The Tangvai operation is in conjunction with South Vietnamese and other American actions in Laos and Cambodia.

Americans and South Vietnamese are hitting Communist Base Area 609 in Laos close to the tri-border of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam and just north of recent U.S. operations in the Se San River Valley in Cambodia.

Move on Red Base

The operations in Laos are said to be necessary to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching the Communists in Cambodia and prevent them from rebuilding their sanctuaries there.

Part of the operation against the Communist Base Area 609 is run from Kongmei, an airstrip used by CIA operatives working out of the Mekong River town of Pakse, a CIA substation responsible for running the war in Lao Military Region 4.

As in other military regions in Laos, it is the CIA and through it the United States which bears the brunt of all military operations.

The Royal Lao Army does nothing except hold a few defensive positions.

The Pakse substation is run by an American counter-insurgency expert. He was once a colonel in the U.S. Army, served with distinction in the Congo, retired, and was later called back to service.

The substation is in a white-walled, windowless building with a forest of communications antenna on its roof.

The building is identified as an "annex" for the U.S. Agency for International Development. Newsmen are told by AID employes to keep out of the building.

More than 30 Americans work there.

Opposite the building is the quarters for U.S. Army personnel. Four men stay there.

Controls Guerrillas

The CIA annex controls the 2nd and 3rd Special Guerrilla Battalions, each of which has armed agency advisers with it on the ground in combat.

These battalions and their advisers are clustered around airstrips on the Bolovens Plateau and are known by code names such as PS22 twenty two and Lima 166.

The special guerrilla units are commanded by Col. Suchai, under American direction.

One insignia of the special guerrilla units shows a snarling wolf's head on top of Christmas tree.

South Vietnamese Near

The mission of these units, which are more highly paid than the rest of the Lao army, is to infiltrate the Ho Chi Minh Trail area in operations such as the present ones at Tangvai and Base 609.

These operations are complemented by South Vietnamese troops operating on the eastern fringe of the trail. The Lao guerrillas hit the western fringes of the trail.

The South Vietnamese wear black uniforms. They tell of

and counting the passing North Vietnamese troops.

These operations do not appear to be highly successful and, to some observers, are even run with a certain degree of stupidity. For example, the guerrillas are grouped around airstrips, making it easy for the North Vietnamese troops to find and attack them.

Despite their higher pay—paid directly by U.S. accountants in Laos—the guerrillas' fighting quality does not appear great.

Fled Without Fight

Last week, guerrillas on the Bolovens Plateau abandoned one of their airstrips without a fight.

The higher pay, of course, causes morale problems in the Lao regular army.

The guerrilla activities are supposed to be secret but it is easy to find out about them.

Army meat buyers in the Pakse market ask for meat for exact numbers of men at such and such a location.

The guerrillas talk freely about real or imagined exploits.

The CIA runs a small private airport at one end of the Payse air base. Almost anybody can walk in.

Reporters watch monks, students and army dependents walking around. In fact, the only people apparently not allowed in are American reporters.

Other U.S. Activities Too

Pakse airport is also a hive of U.S. military activity. U.S. Air Force forward air controllers fly from there in Air America light aircraft to mark Communist targets. They are followed by flights of Lao air force T28s.

American Air Force officers and CIA agents congregate at the Pakse air operations centers.

American C123 transports roar out of Pakse carrying arms cargoes.

Although the Air Force and supply activities in Laos were acknowledged March 6 by President Nixon and more detail was released by a U.S. Senate subcommittee, the American mission in Vientiane is still trying to keep everything secret, apparently under orders from Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley.

The U.S. embassy seeks to prevent correspondents from reaching the military areas.

Laos: a gracious country of gentle people

'If ever a country were made for peace, Laos is that country. Warfare here is not so much a misfortune as an obscenity'

By F. K. Plous Jr.

VIENTIANE, the capital of Laos, lies almost in the center of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, and politically it is a nexus for all the intrigue, diplomatic maneuvering and outright hostility now afflicting Southeast Asia. Lying directly across the Mekong from Thailand, and connected by the same river to Cambodia and South Vietnam, Vientiane could not help being an important place.

The evidence of Vientiane's importance greets you as soon as you land at its modest airport: the runway is in constant use by the most varied display of aircraft outside the Paris Air Show. Most of these planes are carrying freight, and many are familiar to aviation enthusiasts as short-field aircraft, capable of landing on any of the 200 airstrips maintained by the United States in up-country Laos. It comes as no surprise to learn that the aircraft, big and small, are operated by Air America, a CIA front that hauls supplies of all sorts, including military equipment, wherever the tiny Lao army needs it to fight the North Vietnamese who come over the border. We landed at one of these dirt strips and found

no more amenities than a contingent of army trucks, a detachment of soldiers and a "control tower" of unpainted planks that looked like a 10-hole privy. The only decoration was a tattered windsock.

The CIA personnel — known to the less-serious as "spooks" — reveal very little about their actual activities, but their cover stories are more interesting than their job descriptions anyway. One of them, a rangy Southerner with a blond crewcut, described himself as the coach of an American baseball team playing in Laos. Rather strangely for an athlete, he spoke fluent Lao to the waiter in the bar, and it was with no surprise whatever that we learned next day that there is no Laotian baseball team that he could have opposed. His actual work there, in the words once used by the Johnson & Smith catalog to describe the noise of the whoopee-cushion, is "better imagined than described."

The covert American involvement in Laos reveals itself obliquely in reports of an improved Lao army and reports consisting of \$900,000 worth of opium, but its

stores are full of merchandise and the people of Vientiane are adequately dressed and housed. Most of them seem to be gainfully employed. The main street of Vientiane, Luang Prabang Road, included several businesses which by the nature of the country must have been CIA fronts like Air America—shipping companies in quarters far too large for any business that could be developed in Laos, wholesalers of goods the people cannot buy, purveyors of services alien to the economy.

But spooks and spies and gun-runners are only the first impressions. What are the Laotians like, and what kind of a country do they live in?

The kingdom of Laos, first of all, is a geographic, political and ethnographic improbability, created by the French administrators chiefly as a buffer state between Vietnam and Burma. In the North, where Texas-like hills dominate the landscape, the Meo tribesmen somehow contrive to grow rice in an area far drier than those which normally favor the crop. One American aid worker in the area, Edgar "Pop" Buell, of Hamilton, Ind., described the Meo as "a bunch of tough Indiana dirt-farmers—the strongest, hardest-working and most independent people I've ever seen. They're good carpenters, good bricklayers and terrific farmers. They came down here from China 200 or 300 years ago, because the people around them were always taxing them." The hard-working Meo, said Buell, are just too productive for the taste of their lazier neighbors.

The Meo are evacuating now, sometimes in dangerous, disease-haunted 30-day journeys on foot to the lowlands where the army can protect them against the North Vietnamese troops who cross the border. Today, as in ancient times, the Meo are admired for their productivity — and coveted for their strength; to the infinite dismay of the Meo, the North Vietnamese are taxing their rice reserves and conscripting the villagers for service as human trucks on the Ho Chi Minh trail. That, of course, subjects the Meo to American bombings and to raids by the Laotian army, causing further desertions to the Mekong area. There the refugees are gathered into camps (which the people erect themselves out of bamboo, logs and their own undiminished skill). As the Meo wait to be resettled, Laos develops, for the first time in its life, a population squeeze.

Farther south, around Vientiane, the people are more closely related by blood and language to the Thais across the Mekong. Their climate and soil are more hospitable, so that their culture does not reflect the hard-work ethic characteristic of the Meo in their hills.

Because the kingdom is not of ancient origin Laos has little of what could be called national culture or consciousness; its organization revolves around the family, the tribe and the village, resulting in some political odd-

STATINTL

24 MAY 1970

Fresh Threats By the Communists In Laos

VIENTIANE, Laos — At the Laotian Defense Ministry, a peeling yellow building on Rue Sam Sen Thal here, the lobby is occupied by six soldiers playing cards, their shirts off because of the heat.

On Avenue Lane Xang, the Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, at recent ceremonies marking the 23rd anniversary of the Laotian constitution, calls upon his people to close ranks and "confront our enemies with an unflagging national unity based on work, discipline and the strongest civic duty." The response from the reviewing stand, where everyone important in the Laotian Government is sitting, is a continuation of their quick gossiping and reading of newspapers.

These cameos of Vientiane life perhaps reflect nothing more than the tragedy that the war against the Communists in Laos has been going on so long — for over two decades — that it excites few Laotians anymore.

The Government was, nevertheless, getting somewhat excited last week about the latest military drive by the North Vietnamese and their Laotian protégés, the weak and often hardly visible Pathet Lao. In the last few weeks, the Communists have seized territory in the south, near the borders with Cambodia and South Vietnam, which had previously been held by, and conceded to, the Government — even on the Communist maps.

Three weeks ago, the North Vietnamese took Attapeu, a provincial capital that commands a key junction on the Kong River, an important supply route into the Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, to the south. Then they began picking off outposts

on the Boloven Plateau adjacent to Attapeu, and started moving toward Saravane, another provincial capital which sits about 65 miles north of Attapeu at the other end of the plateau.

Military experts here question whether Saravane itself is strategically important to the Communists, but they are generally agreed that the unexpected thrust in the south is designed to expand and strengthen the North Vietnamese supply trails into their bases in both Cambodia and South Vietnam. These experts interpret the moves as a direct attempt to counter the current American-South Vietnamese attack on the North Vietnamese supply depots and sanctuaries in Cambodia.

Some observers here doubt that the Boloven Plateau can substitute for the lost Cambodia sanctuaries because it is so much farther away from the Communist enclaves in South Vietnam that were supplied from Cambodia. But at the same time they acknowledged that the fall of the plateau — which is just west of the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos, the main supply route from North Vietnam into South Vietnam — would mean the loss of one of Laos's main breadbaskets, for it is a significant source of rice, fruit and tobacco.

Also, in reaction to the allied thrust into Cambodia, North Vietnamese troops have launched a successful offensive in the northeastern part of that country, gobbling up important towns and moving to within mortar range of the Laotian border. Many Laotian military officials believe the North Vietnamese will eventually cross the border and attack previously safe areas in southern Laos once they have seized all outposts along the Cambodian side of the frontier.

All of this has markedly dampened the optimism the Americans and Laotians were feeling only two months ago when, after the Communists had captured Sam Thong and were threatening Long Cheng, the two principal military bases in northern Laos, the Government stopped the drive, took Sam Thong and began forcing the enemy into a slow retreat northward.

American and Laotian military sources are still firmly convinced that Hanoi — at least until it can capture its primary objective, South Vietnam — is not interested in conquering all of Laos and occupying it, which, as one source put it, "they are capable of doing anytime with the requisite expenditure of blood and treasure."

According to these sources, Hanoi — afraid of spreading itself thin in Laos at this time — simply wants to use this small country for a supply line and for applying just enough military scare pressure to force political concessions that will produce a new Laotian Government that will not interfere with its activities here. Such a government, in this view, would probably be a neutralist-rightist-leftist coalition dominated by the leftists, that is, the Pathet Lao.

The impact of these developments was heightened last week by Saigon's disclosure that South Vietnamese troops have for some time been conducting raids into Laos against the North Vietnamese there in an attempt to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail, and have stepped up these forays since the start of the allies' Cambodian operation. This has prompted some extreme speculation about the possibility of using American ground troops in Laos in addition to the existing American presence here — the fighter-bombers and B-52's that fly from Thailand and South Vietnam to pound enemy positions here, particularly the Ho Chi Minh trail, and the American military advisers and Central Intelligence Agency men who, in many respects, direct the Laotian Government's side of the war.

Although the use of American troops in Laos has always been considered very unlikely, a few analysts are now wondering whether President Nixon, if the North Vietnamese do build up a huge sanctuary in southern Laos, will send them in as he did in Cambodia.

"Never!" said one official here, but after a moment's reflection, he added, "at least I hope not."

—SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG

STATINTL

MAY 23 1970

The opium war in Laos

There is no question about it, the war in Vietnam has widened into a major Indochina war. American and South Vietnamese troops have been fighting in Cambodia for a couple of weeks and now we are told that the "secret war" in Laos has been escalated.

South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam has revealed that ground troops of his country's forces have crossed the border into Laos to strike at the Ho Chi Minh trail. He refused to say whether or not the South Vietnamese army had been joined by American advisers and U. S. artillery in Laos, simply saying that this was a tactical question which the "generals would have to answer." However, we do know that the U. S. Air Force has been pounding away at Laos for some time.

It was only recently that Americans were told anything officially about our "secret" involvement in Laos and that was when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released to the public, the Administration's censored version of what we have been doing there. The report was not very encouraging.

Not only has the United States had to support the entire Laotian government but hundreds of thousands of refugees — estimates range up to half the population which is about 3,000,000.

Our chief instrument for waging war there has been through the Meo guerrilla army of Gen. Vang Pao, known to be a long-time tool of the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reveals how the war has pushed Meo tribesmen out of their opium-growing areas, providing new sales opportunities to poppy growers further north and west in Burma and China. It is suspected that members of the Royal Laos Army are engaged in opium traffic.

We have the added information provided by Congressman Tunney of California who charged that the CIA-backed Vang Pao's "sole objective is to dominate other factions of this opium-producing Meo tribe." This tribal war, Rep. Tunney said, has as one of its prizes an area capable of producing annually four to ten tons of marketable opium — about \$900,000,000 worth if refined as heroin and sold on the streets of America's cities.

Why should the United States be involved in an opium war in Laos? Laos is of no importance to us nor to the Russians or Chinese. The North Vietnamese are interested in this landlocked country only from the standpoint of being concerned with the security of its northwest frontier. ~~Nothing that happens in Laos will make much difference to the security of the United States.~~ So why are we involved?

STATINTL

Alex Campbell: CIA on the Nile

The Game of Nations by Miles Copeland

(Simon & Schuster; \$6.95)

Beirut has always been full of spies but in the late fifties and early sixties they were very thick on the ground. The British had "Kim" Philby who turned out to be really working for the Russians. There was also a Palestinian who worked for everyone, selling his carbons to the Russians, the British, the Americans, the Jordanians and the Egyptians. And there was Miles Copeland, a business consultant who had worked for the State Department elsewhere in the Middle East, was close to Teddy's grandson "Kim" Roosevelt, and who had joined the CIA. Miles's business took him often to Cairo, where he seemed to have instant access to President Nasser.

His book about the Middle East is subtitled "The Amorality of Power Politics" and is a sort of "Catch-22" of American diplomacy. Quite a lot of people get killed. Husni Za'im of Syria, for instance. Washington decided to make him top American stooge in the Middle East, by hoisting him into power in Syria through a military coup. This succeeded, but then Za'im refused to play. Instead of showing gratitude by being an obedient zombie, he "brusquely informed [Major Stephen] Meade and myself that we were henceforth to leap to our feet as he entered the room." Copeland and Meade were ready to humor their Frankenstein's monster, but Za'im's own Syrian associates were less compliant to his masterful whims. They finally murdered him, buried him in the French cemetery in Damascus and coldly told Copeland and Meade, "We are doing you the favor of treating him as a French agent."

Copeland is coy about revealing how he himself became an agent, but says Meade became one by accident. G-2 had grabbed him for possible parachuting into Russia, because the

Army's IBM machine erroneously wrote his birthplace on his classification card as "Ukr," for the Ukraine. After World War II Meade performed such intelligence chores as rescuing captured German scientists from Communist China, and corrupting Kurdish tribal leaders on the Soviet border. Then "Kim" Roosevelt chose him for Cairo, where he and Copeland worked on Nasser as a promising replacement for the unsatisfactory King Farouk. Soon Nasser was assuring the Americans that all he really wanted was to get rid of the British and that he regarded regaining Palestine as "unimportant." Once in power, Nasser played the Americans off against the Russians. The CIA abjectly put up with this and, when the American Ambassador in Cairo, Henry Byroade, protested to Nasser at a dinner party about Nasser's thugs roughing up the US Labor Attaché, Copeland says that Byroade was pressured into apologizing to Nasser in writing (not for the first or last time) for having "raised an unpleasant subject at a pleasant social gathering." None of which, of course, did the US the least good in Nasser's eyes. The only way to a climb-back the CIA could think of was to circulate among Egyptians a lot of books with titles like *Mohammad Never Existed*, of pre-World War One vintage, and attempt to attribute their distribution to the Russians.

Copeland quit Cairo and set up his Beirut office in May 1957, and about a year later President Eisenhower sent Marines to Lebanon to intervene in a civil war in which Nasser had a hand. Eisenhower also sent Robert Murphy, whose first act according to Copeland was to be photographed shaking hands with the leader of Nasser's terrorist group. The picture was printed, captioned "President Eisenhower's Rep-

resentative sympathizes with the Revolution," which gave Nasser all he really wanted in Lebanon at that time. Ten years after that, Nasser, egged on by the Meade-programmed, coup-crazy Syrians, involved the Middle East in a war from which it's still trying vainly to extricate itself.

The goings on that Miles Copeland describes may - or may not - have been curtailed by President Kennedy's letter of instruction to US ambassadors in May 1961, inviting them to take full control over all American official activity in the countries to which they were accredited. That looked at the time like a mandate to ambassadors to restrain CIA and other meddlers. No more humiliations for decent men like Byroade? But the CIA is currently running a little war of its own in Laos - and the US Ambassador, McMurtrie Godley, is said to be top war lord. Copeland concludes his wry and witty account by saying that "our diplomats who were so naive . . . have come a long way and have developed a whole new perspective."

What perspective?

STATINTL

Robert Hunter on the CIA
—Is it a department of dirty tricks,
or an organisation of fact-gatherers?
Did it underwrite the seizure of power
by the Greek Colonels?



STATINTL

In the Ashenden stories, Somerset Maugham put a human face on the British Secret Service. No matter that the Hairless Mexican killed the wrong man: this bumbling helped soften the image of a ruthless and ever-competent machine dedicated to doing His Majesty's dirty business, and made

Richard Helms, Director of the CIA

everything right. Not so with the Central Intelligence Agency—or the CIA as it is everywhere known. No humour here; just the sense of a sinister and heartless manipulation of the democrats of a hundred coun-

19 MAY 1970

STATINTL

Is this Vietnam all over again?

OUR ASIAN WAR WIDENS



SISOUK NA CHAMPASSAC tapped his desk lightly with his pen and repeated my question: "What aid do we in Laos hope to continue receiving from the United States?" He paused. "Well, to begin with, I hope they don't withdraw the CIA."

This is a priority not necessarily calculated to win the hearts and minds of the U.S. Congress or perhaps to be expected from the finance minister of Southeast Asia's least developed state. But it was advanced without a hint of jest or cynicism and with considerable point.

The Nixon Administration now faces an awful dilemma. The Vietnam war is not contracting but expanding. Through no fault of the United States, the war is leaping over the border into Cambodia, throw-

continued

ing Laos into turmoil and bringing Thailand—which sees neighboring Laos as a buffer that is essential to its own security—into deeper involvement.

Our involvement in Laos has been visible for some time. Below the thick haze of dry-season smoke and dust that hangs like Los Angeles smog over Laos' mountains and jungles, the Central Intelligence Agency's irregular army of Meo tribesmen, led by tough, earthy and able Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, still stood in the path of the 312th and 316th North Vietnamese divisions. Bloodied, sometimes nearly broken physically and in morale, their families driven from their burnt-out hilltop villages and their ranks filling with boys in their teens, the Meo irregulars were now the Royal Lao Government's only effective military prop. No one thought the North Vietnamese would march into Vientiane, Laos' capital, if the Meo failed, but few doubted that the Communist Pathet Lao, Hanoi's indigenous allies, would thereafter be able to call the political tune.

Then the rainstorms came early, and some saw them as a sign of good omen. The rain cleared the mountain smog for the Royal Lao Air Force's T-28's and for the U.S. 7th Air Force jets blasting the supply routes running back to the North Vietnam border. The North Vietnamese thrust lost momentum. Reinforcements plucked from every corner of the kingdom and beyond rushed to help Vang Pao defend his jet base at Long Cheng, southwest of the Plain of Jars. And the parched and sunbaked land, after months of drought, burst into life. And so for a time, all was as it should be.

Left to themselves, there is little the Laos will not do to preserve the harmony of their lives and their country. The attitude takes many forms. For a time, many soldiers of ethnic Lao origin used to fire in the air rather than shoot their enemies. Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao leader, writes a hostile public letter to his half brother Prince Souvanna Phouma, the premier, and softens its delivery with a private and affectionate note. That is Laos—

**The CIA's
tribal army is
the Laotian
government's
only prop**

or part of it. Ethnic Lao who live in the Mekong River and its tributaries account for only half of the country's estimated three million people. In the river valleys of the north are the Tai. Stone Age Kha live on mountain slopes. On the hilltops are Yao and Meo slash-and-burn agriculturalists, cultivators of the opium poppy and now warriors on whom the Royal Lao Government depends so heavily.

When the North Vietnamese launched their late dry-season offensive, and with it a five-point program to end the fighting by negotiations, the opium crop had been gathered and also the fruits of the harvest. Key to both the fighting and the plan for negotiations were the myriad roads and tracks of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Eastern Laos and their ever-increasing importance in the Vietnam war.

Now secure from the bombing in North Vietnam, Hanoi began last November to step up the flow of truck transports along the trail. By spring, 45,000 trucks were using the trail each month, a vast increase over the peak flow of 18,000 a month, reached during the 1968 Tet Offensive.

Using highly sophisticated bombing devices with infrared eyes that saw through the night and the jungle cover, the 7th Air Force leaped upon these new targets, bringing into sharp focus the present reality of the war: North Vietnam needs

free use of the trail to stockpile munitions in the sanctuaries in order to win in the South; the United States has to deny the trail to the North Vietnamese or at least to minimize its use, if its Vietnamization program is to succeed.

Thus, largely unseen and unreported, the Vietnam war changed character and became, for the time being, a battle for the lines of communication in Eastern Laos. In this, the fighting south and west of the Plain of Jars is an essential part. Call off the American bombing in Eastern Laos, Hanoi's leaders say to Souvanna Phouma, and Laos can be reunified by negotiations to enjoy independence, freedom and peace. Fight on and all is lost.

But the Prince does not trust Hanoi, and the bombing can be halted only at the expense of the Vietnamization program and the security of the large American force still in South Vietnam. This is the choice that now faces the Nixon Administration.

If the coup d'etat that ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk as head of state in Cambodia posed a threat to North Vietnam's sanctuaries and supply routes there, it also posed an even graver threat of civil war. While Sihanouk remained in office, he could exercise some restraint on North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory. In alliance with the North Vietnamese, Sihanouk, like Prince Souphanouvong in Laos, may lose even the will to impose

continued

some restraint. If this happens, the hope of confining the war to Vietnam and Laos will also disappear.

Through the center of Southeast Asia and its conflicts slowly flows the Mekong. Traffic across the river is two-way. Families and ethnic groups straddle the border, and the Mekong has long been more of a bridge than a barrier. Included in the traffic are Communist guns, cadres and propaganda for the insurgency that increasingly threatens Northern and Northeastern Thailand.

Twenty-five years ago, Prince Souphanouvong fled across the Mekong from Thakhek into Thailand in a boat and was gunned by a French fighter plane. Friendly Thais dragged him from a heap of 29 dead in the boat, and the provincial governor opened his house to him while his wounds were cared for. Today, Souphanouvong is repaying this hospitality by the creation of insurgency schools for Thais and by pushing new, more sophisticated military equipment into Thailand for the insurgents' use.

With 1,300 kilometers of river to patrol, neither the Thai Second Field Army nor the border police can cope. For years, the insurgents received only defensive weapons. Offensive weapons—AK-47's and B-40 rocket launchers—are now coming in, and incursions of up to company size have occurred in Nakhon Phanom Province opposite Thakhek.

Five years ago, the Thai Government discovered classic indicators of incipient insurgency in the District of Nakae in Nakhon Phanom. They found hard-core cadres had been at work in the villages of the Northeast, organizing cells, building training sites and beginning the traditional murder of school-teachers, village headmen and police informers.

When I came back this time, I found that things were infinitely better in terms of effort and material achievements, in the Northeast generally and in Nakae District in particular, though there was much concern about a threat from Laos.

NEW AND PROSPEROUS towns are springing up throughout the Northeast. Dams bring water for irrigation and electric light to regions that used to be so poor that even the oil lamp was unknown. In many places, there are now all-weather roads. But material progress has not always brought the hoped-for political result, as I learned when I visited Nai Jom Saenpo in his shop in Pontum in the District of Nakae.

Jom Saenpo is 50. His face has begun to dry out and wither like an apple left to hang too long on a tree, though his eyes are still bright and penetrating, and his jet-black hair shows no signs of gray. He sat cross-legged on the floor of his open-fronted shop. A checked blue-and-white sarong tucked loosely around his waist revealed a wide expanse of richly tattooed thigh. Across the dusty track from his shop were the schoolhouse and the sandbagged headquarters of the police and military detachments. In the background, green and inviting, were the slopes of the Phupan Mountains.

The Phupans' shady streams abound with fish. Their forests are filled with game—and with elusive bands of Communist insurgents, one of whom is Jom Saenpo's 22-year-old son and the eldest of his six children. There are about 300 families in Pontum Village, where, with his shop, Jom Saenpo makes a better living than most. About 100 families have

contributed a son or daughter to the insurgency.

"Why did your son go to the hills?" I asked.

"I don't know," he said. "Perhaps he has gone to Vien-

tiane or to Bangkok and not to the jungles at all."

"You know he is in the mountains," broke in Lt. Kanit Pipithirunkarn, a strongly built army officer, who for two years has been hunting the insurgents.

Jom Saenpo nodded. "I mind my own affairs," he said. "I don't bother about other people."

He is, nevertheless, a proud man. "A long time ago," he said, "when I first came here, there was only forest. I started to cut the forest and to make this village. At first, there were few families, and much sickness. My brother died of cholera. Every year there was cholera. People were very poor."

"Has the government helped the people of the village?" I asked.

"Yes," he replied. "The government has helped very much. Now there is no cholera. There are roads, and this year we have fertilizer and the biggest rice crop we have ever had."

"Why do the people support the insurgents?"

"He knows everything," said Lieutenant Kanit. "But he will not talk."

"I am afraid," said Jom Saenpo. "I am afraid they'll come and kill me."

"The insurgents helped with the rice harvest," said the Lieutenant. "Because they helped, no one will talk. When they go against the insurgents, the people have cause to be afraid."

His point was well made. During the night, insurgents had called at the house of a pregnant woman in the village of Dong Thong and asked for food. When she refused them, they shot her down.

Lieutenant Kanit suspected a trap, and his suspicions were warranted. By jeep, a detachment of police was on its way to Dong Thong. The insurgents lay in wait, killing four policemen and wounding nine.

No wonder then that Capt. Khluan Sariboot, the assistant district officer who has been in Nakae for a year, seems less sanguine than many of his seniors in Bangkok. Pontum Village, where he makes his headquarters, not only has a police and military post, it is also defended by one of 12 security teams in Nakae District. But even this is not enough to deter the insurgents. The Captain pointed out of the window of his headquarters to a clump of bamboo no more than 100 yards away, and half that distance from Jom Saenpo's shop. "That was the scene of my third ambush," he said. "I was lucky to get away."

With the harvest in, Captain Khluan expects more ambushes to come. Unmarried and now 37, he is philosophical about it, but he knows and everyone else knows that his life expectancy is not high.

He worries mostly about things he hasn't been able to do. Despite the road improvements, for instance, two villages in the Phupan Mountains cannot be reached by road at any time, and during the wet season, it is extremely difficult to travel to about half of the remaining hundred villages in Nakae District. The population of the district is about 30,000, and one doctor at district headquarters cannot cope with the needs of the people. In 12 of the mountain schools, the only teachers even now are policemen. Thirty-one villages still have no schools at all, and

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continued

insurgents prey on the misery of the people. Captain Khluan said. "Though there are not many of them in the mountains, there are enough for them to operate in teams of 30 to 50 men." This is enough to give the insurgents the initiative.

There are many other areas in Northeastern Thailand where the people live in absolute security, but all around the frontiers, pressures are mounting. The situation is deteriorating in the northern mountains where the Meo tribesmen get support from the Pathet Lao. West of Bangkok, a small group of insurgents uses the sanctuary of the Burma border to strike into Thailand. Two separate insurgent forces have erupted with bloody violence in the south.

Two years have passed since the Chinese announced the formation of a unified command to coordinate widely scattered Thai insurgent groups. Although it would be wrong to give the impression that something like Hanoi's command post in South Vietnam is at work here, more and more insurgents are beginning to wear uniforms with red-and-yellow flashes, proclaiming their membership in the Thai Liberation Army. Comparisons with Vietnam are invidious, but to pretend that a serious threat is not developing is to ignore the facts.

THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST that Thailand is about to become another Vietnam in the sense that American forces will become deeply involved. Yet Thai troops are fighting in Vietnam; Thailand provides the major air bases for American air attacks over South Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and a Thai artillery battalion, protected by Thai infantry, took its place with Vang Pao's men for the defense of Long Cheng. In short, American commitments to Thailand are heavy and, it is difficult to believe otherwise, binding.

Like the Nixon Administration, Thai leaders would prefer to find a peaceful way out of the impasse, if they can. Men like Seni Pramroj, wartime leader of the Free Thai Movement and now leader of the opposition, and Thanat Khoman, the foreign minister, have begun to think in terms of "bending with the breeze," and if need be, realignments. "What can we do? What else can we do?" Seni Pramroj asked me. "Bamboos bend with the wind. But it's more than a breeze now. It's a storm."

"Can you bend with such a wind?"

He sighed. "Can or cannot, we must try."

In 1941, when he was a young minister in Washington, Seni did not bend when the message came through from Bangkok to declare war on the United States, and I reminded him of this.

"I didn't bend because my situation was favorable. I went to Cordell Hull and told him I was instructed to declare war but didn't see any reason why I should. It was all silly, very silly. Hull looked a bit shocked and said, 'You know what you're doing?' " Seni laughed as he recalled Hull's surprise. "I said, 'Yes, I think so.' Cordell Hull hummed and replied, 'Mr. Minister, since you won't declare war, I don't know how to declare it all by myself.' And so that is the way it was. It was all a great help."

Thailand's special relationship with the United States dates from this decision of Seni's. Thailand allied itself with Japan at home, and Seni refused to declare war on the United States abroad, and Thailand bent gracefully in all directions.

The concern now is whether the formula can be adapted to existing circumstances. Seni, who did not go to Russian cocktail parties before the United States began to withdraw from Southeast Asia, now accepts invitations and confesses that "their vodka and caviar taste better every time."

Thanat let it be known publicly that Thailand would welcome the chance to enter into friendly relations with China, most feared of all its neighbors. There has been no response. For Thailand, for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and for the United States, the path to peace with honor in Southeast Asia is still paved with punji sticks.

END

17 MAY 1970

Reds in Stung Treng Attack Entered Cambodia Via Laos

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

PAKSE, Laos—North Vietnamese forces attacking Stung Treng in North Cambodia entered Cambodia via Laos, according to the military commander of Region IV in the southern half of the Laos panhandle.

Gen. Prasouk Somly said six North Vietnamese battalions crossed the high Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos, picked up supplies, floated on rafts down the Sekhong River, and crossed into Cambodia north of the Cambodian town of Siem Pang and went on to Stung Treng.

Thousands Fleeing

The North Vietnamese also took advantage of supplies cached in the Cambodia-Laos border area originally destined for South Vietnam.

Lao military sources said thousands of refugees are crossing into Laos at the Lao-Cambodian border post of Kenak, 30 miles north of Stung

Treng. The refugees include Cambodians, Vietnamese and Laotians who lived in Cambodian border areas.

One refugee was a Cambodian officer commanding a subdivision at Kratie south of Stung Treng. Kratie already is in Communist hands. Many refugees escaped in small pirogues up the Mekong River into Laos.

Estimates of their number range as high as 17,000.

In south Laos, the Communists presently are shelling the town of Saravane and probing the guerrilla outpost on the Bolovens Plateau in what appears an effort to take over the plateau as a sanctuary for the fighting in Cambodia and South Vietnam and to open new infiltration routes into these countries through Laos.

Could Topple Lon Nol

If the Communists succeed in these maneuvers, they could topple the government of Lon Nol in Cambodia by fighting from

bases in northern Cambodia and southern Laos.

This possibly could leave President Nixon the choice of putting ground troops in Laos, or strengthening the present U.S. military advisers, air support and Central Intelligence Agency operations, or leaving South Vietnamese permanently in Cambodia.

Lao military say they would accept American troops but not Vietnamese, who are their traditional enemies.

LETTER FROM WASHINGTON

MAY 9

WHIRL is King, and Richard Nixon is First Minister. Except as Commander-in-Chief of his vast armies and armadas of ships and aircraft, he seems powerless, or nearly so. He can speak more civilly of and to his critics, and perhaps he can leash his snarling deputy, who last night in Idaho dropped some ugly lines from his text—not, Spiro Agnew explained, because they were ugly but because they had been written by a ghost and did not reflect his unique sensibility. Nixon has twice this week listened to and talked with some student protesters, and he did not berate them. But he cannot gain control of events by bonhomie or civility, or by forbearance in the face of incivility. What is at issue is not manner or style but policy. In his appearance on television last night, he seemed conciliatory, and even apologetic, but the policy remains substantially unaltered, and his detractors remain unpersuaded and unappeased. They would prefer a rude peacemaker to a polite warmaker. And one suspects that he lost some favor with those who continue to support his policies; to anyone who opposes conciliation, his efforts at it must reveal not strength or dignity of character but weakness under pressure. There is as yet no measure of his losses in congressional support, but there will be within the next few days. Without doubt, the invasion of Cambodia has produced defections in the legislative branch, and it now seems entirely possible that for the first time an anti-war majority exists in the Senate. Whether it could force, or stay, the President's hand in Indo-China is questionable, but an effort will be made next week.

There is almost as much trouble within the palace as without. The Administration that Nixon formed nearly a year and a half ago now seems less an Administration than a jerry-built governmental conglomerate in the process of dismantling itself. The department heads and the lesser bureaucrats are having at one another in intemperate and impolitic language, and seem united mainly in their resentment of the treatment accorded them by members of the White House staff, whom they accuse of lying to the President and to them and of behaving with impudence

all who question their judgment. There have been and will continue to be resignations, perhaps in unprecedented numbers. Two hundred and fifty State Department officials have formally registered their opposition to the Cambodian adventure, which they are employed to justify and defend. If there is widespread opposition in State, there must be at least as much in most other branches. If it is true that Robert Finch has as much as suggested any kind of complicity on the part of Spiro Agnew in the Kent State killings, it scarcely seems possible that he can continue to serve. The Secretary of the Interior's letter to the President amounted to an accusation of gross Presidential negligence and dereliction, and was thus an act of patent insubordination. The Secretary of State is reported to have encouraged his colleague in this act. The Secretaries of State and Defense have said little about the parts they played or did not play in the decision to go into Cambodia, but it is plain that their enthusiasm was and is limited and that their participation was minimal. Most of what discussion there was seems to have taken place not in the National Security Council but in something called the Washington Special Action Group, to which neither William Rogers nor Melvin Laird belonged. While this group was holding regular sessions late in April, Rogers told a congressional committee, "We recognize that if we escalate and we get involved in Cambodia with our ground troops that our whole program is defeated." And four days before the Cambodian announcement was made, at a time when the President is said to have already made up his mind, Laird, in a taped interview for *U.S. News & World Report*, said that the Cambodians should defend themselves, and that, for his part, he would even "rule out the use of U.S. advisers" with the Cambodian Army.

The Administration was, to be sure, in poor shape before Cambodia. There had been an uncommon amount of infighting since the early days—much of it the inevitable product of Nixon's effort to put together a government of factionalists. The revolt in the State Department over Cambodia is led by men who were opposed to war any-

reasonably more before the escalation of the war into Laos—an earlier development, but one that is hardly different in principle or lack of principle. (It differs in being smaller and in being largely clandestine and under the management of the C.I.A.) But before Cambodia there seemed at least a chance that tensions in the government and in the country might somehow be lessened. Few observers here took "Vietnamization" seriously as a plan for the South Vietnamese, but it seemed to be going over in this country, and de-escalation was slowly taking place. Spiro Agnew was still talking, but fewer were listening, and he seemed something of a spent force except in those redoubts of reaction that used to applaud every sentence Joe McCarthy uttered. Efforts were being made to compose differences within the Administration. The Attorney General went as far as to defend the Supreme Court and, by implication, some of the decisions the President had denounced in 1968. What was predictable all along, however, was that one more war would be disastrous, even if it could be defended by the argument that it would ease the withdrawal process in Vietnam, and even if it could be said that the Cambodians welcomed our intervention. Coming from the Nixon Administration, such defenses would have been judged according to their source, not according to their merits—if any—by the young and by millions of their elders. Nor would they be accepted by many other governments, some of which might subscribe to the military rationale but would nevertheless feel compelled to oppose the action for political and diplomatic reasons. It was presumably the domestic and international considerations that weighed most heavily with the Secretaries of State and Defense and with other skeptics within the government. To what extent they conveyed their misgivings and the reasons for them to the President may never be known. But they would have been derelict if they had not given him their assessments at some point. In any case, he reached his decision on military grounds and put aside all other considerations. This can be said with some assurance not because anyone is privy to all his thoughts but because of an abundance of evidence that the reaction took him greatly by surprise.

COPTER PILOT DIES IN AIR CRASH IN VIETNAM

CWO Robert W. Gardner, 22, of Wheaton, was killed when his helicopter was shot down April 27.

"He said he was over so that the kids with long hair could have the freedom to demonstrate here," Donald M. Gardner said yesterday about his son.

"He was home on a 30-day leave earlier this month and there were demonstrations, and I remember him saying that's what he was fighting for—freedom," his father said.

The chief warrant officer had already had two helicopters "shot from under him" and expressed foreboding about his return to Vietnam April 18, his father said.

It was not immediately known to Mr. Gardner where his son's helicopter crashed. All four members of the crew were killed.

Mr. Gardner had been in Vietnam since February, 1969, and was serving an extra six month hitch there when he was killed.

He was a member of the 3d Platoon, of the 281st Assault Helicopter Company, stationed in Nha Trang in the Central Coast region. His unit supplied Special Forces camps.

HOT ROD FAN

Born in Washington, he grew up in Wheaton, where he graduated from Wheaton High School in 1965. He attended Montgomery County Community College and the University of Maryland before joining the Army in 1967.

A hot-rod enthusiast, Mr. Gardner owned a dragster, which he named "Honest Injun." He was a familiar figure at local drag races and in 1967 he raced in the Hot Rod International in Pomona, Calif.

Besides his father and mother, he is survived by three brothers, Ronald Gardner, of Kansas City, Mo., and Steven and Paul Gardner, both at home.

LETTER TO INDOCHINA

HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 14, 1970

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, the steadily worsening situation in Southeast Asia and particularly the introduction of American ground combat troops into Cambodia are both alarming and repugnant. Our invasion of Cambodia can only serve to get us more deeply involved in an unending, enervating, and immoral conflict unless we act now to take back our constitutional prerogatives and to prohibit further involvement in Southeast Asia. In this regard, I would like to bring to my colleague's attention an article by Robert Shaplen entitled "Letter to Indochina" which appeared in the May 9, 1970, issue of the New Yorker magazine.

The article traces the events surrounding the widening conflict which is now being referred to not as American involvement in Vietnam, or the Vietnam war, but a situation so broad that it is termed the Indochina war. It is the thesis of this article that the United States is not moving toward disengagement. Rather, the present Cambodian action sets the stage—indeed necessitates—further attacks of this nature. I share Mr. Shaplen's fears.

The article recounts the abysmal failure of the Nixon administration in at-

tempting to win a war that is subject only to political settlement.

Mr. Shaplen states:

The prospects for peace are . . . gloomier than ever. And what is happening in Saigon today, on the government side, scarcely improves the outlook. The rebellious attitude of South Vietnamese students and war veterans, and the friction between President Nguyen Van Thieu and the National Assembly, which has worsened the already bad economic crisis, threaten to cancel the gains that have been made in the country over the past year.

Mr. Shaplen concludes that the present problems in Saigon can only aggravate the problems surrounding an American withdrawal and more importantly will create a broader war that will further intensify the painful disillusionment of the American people in their Government. This is the real cost of the present action—the alienation of more and more Americans from their system of government. We cannot afford to fight a war abroad which is destroying us at home. The full text of the article follows:

LETTER FROM INDOCHINA

(By Robert Shaplen)

SAIGON, May 2.—In the entire Indo-China area during the last two months, the Communists of Peking and Hanoi have been given, and have employed to their advantage, a whole new set of options and opportunities, which, it seems, President Nixon's use of American strength in Cambodia will do little to alter. The events that have, so far, worked against us began with the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia by pro-Western generals and politicians, then continued with this group's almost immediate errors of judgment and action—particularly its brutal actions against Cambodia's Vietnamese minority and its over eagerness to join battle with much stronger and more experienced Communist forces—and included renewed heavy Communist pressure in Laos and a serious deteriorating political and economic situation in South Vietnam. In that country, although our stated policy of Vietnamization was reaffirmed when the President announced, on April 20th, the withdrawal—against the advice, not surprisingly, of his generals—of another hundred and fifty thousand men in the next year, the "low profile" our policymakers have sought to maintain had been elevated considerably even before the President's speech on Cambodia by our shipment of arms to Phnom Penh and by our troops' increasing involvement in operations around the Cambodian border. When conditions are as volatile as they now are, it is difficult, if not impossible, to be guided by something as vague as the doctrine enunciated by the President on Guam last July, emphasizing our intention of limiting our involvement and depending on Asian initiatives. Now, instead of Vietnamization, we are faced, in effect, with a new Indo-Chinaization, including the possibility that both Laos and Cambodia may soon be dominated or controlled by the Communists. This belatedly brings into clear focus the problem we have all along refused to face—the unrealism of fighting an isolated war in one small country in the middle of a large racially mixed area without sufficient understanding of the over-all political or military consequences.

The principal beneficiaries of recent events would appear to be the Chinese Communists. Peking is the military and political bulwark behind the emerging new Indo-China United Front Against American Imperialism, created after a meeting on April 24th and 25th somewhere in China. This hastily called "summit conference of the Indo-China peoples," ap-

parently convened at Sihanouk's instigation, forged an alliance of the New Revolutionary Movement in Cambodia, headed by the ousted Prince, with the Hanoi regime and the already established Communist rebel governments of South Vietnam and Laos.

With their growing support of insurrectionary movements in Thailand and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent, in Burma and the Philippines, the Chinese are now in a stronger position to control the revolutionary apparatus throughout Southeast Asia than they have been at any time since 1965, when the Vietcong were stopped by American troops from winning the Vietnamese war and when the Peking-backed coup in Indonesia failed. The response so far of the non-Communist Asian states to the new crisis has been slow; Indonesia has called for a meeting at which Thailand, Japan, and about fifteen other Asian nations can discuss the matter, but that is all. While the Americans have found themselves being inexorably drawn into Cambodian operations, in which the chances for any sort of decisive military engagement will probably prove as evanescent as they have for ten years in South Vietnam, Peking and Hanoi have determined to gain as much as possible from the confused state of affairs.

There is little reason to expect them to cease doing so, particularly in Cambodia, especially in view of Hanoi's decision, indicated in enemy documents, to "re-guerrillize" the war in South Vietnam and to prolong the conflict there until after the departure of the bulk of American forces. No one with any experience in Vietnam, including Hanoi's top experts, has minimized the difficulties of achieving this goal, but no one doubts the will of the Communists or their patience and endurance. In any event, the recently increasing number, in several South Vietnamese provinces, of young men abducted and sent to North Vietnam for training and indoctrination underlines the long-term approach that Hanoi has again adopted. Another indication of this is the vast amount of matériel that has poured down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from the North during the last several months.

Only about twenty per cent of this traffic has been interdicted by American bombing. The coup in Phnom Penh has momentarily denied the North Vietnamese access to the southern Cambodian ports of Sihanoukville, Kep, and Ream, through which most of the Chinese matériel used in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam was previously shipped with the agreement and profitable connivance of the Sihanouk regime. However, the Communist forces in Cambodia are showing every intention of trying to regain access to those ports and supply routes. In the meantime, they are already extending the branches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail deeper into Laos; through the border area where Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam come together; and farther into Cambodia, as well as into the Vietnamese Highlands and the Delta.

This extension, though it will be no easy feat, will undoubtedly serve to strengthen the arguments of the American military leaders who have been against halting the bombing of the Trail in Laos—in return for which Hanoi and its local Communist supporters of the Pathet Lao have indicated their willingness to limit military operations in that country and to start political negotiations there, which would inevitably lead to stronger Communist representation in any new coalition government. This is bound to come eventually anyway, and some Americans have felt that a break in the Laotian situation now could produce some movement in the deadlocked peace talks in Paris, and perhaps bring to an end at least some of the fighting in Vietnam. The intense mixture of political accommodation and competition would certainly continue, accompanied by terrorism and guerrilla warfare, but the Americans would be out of it sooner rather than later. The whole series of developments

WASHINGTON STAR

15 MAY 1970

Reds Attack Lao Town On Routes to Cambodia

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

SARAVANE, Laos—Communist forces today started their expected attack on this town of wooden shacks which is astride several routes through southern Laos to Cambodia.

In doing so, they appeared to be seeking to establish sanctuaries in southern Laos for the Cambodian war.

While townspeople clustered outside some shops here, Lao government 150-millimeter howitzers fired at some 300 Communist troops advancing 6,000 yards west of the town.

Reds Attacked by Air

Lao Air Force dive bombers also pounded the Communists. Communist gunners were using mortars.

Four Communist troops were killed, according to the town commander, Col. Vang, but when a reporter asked to see the bodies he said they were "carried away."

As the Red mortar rounds hit close to a wood hut which serves as the Saravane airport terminal, townspeople awaiting evacuation dived for cover amid their possessions.

Many persons have been evacuated already, mostly the civil servants, and many have fled to outlying villages to avoid Red shelling.

The Lao positions are poorly

constructed, making it unlikely they can hold Saravane in the face of a Communist assault.

The Communist attack was seen as the opening phase of a battle for Saravane and for possession of the Bolovens Plateau to the south.

North Vietnamese forces on the plateau are moving to the rear of Lao Special Guerrilla Unit No. 2, a force paid for by the United States and led by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The unit's positions line the eastern lip of the plateau, overlooking the Sekhong River, a new North Vietnamese supply route into Cambodia.

The unit is supported by 40 American advisers—mostly logistics personnel.

According to the Lao regional commanders here, the Communists are floating bamboo rafts loaded with munitions down the Sekhong, which flows into Cambodia.

The rafts are camouflaged as clumps of brush. The river is full of brush following recent rains, making these rafts difficult to spot. Pathet Lao soldiers with long poles line the river banks and push these rafts out of snags.

If the Reds can take the plateau, they will gain a sanctuary from which they can strike into both South Vietnam and Cambodia.

GUARDIAN
12 May 1970

LAOS: VIET NAM WAR II

Editor's Note: Jacques DeCornoy has travelled extensively throughout Southeast Asia reporting for Le Monde. LNS recently interviewed him in Berkeley.

Liberation News Service

LNS: Are they bombing all over in Laos, or just along the Ho Chi Minh trail?

JDC: I have not been on the Ho Chi Minh trail at all. I was in Sem Neua province, through which there is not such a trail, and when I was there in March of 1968 we were constantly bombed. I remember one day being either attacked or overflown by U.S. planes every 30 minutes. The landscape really looks like the moon. It also looks like the southern part of North Vietnam and some provinces of South Vietnam. Sem Neua is very close to North Vietnam, northeast of the Plain of Jars and Vientiane.

LNS: What was the purpose of the bombing?

JDC: I wish I knew. I personally think (and I wrote it) that the bombing aims not at destroying the North Vietnamese forces in transit through Laos or the forces based in Laos, but aims at destroying the Pathet Lao infrastructure. For instance, I was in what was the city of Sem Neua—it has been entirely destroyed. And I could see—because they had not exploded—lots of anti-personnel bombs. Now it is obvious that those anti-personnel bombs were aimed at killing people and I guess not only Pathet Lao soldiers, but also civilians. And there are civilians that have been killed. All the civilians have had to leave the city. They now live in the woods or in caves a few miles from Sem Neua where absolutely everything has been destroyed. All the villages I saw in the province of Sem Neua except two have been destroyed.

It's very hard to drive in this region, not only because it's dangerous, but because there aren't any roads any more. You have got to drive from crater to crater and it's quite dangerous.

LNS: What about the massive displacement of people? It seems that the U.S. is clearing people out.

JDC: Yes, there is the same process that they do in South Vietnam. Some American right-wing political scientist wrote one day that actually it was not bad because it accelerates the natural process of urbanization. I think Herman Kahn wrote it. Now it is obvious to me that in Laos there are hundreds of thousands of refugees. Those people had to leave their villages and their land because they couldn't cultivate their land any more, because the buffalos had been killed, and because they were too afraid of the bombs. They are now living in camps and they don't join the Royal armed forces. If they were that much anti-communist, and that much anti-North Vietnamese and that much anti-Pathet Lao, I guess they would ask for rifles and go and fight, but they don't. They are just waiting for the end of the war to go back to their land.

LNS: Do you know what the situation is with the CIA-trained Meo tribesmen around the Plain of Jars, and the so-called mercenary army?

JDC: I could see in the province of Sem Neua that lots of Meos are working together with the Pathet Lao and belong to the Pathet Lao forces.

to a certain cave that is hidden not too far from Sem Neua you find the school where they train their teachers. Lots of the students are Meo women and men.

It is true that there are Meos with the Royal Laotian forces. For instance, in Pati which is about 30 kilometers west of Sem Neua, there were Meos with U.S. officers and Japanese, Thai and maybe Filipino mercenaries. It was a kind of U.S. and Meo outpost right in the middle of Pathet Lao-controlled territory.

At the beginning of 1968 Pati was taken over by the communist forces. Several Americans and Asian mercenaries were killed and the helicopters and radar system were destroyed. It was a civil defeat for the U.S. radar network in Southeast Asia because the radars that had been put on the hill in Pati helped the U.S. planes that went to bomb North Vietnam. They missed those radars badly afterwards.

LNS: Why is the U.S. interested in Northern Laos?

JDC: Well, as I said before, I think that they are mostly interested in destroying the Lao left. That's what they are trying to do. I would even say that they are trying to physically destroy the Pathet Lao leadership. I met Prince Souphanouvong, the President of the Central Committee of the Pathet Lao in a big cave. This cave is surrounded by craters—everywhere craters. And the Americans must know where the Central Committee meets. It cannot be a secret. And they are trying to kill those people. They didn't succeed yet, but they are obviously trying to destroy the political infrastructure.

And in a way, the U.S. has succeeded, because the Pathet Lao economy has suffered a lot from the bombing. The people are very poor. I was amazed by their lack of books, of drugs, of pencils—they've just got nothing. It's terrible.

LNS: Is it true that there are a lot of North Vietnamese in the area?

JDC: Well it is true that there are North Vietnamese, but I don't know how many there are. A few weeks ago the U.S. embassy said there were 50,000 North Vietnamese troops and suddenly President Nixon said that there were 67,000. I don't know how they got their figures. There is one thing I'm sure of—the more the U.S. bombs the Pathet Lao zones, the more pro-communist peasants are scared of the bombing and are obliged to flee down to the Mekong Valley, the more the Pathet Lao will require military aid from the North Vietnamese—because they need men.

It reminds me of what happened in South Vietnam before the landing of the Marines in Da Nang in July 1965. There were very few North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. But as the American expeditionary corps grew and grew in South Vietnam to more than a half a million, it was obvious that the NLF needed troops from the north; and the same process might happen for the Pathet Lao. The more the Americans bomb the Pathet Lao zones, the more the Pathet Lao will need foreign troops.

So I think it is not very honest to say that the North

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01661R000700030001-4
Vietnamese, he says, be more honest to say that the Pathet Lao has had to ask the North Vietnamese for more aid because the American intervention has grown bigger and bigger as time has gone on.

LNS: Could you say what the political structure of the Pathet Lao is like? Do they have a government like the NLF? You mentioned a Central Committee.

JDC: No, they don't have a government like the NLF, and I don't think that they want that now. No, there is just the one organization, the Pathet Lao, with the Central Committee, and actually it works like a government of its own. Of course they said that they want to one day or another come back into a national union government but they won't do it now. They administer their zones just like an independent government. They've got their own ministries.

For instance, they started in 1967 or 1968, I don't remember exactly, a kind of five-year plan to develop their regions.

In my opinion, in Laos there are two movements—there is a reactionary movement backed by the U.S. and there is a communist movement, the Pathet Lao and its friends—that's all. That is, I think, the end of any middle-of-the-road movement. And what's true of Laos is true of South Vietnam. And what's true of South Vietnam I think will be true of Cambodia pretty soon. The people don't have any choice. You are on one side or the other. You can't be in the middle of the road any more. If you want to be—and there are people who wanted to be in Saigon—you are put in jail or you are forced to go into exile in Paris or somewhere else. Look at the student leaders that are being arrested right now in Saigon. Look at the Buddhist monks. You must go to the jungle, abroad, or join the right-wing forces—there is no free middle-of-the-road position any more.

LNS: What does the Pathet Lao structure look like at the village level?

JDC: Well, it's hard to say, because as I said, most of the villages have been destroyed—and so has the organization. But in the few villages in which I lived and which have not been bombed, they've got a People's Committee at the head of the village, and several commissions—one for the battlefields, one for the buffalos, one for health and education, that's all. They've got, of course, their political commissar, one from the Central Committee. When I travelled throughout the country there was one political commissar with me who was fluent in French—he had studied in France—and he was with me not only to help me understand what the people said; he was also with me to indoctrinate the people, and he told me so. Every now and then he left me and said, "Well, now I've got a meeting with such-and-such section of the village, I've got to explain to them what we are doing at the Central Committee," and he left me and he came back an hour later after he talked to the people.

LNS: In the areas where the villages have been bombed, what kind of organization do they have—or have they all been dispersed?

JDC: Yes, they have been dispersed into caves. If they don't live in caves, they live in miserable huts in the woods, and just like in North Vietnam, they've got shelters all around. As soon as they hear the jets they go down into the shelters and wait. It disturbs everything, because when the planes come every 30 minutes or every hour you cannot seriously work. And you never knew, at least in 1968, when you were in the Pathet Lao zones, whether the planes came for you or were just flying over you to go to bomb North Vietnam. You had to go down to the shelter and stop your work. You had to.

LNS: Don't they have a canopy of jungle foliage to protect them?

use anti-personnel bombs, but what can you do against B-52s?

LNS: There were reports recently that the government of Thailand sent troops into Laos to help the Royal Laotians. Has this been going on for a long time?

JDC: Yes. There have been some Thai artillery groups fighting for a long time in Laos, and last year it was reported that Thai soldiers were dressed with Royal Lao uniforms and fought in the southern part of Laos. This wasn't confirmed, but it wasn't denied either. It is true, there are more and more Thai connections between the right-wing military leaders in Vientiane and the military establishment of Bangkok. And if things go on there as they have been going on for two or three years Vientiane will become a kind of suburb of Bangkok and the American bases of Thailand—which lots of Laos don't like, even right-wing people.

I remember, I think it was in 1968, one of the toughest right-wing Lao leaders was seen in Vientiane in the armed forces parade together, not with his wife, but with Miss Thailand. And a few days later young lieutenants and captains, right-wing people, but nationalists, put out a pamphlet against him and this Miss Thailand, saying, "We are Laos and we are in Laos—we don't want to become slaves of this big and wealthy pro-American Thailand." Now those people didn't join the Pathet Lao ranks. Still, for the first time maybe, they understood where this pro-American policy of Vientiane might lead their country. That is, the total destruction not only of their country, but also of the values of their country. That is what they don't want, even if they are right-wing people.

But the general doesn't care. He just wants to make money. Everybody knows, for instance, that the commander-in-chief of the right-wing forces is at the head of the opium trade between Saigon and Vientiane and Bangkok. He never goes to the battlefield. You can usually see him in the afternoon in a Vientiane bar.

LNS: Several returned or ex-U.S. servicemen have said that U.S. military and Air America flights fly gold bricks into Laos which are in turn traded for opium produced by the Meo tribesmen, and that the opium eventually winds up in the United States and France.

JDC: Well, I really don't know much about it. All I know is that there are planes that take off from Vientiane and fly to South Vietnam with opium and gold. I know one thing—it was very funny—I was in Vientiane during the Tet offensive in South Vietnam, and a few people at least were very much annoyed, not because it was a military victory for the communists—they didn't care at all—but because the airport at Saigon was closed, and the planes that usually bring gold and opium from Laos to Saigon couldn't land there any more, and they were losing money. I met one of those gold traders, and he told it to me very frankly.

LNS: Can you describe the circumstances around which the Pathet Lao left the coalition government back in 1963? There's been a lot of discussion in the community here that the CIA had something to do with some assassinations.

JDC: I think in 1961 one member of the coalition government was assassinated in front of his house in Vientiane. He was a left-wing neutralist. Other members of the left-wing neutralist movement were killed later on. And then you had the right-wing coups and so on. It was absolutely impossible for the left—whether Marxist left or non-Marxist left, to work in Vientiane any more.

Officially this man was killed by one of his soldiers. Nobody has ever explained why the soldier killed him. What I can say is that he was a left-wing neutralist and his daughter, whom I know, has joined the Pathet Lao.

cannot be in the middle of the road. This family tried to be honestly neutralist in Vientiane. The father was killed, and the family joined the Pathet Lao. They had no other choice. Now the daughter, after some studies in France and then in Moscow—she is an engineer—lives in a cave very close to Sem Neua. That's where I met her. And the uncle, the brother of the assassinated minister, as far as I know, is the official doctor for the Central Committee of the Pathet Lao and he also lives in a cave. He is married to a French woman, by the way, who is now back with the children in France because it's very hard to raise young children in caves.

Very few people know how those people live in caves. It's really terrible, especially during the rainy season, because everything is humid. You cannot bring the children out of the cave because of the bombing, so they lack sun, they lack food, they are white, they are very unhealthy. Very few people know even in Vientiane.

There is something I want to say here. In Vientiane I met a very young, a very brilliant American diplomat, graduated from one of the best American universities. He said to me once, "If we want a really strong, free and democratic anti-communist Laos to be built, we must help the Laos to get rid of their traditional cultural values, bring them back to zero, and then build a new nation." And I'm really quoting. And he said, "Before I was in Laos I was in Africa, and their cultural values here are even worse than the cultural values of those Africans."

Vientiane is becoming more and more a small Saigon or a small Bangkok—a mixture of prostitution, or corruption—I mean really, it's in chaos. The young Laos who live there are forgetting their heritage more and more—they speak broken English, they can speak a few words of French—it's really a pity to see them. They don't know where they go. They try to forget about the war, but it's hard, because they have families on the other side. It's not a new Laos that's being built in Vientiane. It's nothing.

LNS: Are the Pathet Lao aware of the antiwar movement here in the U.S.?

JDC: There is something I must tell you, because I think it has not been reported by the American press. For the first time, five or six weeks ago, the Pathet Lao in a communique mentioned the American movement, asking the antiwar movement to put some pressure on the U.S. government so the U.S. government will stop the U.S. intervention against the Pathet Lao. I think it's a kind of sign. And it shows that for the first time (like the North Vietnamese did a few years ago) the Pathet Lao may start to make some contacts with Americans.

WASHINGTON STAR

11 MAY 1970

STATINTL

U.S. Ground Attack Urged by Laotians

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

PAK SE, Laos—Laotian rightist leader here said the United States should hit the Ho Chi Minh trail in south Laos at the same time it is attacking Cambodian sanctuaries.

They said as long as the Communist Vietnamese are using the Ho Chi Minh trail in eastern Laos to send reinforcements and material to Cambodia and South Vietnam, the U.S. effort in Cambodia cannot be fully effective.

"This is no time for half measures," Prince Boun Oum, the rightist leader in South Laos, said.

"It would be a good thing for the U.S. to cut the trails now," a Lao military official said.

"But," he added hurriedly, "we wouldn't want South Vietnamese troops. Americans would be all right."

Nixon Criticized

The Lao military criticized President Nixon for setting time and territorial limits on American actions in Cambodia. "The North Vietnamese will withdraw to the west, then return and rebuild the base areas when the Americans leave," a Lao general said.

Laotians said they expect the Communists to become active in northern Cambodia and to try and build up the Red Cambodian indigenous movement in these areas, supplied from new sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia border areas.

The Lao military reaction was sparked by Red moves in military region IV, the southern half of the Laos panhandle. Pak Se is military region IV headquarters.

Heavy fighting is going on now at Phou Luan, the highest point

of the rice-rich Bolovens Plateau, 30 miles north of the Lao-Cambodian border.

Reds Regroup

"If they get the Bolovens they can hide and feed five divisions," the south Laos commander, Gen. Bounphone Mahaparak said. North Vietnamese forces are grouping west of Savane, which is the best access route to the plateau.

The Lao lost the province capital of Attapeu last month, opening the Sekhong River Route into Cambodia.

Current U.S. military help to Laos in this area is confined to Army advisers, Air Force forward air controllers, air logistics and Central Intelligence Agency operatives who lead tribal guerrillas from small airstrips on the eastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau.

The number of Americans engaged in these operations totals less than 100.

9 MAY 1970

Substantial U.S. backing of Nol government expected *Involvement without large ground forces forecast*

By George W. Ashworth
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

If the Lon Nol government survives in Cambodia, indications here are that American support of that government will build to substantial proportions.

Some sources here are predicting the virtual "Laoization" of the war in Cambodia—U.S. involvement without massive ground forces.

In his April 30 speech to this nation, President Nixon said, "With other nations, we shall do our best to provide the small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian Army of 40,000 needs and can use for its defense."

The President continued, "But the aid we will provide will be limited for the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality and not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other."

'Trick of the decade'

Making the easygoing, predominantly Buddhist Cambodians belligerents on one side or the other would be the trick of the decade. The Americans, most sources believe, will be doing extremely well indeed, if they can enable the Cambodians to develop even a moderate ability to defend themselves against the highly motivated and trained North Vietnamese.

The President, of course, hopes to have the help of other Southeast Asian countries. This is in line with the oft-enunciated Nixon doctrine, which is a follow-on to a position paper known as the Foreign Internal Defense Policy developed by the Senior Interdepartmental Group under the Johnson administration. The group, now dissolved, was superseded by the rejuvenated National Security Council. One of the NSC's first efforts was to study and reshape the Johnson policy into the new Nixon doctrine.

Inherent in the original concept and the subsequently developed and promulgated doctrine was the idea that the U.S. should not go it alone, rather that it should seek the help of other nations in any endeavor to help a faltering government fight Communist national wars of liberation.

That is precisely what the Nixon administration is trying to do in the case of Cambodia, although it is unclear now whether other nations have the will and the resources to come to Cambodia's assistance.

U.S. officials decidedly do not want to go it alone. Attempts to draw other nations into involvement can be expected to continue, but with

success uncertain. Certainly, the South Vietnamese could help in some slight ways. However the mutual antipathy of the Cambodians and Vietnamese would be a hindrance, as would the still freshly remembered killings of the Vietnamese in Cambodia.

Situation assessed

Perhaps the best hope at present is that the Indonesians will be able to provide advisers and some combat troops as a last resort.

As sources here assess the Indonesian situation, the multinational parley on Cambodia (expected to be held in Jakarta May 16-17) will possibly—if not probably—fail to yield any solutions. Subsequently, the stand of Indonesian Minister Adam Malik will be weakened, and the way will be opened for the Indonesian military, now champing at the bit, to blossom forth with their aid proposals for Cambodia.

Another possibility would be Malay police or some other small form of aid. The Thais possibly would be willing to help, but they are beset by a steadily growing insurgency in their northeastern frontiers that shows signs of growing rather than diminishing now, as the Chinese demonstrate the moral willingness to keep the pressure on and the physical readiness to push their road across Laos toward Thailand.

U.S. in prime role

Thus, at this moment, when the efficacy of the Nixon doctrine might be proved, there are many hindrances and stumbling blocks that will force the U.S. into a prime role, if not the only one, in the matter of Cambodian assistance.

The President has pledged to get U.S. troops out of Cambodia by July 1 and to penetrate no more than 19 miles inside frontiers. During the interim, it is quite possible that the joint Vietnamese and American operations will relieve pressure upon the Cambodian Government.

That was, of course, a strong secondary reason for the decision to move into Cambodia. Hopefully, it will not have the effect of driving the North Vietnamese into Phnom Penh, which would leave the U.S. making plans for the salvation of a government that had fallen.

Given the survival of the Cambodian regime, sources here assess immediate prospects of direct aid this way:

- The Cambodians will be given small

STATINTL

9 MAY 1970

Laotian Tragedy

The Long March

Vientiane

After twenty years of sporadic, semi-secret warfare, Laos has a serious refugee problem. At least half the population of three million has been displaced by the fighting, according to government officials in Vientiane. At least 180,000 are living in "refugee villages."

At the end of 1968, American bombers were diverted from North Vietnam to Laos and began systematically depopulating Pathet Lao-controlled territory. Air strikes were no longer limited to the network of North Vietnamese supply routes twisting through the sparsely inhabited mountains of eastern Laos on their way to South Vietnam (the "Ho Chi Minh trail"), nor confined to "combat support missions," as President Nixon would have it. Everything that stood and was not controlled by the government became a target. Tribesmen and peasants began to flee to the relative safety of the government-controlled lowlands. The US Embassy, having persuaded itself that the people were escaping "Communist terrorism," was enthusiastic about this "voting-with-the-feet." Yet it was not – and is not yet – eager to advertise the refugee situation.

In mid-1969 air strikes were escalated to their present high level of 15,000 sorties a month. In support of a secrecy-shrouded offensive by the CIA-financed "Clandestine Army" of Meo mercenaries, the US carried out a saturation bombing campaign on the Pathet Lao-controlled Plain of Jars in northeastern Laos. After seizing the Plain, the Clandestine Army rounded up the inhabitants, culled out the prosperous farmers and merchants – the main contributors to Pathet Lao tax coffers – and shipped them to the Vientiane lowlands. The poor peasants were allowed to remain behind, not in their original homes, which had been reduced to rubble by the bombing, but in the "refugee villages."

I asked a young man what happened when the Clandestine Army took over his village. "The soldiers gathered us together," he said. "They told us we had one hour to leave. We didn't know where we were going. The soldiers took whatever they wanted from our houses, and then they burned the village down. An officer told us that if anyone asked, we should say we were escaping from the Communists. We walked 20 miles to an airstrip, and then American planes brought us here. I was lucky. I'm half-Chinese, so they didn't make me join the army. The Lao boys were drafted right there. I haven't seen them since."

When the dry season came at the end of last year, intelligence reports indicated that the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao were planning a counter-offensive to recapture the Plain of Jars. No one believed

that the rag-tag Clandestine Army could hold off a determined Communist advance, but the US Embassy here wanted two guarantees: that the peasant-refugees – indispensable producers of rice – would not again be available to benefit the Pathet Lao; and that American bombers would have a free hand to pound the oncoming troops. So it was decided to evacuate all civilians from the Plain of Jars.

Between February 5 and 11, some 15,000 bedraggled Laotian peasants were loaded onto Air American cargo planes and shipped to new "refugee villages" in the Mekong lowlands. The Plain of Jars became a free-strike zone. The US-Vientiane planners, unable to carry their government to the people, had chosen the Vietnam-trying course of bringing the people to the government. "We could work in the fields only at night; by day we slept underground in the bunkers," explained one old woman in a camp near Vientiane. "Everything that moved was bombed. Our village was bombed three times. The second time my daughter was killed. Then we left and went to live in the forest. It's very difficult to live there. There's not enough to eat."

Though more people live under government control since the bombing, American officials here deny that was the intent of the bombing. They claim that "Communist terrorism" is responsible for the influx of refugees. When the mass evacuation from the Plain of Jars



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"Prease, I not American. I are stictly rocal talent."

continued

was begun in February, US AID officials who supervised the operation maintained that the people all freely chose to leave their homes. Other US AID officials, who do not wish to be identified, now admit, however, that the decision was made in Vientiane and that the people were moved regardless of their wishes. Naturally, when confronted with the choice of being bombed at home or surviving in a far-away camp, many people chose the latter. But it seems devious to call that choice "free."

The plight of refugees here is not yet as grim as that of their counterparts in Vietnam. Camps are small and usually contiguous to an established village. The idea is that the old villagers will help dispossessed newcomers; so far it has worked well, to the great credit of the Lao villagers. But refugees do not have enough land to support themselves, and the land they do receive is usually the least fertile. The thatched, barrack housing is depressing even to peasants accustomed to primitive conditions. Medical care is rare; so is schooling. US AID this year will spend some \$7 million on refugee relief (about one thirty-fifth of the estimated \$250 million spent to wage the war); most of that will be used for rice crops.

The worst suffering is not in the camps. By the time people reach them, the worst is over. Their villages have been destroyed; their relatives killed or drafted; they have walked, sometimes for months, through some of the most rugged country in the world. Only the lucky ones ride Air America. The others, by the tens of thousands, put their belongings on their backs and set out across the hills on foot. It is an agony difficult for an outsider to imagine. American and Laotian officials estimate that over the last 10 years 20 percent of the people of northeastern Laos have died in these refugee marches. The verdant limestone mountains that seem to have been lifted from a delicate Chinese scroll are a cemetery for 100,000 peasants! Random air strikes are always a threat; countless unexploded bombs lie scattered half-buried in the hills; exhaustion claims the weaker marchers; epidemics, especially of measles, are common; and of course there is never enough food.

The US Embassy downplays the dimension of the tragedy by counting only those currently living on relief in recognized "refugee villages" - the 180,000 I have mentioned. The Laotian government, however, reports 543,000 refugees and says there are at least another 150,000 unregistered. Now - because of heavy fighting and bombing near the Plain of Jars - another 100,000 are trudging southward through the roadless mountains to safety. One out of five will probably die before reaching the lowlands.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

May 7, 1970

explosion of anger and despair and bitterness—hence violence and counterviolence, rebellion and repression.

WHAT HAS BEEN GAINED?

It may be argued by those politicians and commentators as concerned as Mr. Nixon about manhood, humiliation and American vanity that, even had he known his people well enough to expect the reaction he is getting, he still would have had no choice but to act in the national interest, as he saw it. But none will be able to explain what interest is worth having pushed so many of the educated and concerned of a whole generation into hatred and mistrust of their own Government; and who can say how the future can be protected abroad if a nation must club and shoot its children in the streets and on the campus?

What, in fact, has re-escalation gained us? A chilly diplomatic reaction, for one thing, including quite possible a setback to the nuclear arms limitation talks. For another, the most severe Congressional reaction in decades against the exercise of Presidential powers.

The Administration itself is divided and wounded at the top, with Mr. Nixon—like Lyndon Johnson only two years ago—suddenly unable or unwilling to travel among his own people. Secretary of State Rogers is shown either to know little of what is happening or to have minimal policy influence; Secretary of Defense Laird was apparently overruled and—worse—uninformed about what his own bombers were doing. Is it an accident that these two, with Robert Finch among the ablest men in the Administration, now join Mr. Finch in the kind of public embarrassment to which he has had to become inured?

On the battlefield itself, no supreme Communist headquarters has been found, although its presence had been advertised as if it were Hitler's bunker. In fact, not many Communist troops of any kind have been found, according to reporters on the scene, although captured rice tonnage amounts daily and the body count is predictably inflated. Destruction is wholesale, of course, but mostly of Cambodian towns and farms, not of Vietcong or North Vietnamese soldiers.

BEGGING THE QUESTION

To cap this futility with absurdity, Mr. Nixon now pledges to let the invaders go no further into Cambodia than eighteen miles from the border, a guarantee which if honored makes the rest of that sizable country a real sanctuary easily reached; and he further promises to pull the troops out within eight weeks, a period that probably can be survived by an enemy that has been fighting for more than twenty years. These public restrictions beg the question what the invasion can accomplish.

Whatever the answer, the dead at Kent State are far too high a price for it. Like the dead in Cambodia and Vietnam, they can be buried; but somehow the nation has to go on living with itself. Mr. Hickel's courageous letter to the President shows that even within the Administration, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Agnew have only made that harder to do.

THE UNITED STATES VIOLATES CAMBODIAN NEUTRALITY

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 7, 1970

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, tomorrow the President will speak to the Nation on

the background and details of the American invasion of Cambodia. I expect he will focus on the military aspects of our involvement in Southeast Asia as distinct from the political implication of our action. It needs to be emphasized that the United States has invaded a neutral state without prior consultation with its Government. This reveals a disregard for Cambodian sovereignty. It is my understanding that this disregard for the legitimate aspirations of the Cambodian state has a long history. The following article from the Cornell Daily Sun describes this well:

THE UNITED STATES AND CAMBODIAN NEUTRALITY

(By Laura Summers)

The United States invasion of Cambodia is a blatant and irrevocable confession of our government's lack of understanding and intolerance for Cambodian neutrality. Since Cambodia's decision to adopt a neutral foreign policy in December, 1954, the United States has sought to undermine that neutrality by overt and covert means—first, by refusal to restrain the actions of our allies, Thailand and Vietnam, and second, by distorting the legitimate aspirations of the Cambodian people to suit our own ends in the prosecution of the Vietnamese war. History speaks for itself.

The Eisenhower administration treated Cambodian neutrality with hostility. Secretary of State Dulles, who perceived Communism as an evil to be combated everywhere in Southeast Asia, was suspicious of Cambodia's renunciation of the SEATO pact and its persistent criticism of American intervention in Diem's Vietnam and Sarit's Thailand. Cambodia matched each threat from the West with a concession to the East to gain international leverage in its struggle to prevent domestic intervention.

Dulles was thoroughly convinced that neutral nations were a danger to the "free world" cause when the Pathet Lao won the only free elections in Laotian history (1958). One month later, the South Vietnamese army invaded a Cambodian province, occupied two villages, and moved a border marker before returning to their own country. Sihanouk protested directly to the United States. The U.S. promised to counsel moderation to the Vietnamese but also warned the Cambodians not to use any weapons provided by American aid against the invaders. One week later Cambodia initiated negotiations for full diplomatic relations with China. Washington's response was to begin plans to remove Sihanouk from power.

Shortly thereafter, the Khmer Serol Movement was founded. Presumably supported by Thailand, South Vietnam and the American CIA, this group of approximately one thousand Cambodian dissidents attempted a "Bay of Pigs" type invasion in early 1960. Sihanouk was warned of the plot by three foreign ambassadors. Confessions of the captured participants implicated Marshall Sarit of Thailand; Ngo Trong Hieu, Diem's representative in Phnom Penh; and Victor Matsui of the American Embassy, widely rumored to be a CIA agent.

The Kennedy administration was somewhat more sympathetic to Cambodia's desires to practice a true neutrality. But by 1961, the U.S. was so committed in Thailand and South Vietnam that Kennedy's conciliatory attitude toward Cambodia was not well-received by our anti-Communist allies. Thus, Kennedy was unable to promise United States participation in an international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality. In urging Diem to support such a conference, Sihanouk said Cambodia would agree to complete international control if South Vietnam would

agree to recognize Cambodia's present borders. Diem refused.

In 1964, Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, expressed American apologies and regrets for the damage and death caused by an attack on a Cambodian village staged by a South Vietnamese army unit with an American advisor. Later he denied numerous other complaints submitted by Cambodia dealing with military raids.

American policy took a sharp change in late 1964 after the first infiltration of a large North Vietnamese regular force through Cambodia. In December, Khmero-American negotiations in New Delhi ended abruptly after one day. The American ambassador reported he had made the American position absolutely clear. After further American-South Vietnamese violations of Cambodian territory, Cambodia severed diplomatic relations with the United States in April, 1965. Simultaneously, Secretary Rusk announced the United States would be glad to participate in an international conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality.

Cambodia refused to participate in a conference on its neutrality where the issue of nonintervention by SEATO powers would be ignored while the United States and South Vietnam attempted to cut off North Vietnamese infiltration. On April 28, 1965, Sihanouk requested that the SEATO powers make a formal declaration that Cambodia was not included in its "perimeter of intervention." The request was ignored.

In contrast to Johnson administration policy, Nixon's statement on Vietnam in his address to the nation on May 14, 1969, omits any reference to an American guarantee of Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity. Significantly, Nixon notes that his four month review of the war revealed a "wide gulf between Washington and Saigon." Was Cambodia part of this gulf? His carefully measured comments on Laos and Cambodia read as follows:

We ask only that North Vietnam withdraw its forces from South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into North Vietnam, also in accordance with a timetable. We include Cambodia and Laos to ensure that these countries would not be used as bases for a renewed war.

This language was echoed by Nixon and Thieu in their joint communique after the Midway conference and by the United States delegation to the Paris peace talks.

This, then, is the historical prelude to invasion.

(Note.—Laura Summers, a third-year graduate student in government, specializes in the area of Southeast Asia.)

DOCUMENTS

Either House may order the printing of a document not already provided for by law, but only when the same shall be accompanied by an estimate from the Public Printer as to the probable cost thereof. Any executive department, bureau, board or independent office of the Government submitting reports or documents in response to inquiries from Congress shall submit therewith an estimate of the probable cost of printing the usual number. Nothing in this section relating to estimates shall apply to reports or documents not exceeding 50 pages (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 716, 82 Stat. 1250).

Resolutions for printing extra copies, when presented to either House, shall be referred immediately to the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, who, in making their report, shall give the probable cost of the proposed printing upon the estimate of the Public Printer, and no extra copies shall be printed before such committee has reported (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 703, 82 Stat. 1247).

STATINTL

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

will not bow before protracted aggression from Communist powers.

I believe the most significant passage in the President's speech of April 30 was the following:

We live in an age of anarchy both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free civilizations in the past five hundred years. Here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed. Small nations all over the world find themselves under attack from within and from without.

If when the chips are down the U.S. acts like a pitiful helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free institutions throughout the world.

It is not our power but our will and character that is being tested tonight. The question all Americans must ask and answer tonight is this: Does the richest and strongest nation in the history of the world have the character to meet a direct challenge by a group which rejects every effort to win a just peace, ignores our warnings, tramples on solemn agreements, violates the neutrality of an unarmed people and uses our prisoners as hostages?

In this passage the President intentionally and correctly relates the violence exported by Communists in Asia to a general decay of confidence in the capacity of the great free nations—and especially the United States—to defend themselves and their best institutions.

A score of retired university presidents in this country can testify to the fact that it is dangerous to earn the contempt of determined enemies of civility. The President understands that it is dangerous for a nation to earn the contempt of those nations whose very *raison d'être* is the destruction of free nations.

One hundred and eight years ago, on December 1, 1862, in his second annual message to Congress, Abraham Lincoln said this to an embattled nation:

Fellow-citizens we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.

What was true of Congress and of the American people in that day is also true of Congress and of the American people today. Totalitarianism challenges us in several regions. How we respond today and in the wearisome years ahead will determine whether we earn the respect or the opprobrium of succeeding generations.

It has been said that a politician thinks of the next election while a statesman thinks of the next generation. In this time of testing those who hold real sovereign power in this Nation—the American people—must measure up to the standards of true statesmanship. If Americans understand the nature of the challenge they face, and the consequences of weakness, they will respond as they have in the past—with courage, and with success.

Twenty-five years ago this week the guns of the Second World War fell silent. But Peace did not follow. For a quarter of a century the American people have borne the burden of supporting resistance to expansionist communism. The fact that the North Vietnamese

Communists have been beaten back into a strategy of protracted conflict does not confront the American people with a new experience. The American people have been directly involved in open protracted conflict with Communists at least since the Berlin blockade.

Communist rulers have always understood one thing: All that stands between them and the success of their vicious plans is the determination of the American people. The American people dare not—they will not—falter now. Our enemies are in the process of learning, to their sorrow, a lesson that other tyrants have had occasion to learn during the last 194 years. It is dangerous to underestimate the American people.

My friend and colleague, the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), concluded his moving and eloquent Law Day address with a quotation from Tom Paine. I would like to conclude my prepared remarks with the same words:

Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it.

Mr. President, one of the great Senators of this Senate in the past was the Honorable Edwin C. Johnson who served as U.S. Senator and then as Governor of Colorado.

I have in my hand a copy of a letter he has written to the President, which is printed in the Denver Post.

The title is "Courageous Action: Message to the Honorable Richard Milhous Nixon, Washington, D.C." It reads:

Your courageous action did not surprise me. It will shorten this cruel war many months.

It is signed Edwin C. Johnson, a Democrat and former Colorado State Governor and U.S. Senator.

Mr. President, I think I have just a few minutes remaining. I would like to speak extemporaneously for those few moments.

Mr. President, in response to a question from the distinguished Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), I want to say—as I said at that time—that this was not a speech for the administration. This speech was not made at the request nor with the knowledge of the administration.

I have seen history distorted so many times and for such a long period on the floor of the Senate and in the news media and other places that I felt it was incumbent upon me to enter into a discussion not only with respect to the Cambodian situation but also with respect to the situation, as I see it, in the world in the next decade and perhaps for the next two decades.

Mr. President, it is for this reason I have made this address this morning. I feel seriously about this matter. I only hope that within the structure of these remarks there will be some help to those people who feel frustrated and that those who suffer trepidation will find cause for courage. Those who disagree and dissent can do this in an atmosphere of quietness and they can be heard and listened to.

I believe that the future of this country is going to lie in the actions of the executive branch of Government and particularly the actions of Congress in the next few years. Lincoln said what we do and

say here now truly "will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation."

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be recognized pending the arrival of the distinguished Senator from New York, who is next on the agenda, without any loss of time to him.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LAOS—HEARINGS CONDUCTED BY SENATOR SYMINGTON

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) has been conducting a number of most interesting hearings affecting various parts of the world. The results of those hearings when they are finally published—and I use the word "finally" advisedly—will receive a good deal of attention. Perhaps otherwise they might have been lost in the shuffle.

I refer particularly to the Symington committee hearings on Laos and the length of time it took to get clearance from the administration so that at least some parts of the report could be published.

It is good that this committee held these hearings on this forgotten war, this hidden war, this secret war which, while tied to the war in Vietnam, insofar as the Ho Chi Minh Trail coming down from the Laotian panhandle is concerned, nevertheless was in other respects an auxiliary and separate war because it was tied to the army of Vang Pao, the chief of the Meos and the Royal Laotian Forces, away and apart from the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Now, with what is developing in Cambodia, which is a war on a war on a war, and marks an extension and enlargement of the conflict, I think it is most important that the situation, as it exists in Laos, should be brought out and given consideration by all Members of the Senate.

Mr. President, in order to help that along, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD certain news stories having to do with the publication of the report.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 20, 1970]
UNITED STATES ESCALATES WAR IN LAOS, HILL DISCLOSES

(By Murray Marder)

The United States is engaged in "heavy escalation" of its air war in Laos while try-

MAY 1970

STATINTL

U.S. throws more troops into Cambodia

Daily World Foreign Department

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, ousted Cambodian chief of state, who in Peking announced formation of a government in exile backed by the recently formed United National Front of Cambodia, said the Front includes Communists as well as other political groups.

The U.S. and the Saigon puppet regime yesterday launched three new offensives into Cambodia, bringing to more than 50,000 the number of U.S. and Saigon troops there.

An armada of U.S. Navy river gunboats went up the Mekong River into Cambodia, while along a 200-mile front in Cambodia's eastern provinces, heavy U.S. air and ground operations continued.

U.S. and foreign newsmen remarked on the low number of U.S. casualties produced by such a huge invasion — 18 dead and nearly 60 wounded. Some of those killed were victims of their own troops' gunfire or air crashes unrelated to any hostile action.

The U.S. invaders are still hunting — apparently somewhat desperately now — for the alleged "Central Office for South Vietnam" (COSVN), of a claimed "Vietcong" setup. Destruction of COSVN was the major reason given for the invasion.

"What's COSVN?" a puzzled U.S. Army lieutenant in Cambodia asked Tuesday, as he looked at some captured office equipment. "It's just a bunch of typewriters."

The U.S. and the Cambodian regime of puppet Lon Nol confirmed earlier reports that several thousand Cambodian mercenaries trained by the CIA have been integrated into the Lon Nol armed forces.

The Cambodian mercenaries are called "Khmer Kampuchea Krom" (Cambodians from Lower Cambodia), or KKK. The KKK troops are from the Lower Mekong area in South Vietnam. They were trained by the CIA to man Special Forces camps in South Vietnam.

More than 4,000 KKK mercenaries were brought into Cambodia in the last few days by helicopter and air transport. Nearly all are in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital.

Lon Nol said Tuesday that his regime "welcomed" the U.S. invasion.

In Paris yesterday, both the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam boycotted the 66th session of the peace talks. A DRV spokesman said this action was taken "to express their firm protest against the extremely grave acts of the U.S. in Indochina."

Nguyen Thanh Le, the DRV spokesman, read the formal DRV-PRG statement, which accused the U.S. of violating its commitment to cease the air war against the DRV and of expanding the Vietnam war into Cambodia.

"If the Nixon administration continues its bombardments against the territory of the DRV, it must bear full responsibility for all the serious consequences arising from its acts," the joint DRV-PRG statement said. The DRV said the next meeting of the talks should be held on May 14, but the U.S. delegate, Philip Habib, refused to say whether the U.S. would attend. Habib, after a brief talk with reporters, started making preparations to leave for Washington on a trip he alleged had been planned some time ago.

STATINTL

LOWFLL, MASS.
SUN

E - 47,948
S - 38,570

MAY 6 1970

Vietnamization

With the recent events in Laos and Cambodia, the question for the Nixon Administration and the American people is whether now is the time to stop talking about Vietnamization as an end-all and cure-all for U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.

Vietnamization is the promise and hope that the Saigon government of President Thieu is becoming strong enough to maintain itself in power. But the question is never answered: Against whom?

Vietnamization implies that a great majority of the people in Vietnam have a fondness and respect for President Thieu and his military regime. If that were true, the 450,000 American troops in Vietnam could start leaving for home today.

If Washington will ever ask itself why all those Vietnamese people keep struggling against the tremendous firepower of 450,000 U.S. soldiers and devastating air power, there will be finally an understanding of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as areas of civil conflict.

In Laos, two half-brothers are contesting for control of the country while the main fighting force is made up of Meo tribesmen recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In Cambodia, the situation is not yet clear. But there are disturbing questions about U.S. involvement and CIA intrigue.

It is obvious that President Thieu would profit through the spread of fighting throughout the former Indo-China area. It would mean that withdrawal of U.S. troops would have to be slowed down or even halted.

Certainly the Vietnamization policy would be made meaningless if President Thieu's troops become involved in fighting beyond their own borders.

The reports are disturbing for the American people who see their sons sacrificed at the rate of 100 a week in an Asian civil war 10,000 miles away.

6 May 70

Clandestine Airline in Laos Has Adventure-Hued Flavor of CIA

NY Times Service (c)

WASHINGTON—As the American-supported clandestine army went on the attack in Laos again, pilots of a flamboyant airline called Air America took to the skies once again to move its troops, provide its supplies and evacuate its wounded.

Air America is a flight charter company that, like the clandestine army, is widely considered to be the servant of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

With its assorted fleet of 167 aircraft, Air America performs diverse missions across East

Asia from Korea to Indonesia. It is believed to be a major link for the CIA's extensive activities throughout Asia.

Air America parachutes MEO tribesmen and other secret agents behind North Vietnamese lines in Laos, trains mechanics for the aviation division of the national police in Thailand, hauls American aid cargo for the Agency for International Development in South Vietnam, ferries United States Air Force men from Okinawa to Japan and South Korea, and dispatches intelligence flights

from Taiwan along the coast of Communist China.

THE COMPANY ALSO transports helicopters from France and Italy for assembly in Southeast Asia, flies prospectors looking for copper and geologists searching for oil in Indonesia, and provides pilots for commercial airlines such as Air Vietnam and Thai Airways and for China Airlines, which is on Taiwan.

Air America's civilian facade permits the United States to do things that would otherwise be impossible or, at least politically

embarrassing. The 1962 Geneva accords, for instance prohibit foreign military aircraft in Laos but they say nothing about civilian planes. The facade also averts public attention in countries such as Japan that are sensitive to the American military presence.

Then too, intelligence services the world over have always used business as a cover. Air America gives the CIA and other government agencies controlled and secure transport. On the economic side, commercial work enables the company to keep its large fleet busy when part might be idle.

THE OUTFIT EXUDES an air of oriental adventure out of Milton Caniff's comic strip "Terry and the Pirates." It has the flamboyance of the late Lt. Gen. Claire L. Chennault's wartime Flying Tigers, from which it is descended. Working for Air America demands the resourceful skill of the busy pilots who have explored the unknown reaches of Northern Canada, the South American highlands and Africa.

Those who have seen Air America's pilots on the job in Asia say they have a sense of dedication and duty. They take more than routine risks and some have gone down in Asian jungles, not to be seen again.

Most of the company's aircraft like those of regular airlines, carry its name, though some are unmarked. The fleet includes long-haul jets, the C46 and C47 propeller craft that were the workhorses of World War II. A variety of helicopters and the latest in single-engine and twin-engine utility planes. Air America also borrows Air France planes.

THE LINE'S headquarters in Washington looks much like the offices of other medium-size businesses—conservatively dressed executives, miniskirted secretaries, bits of Asian art of the walls, a reddish-orange carpet to lend

The chief executive of Air America is George A. Doole Jr., a low-key 60-year-old business-

man who holds a master's degree from the school of business administration at Harvard. Before joining Air America in 1953 he was the chief pilot for Pan American and pioneered

transatlantic air routes before World War II.

In Asia the general manager is Hugh L. Grundy, 55, who is described by acquaintances as a quiet, shy man. He too is an alumnus of Pan American, having been an engineer with the line before the war and then having served in China. His headquarters is in Taipei, Taiwan.

THE CIA EVIDENTLY has at least two channels into Air America—one through the holding company atop the corporate structure of Air America and its affiliates, the other through charter arrangements under the guide of contracts with AID. Gleanings from those contracts, which have been made available to the New York Times, show the extent of the operations.

The CIA declines to comment on this subject, and AID officials refuse to discuss intelligence operations.

THE PACIFIC corporation owns 100 per cent of Air America, which is also a Delaware corporation founded in 1950. The line owns 125 aircraft and leases 42 more. It employs about 4,700 people, some 400 of them pilots, and has bases in Okinawa, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos.

Air America, in turn owns 99 per cent of Air Asia, which was set up on Taiwan in 1955. Air Asia claims the finest aircraft maintenance and repair facility in Asia, Taiwan.

In addition, the Pacific Corp. owns 40 per cent of Civil Air Transport, incorporated under Chinese Nationalist law on Taiwan. It was founded in 1946 by Chennault, the United States air commander in China during World War II who died in 1958, and was manned by many of the pilots who had flown with the Flying Tigers against Japan during the war.

Civil Air Transport known as CAT which originally functioned as a regular airline as well as carrying out clandestine mis-

sions, is also generally believed to have been financed and operated by the CIA in recent years. Air America took over CAT in 1950.

WHEN THE CHINESE nationalists wanted to establish a Chinese-run airline, CAT had to get out of the passenger business. Most of its other operations have since been absorbed by Air America but it still flies some special missions.

There is also a separate operating division of Air America known as Pacific Engineering. Its functions are obscure.

"We're all one family," Doole said. "You can't tell one from the other. We tie them together with contracts and don't even keep separate books except for tax purposes."

A glance at the boards of directors of the companies bears out the point. Most of the boards, which are made up of reputable businessmen, overlap.

Samuel A. Walker, chairman of the Pacific Corp. is a managing partner of Joseph Walker & Sons, a New York banking house. He is also a director of Air America.

The chairman of Air America and Air Asia is Adm. Felix B. Stump, who was commander-in-chief of United States forces in the Pacific from 1953 to 1959. Doole holds the titles of president of the Pacific Corp. and chief executive of Air America and Air Asia.

ROBERT G. GOELET, William A. Read and Arthur B. Richardson are directors of all three companies. Goelet has extensive holdings in New York real estate. Read is a retired member of the investment house of Dillon, Read & Co., and Richardson was formerly president of Chesebrough-Pond's.

Air America's greatest assets are its pilots, mostly Americans but including some Chinese and Thais.

"We hire the same pilots that Pan American and United hire," Doole said, "except that ours are a bit more experienced."

EDITORIALS

STATINTL

More Flimflam

The President's address on the Vietnamese War was more of the same—evasive, misleading, blandly dishonest—a pitchman's effort. Yet, with few exceptions, it received a good press. It may be that this is the kind of pap the people wish to hear—or the kind that the media now feel obliged to endorse. If so, the country is in for a worse time than even pessimistic prognosticators have envisioned.

The speech purported to promise a withdrawal of 150,000 men over a period of one year, but this was made conditional on the good behavior of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, and on Mr. Nixon's interpretation of his duty as Commander in Chief to safeguard the troops. If 150,000 effectives are actually brought home during the next year, the rate of withdrawal will be about the same as in the earlier reductions, which were on a shorter timetable. The extended timetable may be a compromise between General Abrams' reported request for a six-month suspension of withdrawals (the Joint Chiefs are said to have asked for only a two-month suspension) and the President's need to convince the public that the boys are streaming home in great numbers. One hundred and fifty thousand is a good round figure to toss about on TV and radio, but it commits Mr. Nixon to nothing.

The President likewise ducked any commitments, or even informative discussion on Laos and Cambodia. However, he repeated his threat to take "strong and effective measures" against North Vietnam should Hanoi increase military action in South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. Since the overthrow of Norodom Sihanouk, the situation in Cambodia has radically changed. The rightists who seized power have attempted to oust the approximately 40,000 North Vietnamese from their Cambodian sanctuary. These efforts, ineffectual so far, were performed in concert with American blocking forces on the South Vietnam side, attacks by American gunships from across the border, and the invasion of Cambodia by South Vietnamese units. North Vietnamese resistance can be construed, at Mr. Nixon's pleasure, as an enlargement of the war, and ground for "strong and effective measures." Even if he does not resort to a resumption of bombing in North Vietnam, he can thus excuse a postponement of withdrawals of our forces from South Vietnam.

Mr. Nixon painted the standard picture of a wicked enemy who refused to meet us halfway when we stopped bombing North Vietnam, and who now refuses to match our troop withdrawals with withdrawals of his own. He says nothing, however, about the stepped-up American bombing in Laos which we have been conducting at the rate of some 18,000 sorties a month. The wicked enemy has sent his troops into Laos, in collaboration with the Pathet Lao. So have we, using CIA combat advisors. Air

America, etc., but on our violation of the Geneva Accord of 1962 Mr. Nixon is silent.

He told the radio-TV audience that Vietnamization was working, and that progress was likewise being made in pacification. Both claims are contradicted by informed journalists such as James McCartney, the American reporter whose column appears in the *Toronto Star*, among other papers. McCartney casts doubt on the efficacy of Vietnamization and says that the enemy is present in substantially the same numbers as two years ago. He said that U.S. officials, measuring everything by computer and statistics, are capable of fooling themselves as well as the American public. Writing from Saigon, Evans and Novak describe the ruinous inflation in South Vietnam, with the price of rice rising 60 per cent during the past year, and quote a high government official as saying that if South Vietnam cannot get its economic house in order, "it is a sick society that no number of M-16 rifles can cure."

The omission of Laos and Cambodia from the President's speech, and the incomplete report that Senator Symington has succeeded in prying out of the State Department, shows that the Pentagon and whatever administration is in power (whether Johnson or Nixon makes no appreciable difference) is capable not only of waging undeclared wars but also undisclosed wars. We know that this has happened in Laos; it may happen in the future in Cambodia, unless the media should prove less compliant there than in Laos. If the State Department could be forced to disgorge the information about Laos that was omitted from the report publicized by Mr. Symington, it would be some protection against a repetition in Cambodia. Mr. Nixon gave no such assurance.

The only hopeful element in the speech was a peripheral suggestion that a political settlement should reflect the existing relationship of political forces within South Vietnam. This was contradicted, however, by the President's insistence that the will of the South Vietnamese people is what the Thieu government says it is. He keeps repeating that the South Vietnamese people must be allowed to determine their future without outside interference. That the installation and maintenance of the Thieu government is outside interference he refuses to recognize. His efforts to persuade the American people of his good intentions are all at this level of duplicity. Anyone who is taken in by such tergiversation must be a willing victim—but isn't that the principle on which Mr. Nixon has always operated?

The 'Cool' Prince

Laotian Premier Sidesteps Political Trap Set by Pathet Lao to End U.S. Presence

By Rowland Evans
and Robert Novak

VIENTIANE — THE reliance by the United States on Prince Souvanna Phouma, sly and skillful prime minister of Laos, to prevent total deterioration here was shown by a backstage political episode during the peak of the Communist offensive in March.

With invading North Vietnamese troops nearing this worried capital city, a startling (and quite accurate) report circulated through Vientiane: Gen. Phoumi Nosa-van, the "rightist" leader, was returning from his long exile in Bangkok. That could mean only one thing: "rightist" generals were plotting a coup to substitute Phoumi for "neutralist" Souvanna Phouma.

The coup was stopped before it started. The "rightist" plotters were flatly informed that the United States could not tolerate Souvanna's ouster. Since the United States picks up half this country's budget and is essential to armed resistance against the Communists, that was that. "Rightists" who had been babbling about Phoumi on one day were attributing the talk to somebody else the next day.

This American sponsorship for Souvanna represents a complete turnabout since 1961 when a coup temporarily replaced Souvanna with a government supported by Phoumi and aided covertly by U.S. military and intelligence officers. In the subsequent turbulent decade, the lingering "rightist" and "neutralist" labels have lost all meaning. Souvanna has become the best, perhaps the only hope to hold off North Vietnamese encroachment.

The indispensability of the 69-year-old prince reveals the fragility of the Lao political structure in a war that is vital to the U.S. overall interest in Indochina. Any other Lao in power could upset the precarious balance of political forces to the benefit of the Communists.

SOUVANNA'S VALUE was demonstrated during the period when the "rightists" were plotting against him a few weeks ago. With North Vietnamese bearing down on Gen. Vang Pao's base at Long Tieng, the Communist Pathet Lao came up with a clever ploy. They demanded total expulsion of the U.S. military presence here and the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos ended, but offered deceptively easy terms to the Lao government as preconditions for negotiations.

A good many Lao politicians, "rightists" and "neutralists" alike, were eager to step into the trap. Some may have been panicked by highly undiplomatic maneuvers from Viktor Menin, Soviet ambassador to Laos. Menin warned prominent Laos that this might be the "last chance" to negotiate. The implication: If the Pathet Lao offer were not pounced upon, North Vietnamese troops could force a military solution.

Souvanna kept cool. He replied to the Communist proposal with a masterpiece of doubletalk. In fact, he realizes fully that withdrawal of U.S. help would insure his eventual replacement, sooner rather than later, by a Communist dictatorship.

In an interview at his villa here which doubles as the prime minister's office, he told us there would be no negotiations with the Pathet Lao because he would never agree to their precondition of an end to the bombing. Furthermore, he similarly re-

jected additional seats for the Pathet Lao in the country's non-functioning coalition government.

Souvanna is without illusions about the Pathet Lao. He views Prince Souphanouvong, his half-brother and longtime chief of the Pathet Lao, as utterly without power to make decisions because the Pathet Lao's decisions are made for them by Hanoi.

As long as the United States supports him, the pipe-smoking old prince can be expected to talk softly and concede nothing important to the Communists. This forces Hanoi to keep four combat divisions of North Vietnamese troops tied down in Laos and gives the United States a legal right to bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail.

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Charge Nixon defies people and constitution

STATINTL

NEW YORK, May 1—The following statement condemning U.S. aggression against Cambodia was issued today on behalf of the National Committee of the Communist Party by James Jackson, international affairs secretary, and Daniel Rubin, national organizational secretary:

In launching his criminal aggression against Cambodia, following the bombardment of Laos, President Nixon is violating the Constitution of the United States and defying the expressed will of the American people. He is violating Cambodia's sovereign rights and is recklessly gambling with moving to a world nuclear war. He tries to cover up the deed and the danger by a series of lies and false promises. That disastrous course must be reversed.

The most massive and militant response by millions of our people must be mounted to the new, criminal expansion of aggression in Cambodia. The mask has been removed. The policy pursued by Nixon is the continuous expansion of the brutal aggression in Vietnam, Laos and now Cambodia. Thousands of U.S. ground troops as well as planes and supporting units have invaded Cambodia together with Saigon puppet troops.

The inevitable result will be intensified fighting throughout the entire area and a grave new threat to world peace. To the 325,000 admitted U.S. casualties will be added new thousands in the stepped-up war. The toll of Vietnamese, and now Cambodians and Laotians, predominantly non-combatant women and children, is of genocidal proportions. Song My's will increase

In the U.S. the mass of workers, particularly black, Chicano and Puerto Rican, will pay the heavy

costs of the escalating war in lives and broken families. Runaway prices and taxes will increase further. Paychecks and contract settlements will be cut, even as unemployment grows. Programs for schools, hospitals, welfare, etc. will suffer even sharper slashes.

Jingoism, racism and repression will be further stimulated. In our country where racism has been the main tool of reaction for so long, it is not possible for President Nixon to rattle the saber jingoistically in justifying the slaughter of darker peoples in Southeast Asia, treating them as mere pawns of U.S. imperialism, without promoting racism at home.

It was no accident that at the moment U.S. troops were being sent into Cambodia, other federal troops were being sent to Connecticut. They were sent there to intimidate and provoke a mass rally opposing a repression which has especially singled out the Black Panther Party and the black community for victimization.

Such a course requires President Nixon to couple his announcement of expanded aggression with threats not only to university students but even to the Senate and Supreme Court. It requires lying about U.S. involvement to the country in the TV speech ten days before and to the Senate two days before the April 30 announcement. It requires acting contrary both to the will of the people expressed in actions and polls and to the opinion of Congress and, thereby, violating fundamental principles of the Constitution he has sworn to uphold.

The new aggression arises out of a crisis in the policy of so-called "Vietnamization." U.S. ruling imperialist circles have sought to maintain control of South Vietnam which can only be done by mili-

tary means. Having failed to force such a solution at the conference table or in fact on the battlefield, it has sought to exhaust the Vietnamese in a war of attrition.

A rising tide of opposition at home and around the world forced the Nixon Administration to try to achieve the same results by scaling down U.S. ground forces, with puppet troops increasingly taking over the ground fighting and casualties. The attempt is to deceive public opinion and reduce the massive popular opposition, while pursuing the same aims.

Such a policy was bound to fail, for it does not recognize that the Thieu and Lon Nols can achieve no stable popular support because they serve the interests of U.S. imperialism and not those of their own people. "Vietnamization" was, therefore, both immoral and doomed to failure because the Provisional Revolutionary Government represents the popular will for national freedom and the Thieu-Ky regime is nothing but a fascist, dictatorial creature of the CIA.

"Vietnamization" immediately required military buttressing of the Thieu clique to have any hope of success. These steps included stepped up bombing in South Vietnam, increased bombing and military action in Laos and the CIA-engineering coup in Cambodia.

But the CIA coup in Cambodia rapidly suffered the same fatal weakness. The Lon Nol regime, a tool of the CIA, had no popular support and was rapidly collapsing before the wrath of the Cambodian peoples. A new crisis then confronted the military preparations for "Vietnamization"; the next logical step in its pursuit is being taken, military action to save the Lon Nol puppets.

President Nixon acknowledged that the military support had to be U.S. forces and Saigon puppet troops because Lon Nol could mus-

2 MAY 1970



International

Nixon blocks the only peace plan

By TOM FOLEY

The American people were never asked beforehand whether they wanted to get involved in Vietnam. They were presented with an accomplished fact. Blatant fraud was used to get the Congress to agree to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which was then stretched to the breaking point to cover anything the Pentagon felt like doing.

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution has now been repudiated by Congress, and most strongly of all by the man who got it through in the first place — Sen. J. William Fulbright. I think few observers would disagree with the statement that the American people are heartily sick of this war today, and would do almost anything to end it.

Nixon has been able to muster what little support he has for his so-called "Vietnamization" program, because he promised it would get the U.S. out and bring the troops home from Vietnam. Yet it is clear today that those who were misled at first by "Vietnamization" are growing increasingly unhappy about it.

"Vietnamization" is a military program, not a political one. It means that Nixon will continue to ignore the Ten-Point Peace Plan made public by the new Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam in the Paris peace talks last May 8, although in reality this plan is the only way of ending the war.

What Nixon and other members of his administration most of all would like to see in South Vietnam is a "solution" based on the South Korean model: a CIA-backed military dictatorship, supported by Asian troops used as cannon fodder pure and simple.

No matter who does the fighting, the Pentagon is clearly committed to "winning" a military victory in Vietnam and is in fact responsible for spreading the war with much greater intensity than ever before into Laos and Cambodia. It was the Pentagon which insisted on stepping up the bombing of Laos in conjunction with the CIA-directed assault on the Lao Patriotic Front last fall,

and is now insisting that the bombing cannot be halted.

The Pentagon and the U.S. military command in Saigon both have argued that they can "win" in South Vietnam within a year if they go into Cambodia. As a result, "Vietnamization" as a military solution has come to mean spreading the Vietnam war all over Southeast Asia.

The peace movement in the U.S. has got to get busy in order to prevent thousands more American GIs from dying in senseless battles in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. It must insist that the only solution to the war is a political one which recognizes the points put forward in South Vietnam's Provisional Revolutionary Government's peace plan almost a year ago, which the Nixon administration has been evading ever since.

The plot to push war into Cambodia

STATINTL

By WILFRED BURCHETT
Special for Prensa Latina

PARIS — Norodom Sihanouk's concept of Cambodian neutrality — which has kept Cambodia neutral, independent and relatively peaceful while war raged on the other side of her frontier — has fallen victim to Nixon's "Vietnamization" policy.

Sihanouk's concept of neutrality was based on opposition to U.S. imperialism, friendship towards the countries of socialism, good neighborly relations with the Peoples Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Nixon's insistence on continuing the war in South Vietnam by other means is "Vietnamization" and of striving to maintain in power indefinitely the corrupt fascist regime of Thieu-Khiem-Ky encouraged right-wing elements in Cambodia to try and reverse the trend of Sihanouk's policies and place Cambodia in the U.S. camp.

It was no accident that the sacking of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government embassies in Phnom Penh took place 24 hours after Sihanouk had announced that DRV Premier Pham Van Dong would be visiting Cambodia during the month of May and on the very eve of Sihanouk's departure for Moscow and Peking.

Enviied Saigon boodlers

The rightists could not bear the thought of aid from the socialist countries. All their hopes were based on the Yankee dollar.

Elements within the upper strata of the armed forces eyed with envy their opposite numbers in South Vietnam stuffing their pockets and foreign bank accounts with U.S. dollars. Right wing elements among the bourgeoisie wanted an end to nationalization of the banks, of import-export companies and dreamed of the rake-off from dollar aid which they hoped would come pouring in once diplomatic relations with the USA were restored last June.

Had the Americans been sincere at the Paris talks in negotiating political settlement in South Vietnam based on a coal-

ition government and an independent neutral South Vietnam, Sihanouk's position would have been unassailable and the rightists would not have dared emerge from their holes. There would have been immediate prospects for a neutralist block of states including South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for a start and probably Thailand fairly soon. This bloc would represent no threat to legitimate western interests.

Sihanouk's policies would have been vindicated; he would have been honored by his people as the leader whose stubborn defence of Cambodia's independence and neutrality, kept the country out of the war. But U.S. imperialism is not interested in

neutralist prince. Under his leadership, the Cambodian government had:

- 1) Closed down a U.S. military mission when it was discovered that mission members were involved in a plot to overthrow and assassinate Sihanouk.
- 2) Cut off U.S. military aid when it became clear this could not be used in defense against Thailand and the Saigon regime which represented the only military threats for Cambodia.
- 3) Took the extraordinary action of being the first country to halt U.S. economic aid when it became clear this was being used to strangle the country's economic development.
- 4) Took no action when the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh

class trading community which Prince Sirik Matak is said to represent, was to try and secure a big slice of a potential dollar pie. But even when the U.S. embassy was reopened the expected offers of dollar aid failed to materialize while attacks on the frontier villages, including chemical war against the rubber plantations, was intensified.

"People think we're getting the big stick and carrot treatment," one top official told me in Phnom Penh in February. "In fact we're only getting the big stick. No sign of the carrot."

The inference was clear: "Show your change of hearts by concrete acts" was the message Washington was flashing.

It is in this context that the Vietnam embassies and the subsequent removal of Sihanouk must be seen. The presence of Vietnam troops in the border areas was of incidental importance only. The timing and sequence of events makes this clear.

Sihanouk and the Cambodian people know full well that any North Vietnamese or NLF troops in the border areas are there without hostile intent as far as Cambodia is concerned. They were there fighting the common threat to both peoples—a hostile Saigon regime with avowedly expansionist policies towards Cambodia and the U.S.A. obsessed with the idea of filling the "power vacuum" caused by the departure of the French.

It is not the North Vietnam or

continued

GRAND RAPIDS, MICH.
PRESS

E - 133,419

S - 139,539

MAY 1 1970

The Public Pulse

Sees U.S. on Familiar Road To Second Vietnam War

EDITOR OF THE PRESS: While President Nixon placates public opinion with promising rhetoric about the ill-fated "Vietnamization" program, he is foolishly committing the U.S. to the Second War of Indochina. Secret CIA operations in Cambodia and Laos have expanded into covert military entanglements. And, contrary to overly-optimistic reports, the U.S. is becoming further enmeshed in a disastrous war no one wants.

Our combat troops have penetrated Cambodia repeatedly, while the CIA searches for soldiers-of-fortune willing to fight in the jungles for \$1,000 a week. American aircraft are dropping napalm on Cambodians, and artillery continually pounds the countryside. In addition, the Nixon administration has agreed to send military aid to the right-wing Cambodian government.

Thousands of CIA-sponsored "advisers" are directing the clandestine army of Meo general Vang Pao, in the Plain of Jars, Laos. During the past year, Nixon has escalated the air war over Laos to a greater intensity than it once was over North Vietnam. U.S. aircraft based in Thailand, South Vietnam and on carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin fly more than 500 sorties a day, 24 hours a day, although bombing is only marginally effective at best—perhaps counter-productive (as it was over North Vietnam).

The mistaken policies in Southeast Asia are tragic symptoms of a bankrupt foreign policy based upon 1) blind containment of Communism, 2) expanding foreign investment, and 3) military intervention. Instability is automatically responded to militarily.

Until the U.S. adopts a more realistic and flexible foreign policy there seems little hope of abandoning the costly role of world policeman. The 440 U.S. military bases on foreign soil will be jumping-off points for future Vietnams. And a reordering of national priorities, beginning with reduction in military spending, will remain just a lingering dream humanists and ecologists discuss.

President Nixon's escalation of the Second War of Indochina illustrates that there has been no significant change in U.S. foreign policy since 1954, when he advocated direct American involvement in the original war of Indochina.

THOMAS MINNERICK

STATINTL

HAVERHILL, MASS.
GAZETTE

E - 22,571

MAY 1 1970

Cambodia Reaction

Congressional opposition to the entrance of American troops into Cambodia this week was far different from the favorable response made to the Gulf of Tonkin story which put U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

Senators and House members alike were strong in their repudiation of the decision by President Nixon to send military units into Cambodia. Support for the decision was numerically small and comparatively weak.

Public reaction to the spread of the war was practically instantaneous. Telegraph offices were besieged. There were calls to Gazette workers, asking where to send letters and telegrams of protest.

Appearance of the President on television last night will not, we feel, have the same effect on Americans as the words of President Johnson did after Tonkin Gulf, when the full effects of the action he planned could not be foreseen.

Where promises were made during the campaign to get American troops out of Vietnam, and where a withdrawal program was initiated, hope had been raised that U.S. participation in the war was closing.

We must now ask about the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in these Southeast Asia developments. Until a few weeks ago, Cambodian neutrality, however shaky, had been maintained. Then Prince Sihanouk, its ruler, was deposed in a coup, and the war immediately escalated. The CIA has been functioning in Cambodia and Laos for some time. Questions should be asked about its activities by Congressmen, like our own Rep. Michael J. Harrington, who oppose the broadening of the fighting.

Denial of funds, as proposed by Harrington, appears to be the only way for Congress to regain its role in forming national policy.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

U.S. Penny Pinching in Laotian War Is Too Fine to Stop Red Offensive

VIENTIANE, Laos — A 5,000-man increase in the hard-pressed Royal Lao army is being blocked because the war in Laos, though vital to the enormous U.S. commitment in Vietnam, is financed on a pinchpenny basis by Washington.

The 5,000 new soldiers, on top of the present 55,000-man Royal army and 40,000 irregulars, are needed to cope with the greatly escalated invading army of nearly 70,000 North Vietnamese (plus ineffective Pathet Lao Communist guerrillas, variously estimated between 20,000 and 50,000). But so great are Washington pressures to hold down spending in Laos that chances are Uncle Sam won't produce the money.

The problem is by no means limited to troops. U.S. officials, slowly losing ground against the North Vietnamese invaders, must coax and tease for weapons, aircraft, and other equipment. What's worse, with the new isolationism running high in Washington and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's unweaving of the previously covert U.S. operation here, money available for Laos may become tighter still.

Yet, Laos is critical to the over-all fate of Indochina. As its problems mount in South Vietnam, North Vietnam has nearly four regular divisions pinned down in Laos. Without the U.S.-financed Lao resistance, Hanoi not only could transfer most of these troops to South Vietnam but also might pressure the Vientiane government into demanding an end to U.S. bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos.



Evans Novak

Considering these stakes, the shoestring American budget in Laos — less than \$500 million a year — makes the operation a model in cost effectiveness. For example, the 40,000 irregulars (including Gen. Vang Pao's Meo guerrillas) are advised by fewer than 250 operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency.

More important, Laos demonstrates that the U.S. can effectively fight Communist insurgency without sending nine U.S. army divisions into battle. No conscript U.S. soldier has been killed in Laos. The Americans taking the risk here are Army and CIA professionals.

But Washington may be drawing the pinchpenny concept too fine to stop the Communist offensive in northern Laos. Lao forces are outgunned as well as outnumbered. In a pleading tone, political figures and generals from Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on down stressed to us the desperate need for better arms.

Only 21,000 M-16 rifles have been squeezed out of Washington, and at least 10,000 more are essential right now. For budgetary reasons, Washington has flatly refused to supply the potent M-60 machine-gun. The contrast with profligate U.S.

military spending in Vietnam is stunning.

ALL THAT HAS really kept the Lao army in the fight has been airpower, especially bombing strikes flown by Americans. But this too is a hand-me-down affair. Requests from U.S. officials here for bombing runs are handled by Gen. Creighton Abrams in Saigon, who naturally gives the Vietnam war priority. Accordingly, when a recent Communist truck convoy was spotted heading toward Vang Pao's embattled base at Long Tieng and an air strike was requested, no planes were made available. The chance was lost. It was not the first such lost opportunity.

Actually, there are incipient signs of self-sufficiency by the Lao army. A North Vietnamese assault on Pakxane last week was repelled by Lao troops and Lao aircraft (dispatched from Vientiane) without a single American adviser in the act. Nobody is calling the Lao soldier a tiger, but there has been improvement. Lao troops—at least those with an M-16—no longer run at the sound of Vietnamese footsteps.

Far into the future, however, U.S. aid will be essential. If it ends, the North Vietnamese would need barely four months to liquidate the war in Laos. Even the present level of U.S. aid may be inadequate to prevent disaster.

The only recent relaxation in this pressure was a move by some North Vietnamese regulars from southern Laos into Cambodia, again demonstrating that this is one large Indochinese war.

Just how clearly the Nix-

on administration envisions Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos as part of the same war will determine the ultimate outcome here. Having unsuccessfully attempted a covert operation in Laos, Washington now confronts the need for greater spending here just as political pressures at home are running in the opposite direction.

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The Secret Team and the Games They Play

STATINTL

by L. Fletcher Prouty

✓ "The hill costumes of the Meo tribesmen contrasted with the civilian clothes of United States military men riding in open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and pistols. These young Americans are mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA contract to advise and train Laotian troops." Those matter-of-fact, almost weary sentences, written late in February by T.D. Allman of *The Washington Post* after he and two other enterprising correspondents left a guided tour and walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe a situation that today may seem commonplace to anyone familiar with American operations overseas, but that no more than 10 years ago would have been unthinkable.

To take a detachment of regular troops, put its members into disguise, smuggle them out of the country so that neither the public nor the Congress knows they have left, and assign them to clandestine duties on foreign soil under the command of a non-military agency—it is doubtful that anyone would have dared to suggest taking such liberties with the armed forces and foreign relations of the United States, not to say with the Constitution, to any President up to and especially including Dwight D. Eisenhower. Indeed, the most remarkable development in the management of America's relations with other countries during the nine years since Mr. Eisenhower left office has been the assumption of more and more control over military and diplomatic operations abroad by men whose activities are secret, whose budget is secret, whose very identities as often as not are secret—in short a Secret Team whose actions only those implicated in them are in a position to monitor. How determinedly this secrecy is preserved, even when preserving it means denying the United States Army the right to discipline its own personnel, not to say the opportunity to do justice,

was strikingly illustrated not long ago by the refusal of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide witnesses for the court-martial that was to try eight Green Beret officers for murdering a suspected North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the Army to drop the charges.


The Secret Team consists of security-cleared individuals in and out of government who receive secret intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the National Security Agency and who react to those data when it seems appropriate to them with paramilitary plans and activities, e.g., training and "advising"—a not exactly impenetrable euphemism for "leading into battle"—Laotian troops. Membership in the Team, granted on a "need to know" basis, varies with the nature and the location of the problems that come to its attention. At the heart of the Team, of course, are a handful of top executives of the CIA and of the National Security Council, most notably the chief White House adviser on foreign policy. Around them revolves a sort of inner ring of Presidential staff members, State Department officials, civilians and military men from the Pentagon, and career professionals in the intelligence services. And out beyond them is an extensive and intricate network of government officials with responsibility for or expertise in some specific field that touches on national security: think-tank analysts, businessmen who travel a lot or whose businesses (e.g., import-export or operating a cargo airline) are useful, academic experts in this or that technical subject or geographic region, and, quite importantly, alumni of the intelligence service—a service from which there are no unconditional resignations.

Thus the Secret Team is not a clandestine super-planning board or super-general staff but, even more damaging to the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a bewildering collection of temporarily assembled action committees that respond pretty much ad hoc to specific troubles in various parts of the world, sometimes in ways that duplicate the

STATINTL

2.9 APR 1970

STATINTL



Editorials

Out of the quagmire now!

Public and Congressional anger is rising over White House and Pentagon attempts to spread the Vietnam war into Cambodia. Rarely has there been such wide agreement in Congress that the U.S. should not get bogged down in another quagmire in Southeast Asia.

Congressmen, whatever their reasons for opposing Nixon, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, should get massive public support to steady their resolve when the warmongers begin putting on the screws, threatening to cut war contracts in their districts.

The generals in South Vietnam have been unable to stop the steady growth of the heroic Vietnamese peoples' resistance. And this military zero has been accompanied by 300,000 American casualties—dead and wounded young Americans from every part of the U.S.

Will this figure double or triple as the Pentagon tries to get out of the trap it has laid for itself by spreading the war into Cambodia? By intensifying the dirt, war in Laos?

A powerful resistance here in the U.S. is rising up against these schemes, because more people are coming to realize what a total fraud Nixon's "Vietnamization" plan is: it is a plan to "win" in Vietnam, by purely military solution which will keep American GIs in Southeast Asia for years to come, and may require hundreds of thousands of young Americans to die in Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam.

It is time for all Americans, to demand that the military not only get out of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, but get out of the U.S. government, as well and stop any attempt to impose a military solution on the American Congress.

29 APR 1970

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Laos Guerrillas Have Backs to Wall After a Decade of Fighting the Reds

SITE 37, Laos—Here in the rugged mountains of northern Laos, the Meo guerrilla army of Maj. Gen. Vang Pao—underfed, undermanned, and undergunned—is nearing a confrontation with invading North Vietnamese regulars, with potentially disastrous consequences in the struggle for Indochina.

The immediate stake is Long Tieng, strategic base for Vang Pao's irregulars. Before the deadline (probably mid-June) set by the rainy season, the Communists will attempt to both capture Long Tieng and knock the Meo guerrillas, by far their toughest foes in Laos, out of the war.

As we interviewed Vang Pao at this Meo refugee center not far from Long Tieng, he was clearly apprehensive—his back to the wall after a decade of fighting the Communists. Explaining how his people had been driven down from the North Vietnam frontier over the years, Vang Pao told us: "There is nowhere else for us to go. This is our last defense."

Nor did he contradict the general assessment that his prospects at Long Tieng are barely even. "We will defend Long Tieng as long as possible, but I cannot absolutely guarantee that we can do it," he said. "My soldiers are brave but are very tired."

LOSING LONG TIENG could be catastrophic because of the destructive psychological impact on the Meos. Whether they would continue in the war in any important way after losing Long Tieng is open to question.

If unrestricted by Vang Pao, the North Vietnamese would wheel southeast toward the capital of Vientiane to apply pressure for a political capitulation. Nervous regulars are now



Evans Novak

as might be willing to accept a Communist-dominated coalition government. If so, the four divisions of North Vietnamese regulars pinned down in Laos would be freed for South Vietnam and the United States might encounter a government request to stop bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos.

Actually the danger was more acute a month ago when reinforced North Vietnamese troops swept the Meos from the Plaine des Jarres and were headed for Long Tieng. Facing overwhelmingly stronger forces, Vang Pao's army disintegrated with Meo tribesmen leaving the war to seek refuge for wives and children.

The North Vietnamese at that point could have completed their successful new strategy. In past dry seasons, they had moved southward only to be slashed brutally on the flanks by Vang Pao—one of the world's great guerrilla chieftains in an age of guerrilla warfare. This year, the Communists decided that the key to success, military and political, was to grind down Vang Pao.

THANKFULLY, however, they did not move into Long Tieng in force a month ago and instead waited for supplies to catch up, acting like a muscle-bound conventional army fighting guerrillas. Indeed, the Communist logistical crisis was triggered last December when the Meos captured a huge

While the Communists have been methodically preparing the assault on Long Tieng, Vang Pao's guerrillas have pulled themselves together considerably. Having relocated their families, Meos are drifting back to rejoin Vang Pao. Regular Lao troops as well as other irregulars from southern Laos have reinforced him, and he now commands 5,000 men in the Long Tieng perimeter.

Nevertheless, Vang Pao is badly outnumbered. On the day we talked, he was concerned that, of the four sites north of the Plaine des Jarres he still holds, three were under heavy Communist attack that morning. Most worrisome was Site 32 at Boun Lom where 500 Meo home guards commanded by Vang Pao's father-in-law had withstood a siege by vastly more numerous North Vietnamese. Now, however, the Communists were tunnelling under the bunkers at Site 32. Unless needle-threading aircraft could stick a bomb in the tunnel, Boun Lom was lost.

IF THOSE northern sites fall, the Communists can concentrate on Long Tieng, massing close to 20,000 there. To prevent this, Vang Pao last week resorted to guerrilla tactics: Sneaking back of North Vietnamese forces to edge them away from Long Tieng.

It could work. It probably would were the Meos decently equipped. Vang Pao told us he needs basics; first of all, food for his troops and their families, then more M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers. But the fact that the Meo guerrillas, ably advised by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operatives, are so badly equipped for their coming test is symptomatic of the Laos war.

Even though it is critically important to Vietnam, the United States supports this war on a shoestring that might get stringier yet if critics in Washington have their way—a strange state of affairs worthy of consideration in a future column.

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29 APR 1970

Reds Driving On Capitol of Lao Province

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — Communist forces this morning launched concerted attacks against the Lao province capital of Attapeu near the Cambodia-Laos border, military sources reported.

Sources said they thought the Communist attacks was aimed at opening new supply lines from Laos into Cambodia.

Communist infantrymen overran a government artillery position and captured a 105-millimeter howitzer on a hill outside the town.

Other forces overran the government command post next to the Attapeu airstrip and other positions a thousand yards outside town, sending Lao infantry troops fleeing into the streets.

Heavy fighting was reported to be continuing around a mountain position 3 miles outside Attapeu.

Attapeu is the capital of Attapeu Province in southeast Laos, close to the tri-border of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam and only 10 miles west of the junction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail with the Sihanouk Trail.

From Attapeu, Communist

trucks can be heard moving along the trails, and government troops occasionally fire mortars at the trucks.

Attapeu is sometimes used by secret army guerrillas operating against the trails. A major part of the trail surveillance is carried out from an American Central Intelligence Agency camp south of Attapeu and close to the Cambodian border.

This camp has not yet been attacked, military sources said.

The Pathet Lao attack against Attapeu possibly is a Communist move to gain a political victory by taking a provincial capital. The Communists hold three of 16 provincial capitals.

If so, this would signify a major political change in Red tactics in Laos. Attapeu is recognized by the Geneva Accords as rightist terrain.

By attacking it, the Communists could be trying for a new political balance—a move signaling further hard fighting in Laos.

Military sources said, however, that the Communist assault at Attapeu may be linked with a drive to enlarge the Red trail network into Cambodia, so the North Vietnamese can move more reinforcements and supplies there to make up for losses caused by the closure of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville to the Viet Cong.

Year of Battle

Sources said Attapeu has been encircled for more than a year by Communist forces. Pathet Lao gunners have shelled its dirt airstrip sporadically, forcing U.S. resupply helicopters to land on the town's only paved street.

"It's been withering on the vine," the sources said. "They could have taken Attapeu any time."

Sources fear the Reds also may try to take Saravane, the capital of Saravane Province north of Attapeu. Like Attapeu, Saravane has been surrounded by Communist forces for over a year. Also like Attapeu, Saravane is on the west flank of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Attapeu, a town of thatched huts on stilts, in normal times had a population of 10,000 people. Most of those remaining are Lave tribesmen.

CIA Camp Is Near

North of the town on the Bolovens Plateau are Central Intelligence Agency hideouts where Americans pay Naheung tribesmen to watch Vietnamese boats on the Mekong River.

American trailwatchers lie on grassy slopes above the Ho Chi Minh Trail, usually with a circle of tribesmen around them for protection from North Vietnamese patrols and attacks by pro-Communist Kasseng tribesmen.

Attapeu and the CIA posts are resupplied by an undercover airline known only as "Boun Oum Airlines," named after its owner, Prince Boun Oum.

The airline is based at the Mekong town of Pakse, which Boun Oum runs like a fiefdom.

Pakse is called a substation by intelligence officers. From there activities against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the south panhandle of Laos are coordinated.

ALAMOGORDO, N.M.

NEWS

E & S - 7,425

APR 28 1970

World Tightrope

National leaders must always walk a tightrope between the world as they would like to see it for the good of their policies, and the world as it really exists. Often the two worlds are not the same thing, and from this disparity arises decision-makers' problems.

If a leader can convince the public that the world exists in a certain way and that his policies are a response to this world, he is in good shape. When this proclaimed world comes into conflict with the real world, he is in trouble.

These generalizations are relevant to the uproar caused by President Nixon's recent moves in Laos. For some time the Nixon administration has maintained that the United States was not involved in the conflict there. The President's now famous statement that there were no American ground forces in Laos was supposed to attest to this non-involvement.

The truth is that in one degree or another the United States has been involved in Laos. Our military advisers have worked for years with the Royal Laotian army. Air America, ostensibly a civilian-owned airline, is an important arm of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Until the recent inception of American B-52 raids in the Plain of Jars, President Nixon was technically correct in saying that the United States was not violating that part of the 1962 Geneva agreements which prohibited foreign military aircraft in Laos. The point is that during this period companies such as Air America have served the same purpose in Laos as regular Air Force planes would, such as parachuting Meo tribesmen and other secret agents behind North Vietnamese lines.

The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao, of course, respond to this real-world involvement of the United States and not to the non-involvement formally proclaimed by the President. Mr. Nixon, however, is forced to juggle these two worlds. He appears to act from altruistic concern over the welfare of the Laotians. What he is actually doing is reacting to Communist moves against our previous—and unannounced—clandestine involvement.

Surely no one desires another floundering into a second Vietnam. To avoid this, the President should steer clear of trying to construct a picture of the situation in Southeast Asia different from what is really happening there. Evidence to date suggests that the juggling act has not been successful.

STATINTL

WASHINGTON STAR

28 APR 1970

U.S. BASE IN LAOS OVERRUN, OTHER OUTPOSTS ENDANGERED

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE—An American guerrilla base known as "Three Peaks" was overrun by North Vietnam infantry yesterday, sending 1,100 refugees fleeing, military sources said today.

One U.S. helicopter was downed and the crew reportedly was missing.

Three Peaks is a guerrilla base run by the Central Intelligence Agency in Sam Neua Province in northeast Laos. The base had been used for interdiction of the route Hanoi has used to supply the Plain of Jars from North Vietnam.

The refugees were airlifted by helicopter to another airstrip but were coming under heavy fire once more as their new resting place was expected to be overrun at any time.

"These outposts up there are starting to go like nine pins," an informed source said noting that Bouam Long, an important government outpost, was coming under heavy North Vietnamese fire and was not expected to hold.

STATINTL

LONG BEACH, CAL.
INDEPENDENT

M - 49,632

APR 27 1970

Ex-U.S. Diplomat in Laos Sees More 'Viet-Like' Wars

By WALT MURRAY
Staff Writer

Unless strong public opinion is brought to bear on U. S. policymakers, Vietnam-like wars will likely break out in other Southeast Asian nations, a former U. S. cultural officer in Laos said in Long Beach Sunday.

Dr. Frank Thompson, now minister of the First Congregational Church in Alameda, warned that continued step-ups of U. S.-backed clandestine warfare in Laos and Cambodia will mean disaster.

He spoke to about 50 persons at a United World Federalists meeting at the East Long Beach home of Abe Zucker.

Thompson, who resigned as cultural officer for the U. S. Information Agency in Laos in 1967, charged there was "tremendous U. S. involvement" in the Mar. 18 ouster of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia.

Large amounts of U. S. weapons and material aid are being supplied to Laotian forces who are fight-

ing the Nationalist-Communist Pathet Lao, he said. The U. S., he said, also supplies many specialists.

"Much of this is done by the Central Intelligence Agency," he charged. "The CIA works beyond censorship, below control and with unlimited funds. Congress is unable to check its operations effectively."

The CIA gets its budget from many hidden sources, he said, including — in at least one year — \$10 million from the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Thompson said the Agency for International Development — "once a noble concept to build the economies of underdeveloped nations" — has become a front for political and military operations in Laos.

He said the U. S. should have lived up to a 1962 treaty between the U. S. and the Soviet Union which "guaranteed iron-clad neutrality for Laos."

If the U. S. had honored such pacts in Vietnam, he said, the Vietnam war

might never have happened.

He conceded that North Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. broke the treaty, too, but said:

"We could have effectively called the world's attention to that perfidy if we had kept our own skirts clean."

Thompson said that Southeast Asian leaders had repeatedly asked him to convey their desire for U. S. economic aid — "the kind of aid they want, not the kind of aid we think they need, such as bases for U. S. military operations."

"I'm against isolationism," he said.

WASHINGTON STAR

27 APR 1970

Hanoi Troops Gain Ground in Laos

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE—Fighting, in some places heavy, is continuing in northeast Laos with North Vietnamese forces gradually gaining ground from Meo guerrillas and Lao government forces.

The fighting is centering around Bouam Long, an airstrip used by American aircraft north of the Plain of Jars.

The north Vietnamese are using what military sources said are "18th Century tactics" by digging rings of trenches around Bouam Long, then pushing forward with zigzag trenches.

The trench digging efforts have been blasted by U.S. jets, Lao sources said; causing the Reds heavy losses, but the North Vietnamese are continuing to edge closer.

The North Vietnamese, backed by four 105mm howitzers, want to take the position, which is a jumping off point for Gen. Vang Pao's guerrillas against Hanoi's supply lines in the northern area.

U.S. Strikes Called In

Meo guerrillas with radios are searching for them and calling in U.S. and Lao air strikes and Thai artillery fire.

American military advisers are flying forward air control

and coordinating forward air guides on ground.

The Meo guerrillas and Lao special guerrilla units are bypassing Hanoi valley positions, hitting ridges. Sometimes they are pushing North Vietnamese machinegunners off these ridges at a cost of high government casualties.

At night the North Vietnamese are launching ground probes, reaching within 2,000 yards of the Sam Thong airstrip and triggering an action 8,000 yards northeast of Long Chien.

Although Vang Pao succeeded in widening his defensive perimeter around Long Chien, this is no indication the government is winning.

Reliable military sources, however, believe the probes and shelling are a prelude to new North Vietnamese attacks.

They say the North Vietnamese are resupplying, reinforcing and regrouping their forces.

Situation Bleak

Although the North Vietnamese are concentrating on Military Region II in northeast Laos, the situation of the government forces in the rest of northern Laos is dismal. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in northwest Laos have reached the Thai border near Pak Tha and gradually are picking off government outposts near the Chinese-built road in the area. The U.S. is continuing to maintain what is called Site 118 west of the road, a military and Central Intelligence Agency base similar to Long Chien.

Pathet Lao forces have driven government troops out of outposts 30 kilometers northwest of the royal capital of Luang Prabang. These areas west of the Chinese road have been normal-

ly held by government forces. Red troops are clearing the area around Pak Beng, the terminus of the Chinese road, apparently indicating the Communists are planning future actions in the area.

In the southern portion of North Laos, Hanoi troops seem content for the moment, having driven government forces back to Snake Ridge, northeast of Paksae. This leaves the Reds free to start work on a new communications system linking the Plain of Jars in northern Laos with the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the south.

In northern Laos, where the fighting is part of a political struggle for Laos cabinet seats between rightists and Communists, with the neutralists no longer a viable military force, U.S. officials still hope to hold Long Chien and Sam Thong, insuring the survival of Vang Pao's effective guerrilla forces in the northern mountains.

In southern Laos, where fighting centers basically on the North Vietnamese attempt to keep the Lao from interfering with the Ho Chi Minh trail, there is a lull in fighting.

Intelligence reports say some North Vietnamese units guarding the west flank by the trail have pulled out to the east and then moved down the Ho Chi Minh trail where it joins Route 110, also known as the Sihanouk trail.

North Vietnamese troops have moved into the tri-border area where Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam join, but it is not clear whether they crossed into Cambodia or South Vietnam. The U.S. Air Force, meanwhile,

is attacking the trail system to prevent suspected movements.

Pathet Lao forces near the Cambodian border have been foraging heavily, the military sources said, indicating they may be hurt by the Cambodian blockade of their food supplies.

STATINTL

Fulbright Prepares Challenge to Nixon Asia Policy

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is preparing the groundwork for yet another confrontation with the White House over American involvement in Southeast Asia. It could become a major challenge to the President Nixon's conduct of foreign policy.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers was appearing before the committee this afternoon—apparently to testify, among other things, on the U.S.-approved dispatch of automatic weapons to Cambodia from South Vietnam last week.

The administration has discounted the importance of this military aid to the besieged government of Cambodia, and assured members of the committee that the weapons were captured AK47s of Chinese manufacture, and not American arms.

On Wednesday two committee staff members, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, are scheduled to leave for a two-week inspection tour of Cambodia to report on the extent of the American presence there.

Lowenstein and Moose caused some displeasure within the administration after a similar trip to Vietnam last December.

Their published report called into question the President's public optimism concerning large-scale troop reductions. It said most officials of the American and South Vietnamese governments in Saigon were presuming that 250,000 troops would remain in the country "for years."

There is an important difference in the committee's quick action to make an independent judgment on conditions in Cambodia, where Prime Minister Lon Nol's government has asked for massive U.S. aid.

In the cases of Vietnam and

Laos, Chairman J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., and the leading members of the committee found themselves reacting to policy after it was firmly established, and unable to convince either the administration or the senate to cancel U.S. military commitments.

Through a series of recent actions the committee has prepared itself to muster widespread support in Congress to block any attempt by the President to extend military aid to Cambodia, or any country, without congressional approval.

One of these was the successful passage in the last session of a National Commitments Resolution, expressing the sense of the Senate that "a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the legislative and executive branches. . . ."

Another was the establishment of a new subcommittee under Stuart Symington, D-Mo., to investigate the extent of American commitments around the world.

It has completed hearings on the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Laos, and last week succeeded, after months of struggle with the administration, in publishing 90 percent of the secret testimony taken in Laos.

The debate and study has spread disenchantment with the past conduct of the Vietnam war among congressmen, and led to the passage of a defense appropriations bill amending forbidding the financing of American troops in Laos or Thailand.

This reassertion of legislative prerogative is expected to have some effect on the President's actions in Cambodia. But committee sources believe the recently published Laos transcript may have the greatest influence on how Nixon proceeds.

The testimony showed in detail how a small American commitment multiplied, while successive administrations followed a deliberate policy of denying American military involvement.

Committee sources, by use of newspaper clippings and similar dispatches, make a telling case that the only group deceived was the American public.

The report tells of secret American actions to continue military activities after the signing of the Geneva Accords of 1962. The Soviet Union tacitly approved the continuance, apparently to maintain an anti-Chinese balance in the area.

It also showed that after the cessation of bombing over much of North Vietnam in November 1968, U.S. B52 bombers began flying their bombing raids over northern Laos, near the North Vietnamese border.

Committee sources insist that this must have had a marked impact on the unwillingness of the North Vietnamese to negotiate in Paris.

Excised from the report, but readily available through dispatches from journalists on the scene, was information on the use of the Laos AID mission as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency operatives, the use of Thailand to fly bombing raids over Laos, and the introduction of third country nationals as ground troops in Laos, financed by the United States.

On release of the transcript, Fulbright said "I have never seen a country engage in so many devious undertakings as this," and Symington charged that the ambassadors to Laos, first William H. Sullivan and now G. McMurtrie Godley, were turned into "military proconsul" by their role in directing the secret war, including the selection of targets for American pilots to bomb.

When Sullivan was ambassador, Godley was assistant secretary of State for Southeast Asia. Last year they exchanged positions. "This is an indication of what a tight shop the secret warriors ran," said a committee source.

"Sullivan made himself quite a reputation as an 'activist' ambassador. You can be sure that Mac Godley is not going to be the first ambassador to preside over an American defeat in Laos," the source added.

The public facets of the Laos war were just beginning to unfold when Cambodia was added to the strategic balance in Southeast Asia by the overthrow of Norodom Sihanouk.

At least some high administration officials are reported to view the pro-American government and its request for aid as a golden opportunity to force the exhausted North Vietnamese to overextend their lines.

The argument is that a trickle of aid to Cambodia now might shorten the Vietnam war by denying enemy troops their traditional Cambodian sanctuaries and staging areas.

Other officials are fearful of both the public consequences at home and the possibility of new entrapments in the battlefield should aid be extended.

This is the position that the Foreign Relations Committee's senior members lean toward.

When confronted with the details of the secret war in Laos, administration officials often note that leading members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and especially Symington, knew many of the details, but declined to oppose the situation until recently.

This underscores the fact that the possibility for a similar secret war in Cambodia is slight, and probably doesn't exist.

Point of View

War in Laos Pictured As American Blunder

The writer, an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "The Arms Race" and "Strategic Persuasion."

By JEREMY J. STONE.

Washington — In the northern highlands of Laos, the United States is fighting a secret war that is totally unnecessary from every point of view.

Our willingness to do it plays into the hands of the North Vietnamese and undermines our policy in Vietnam.

There is no treaty requirement for it and "no defense commitment — written, stated, or understood."

The fighting is taking place without any overall congressional authorization, but solely under the "executive authority of the President."

These conclusions, and official quotations, are based on Symington Committee testimony just released after six months of wrangling with the State Department over its declassification.

Two Separate Wars

The Senate hearings reveal two separate wars in Laos.

In the southern part of Laos, massive American bombing strikes attempt to reduce the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In the northern highlands of Laos, the United States also is engaged in massive bombing of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces, which are fighting the royal Laotian army and the American-sponsored clandestine Meo army.

And since before the 1962 Geneva accords, the United States has been feeding, sheltering, equipping and advising the only army in Laos that can fight — the Meo army — for use in northern Laos.

In central northern Laos, there have been several years of seasonal offensives and counteroffensives in which increasing American air and logistic support has been induced

by (or matched by) increases in North Vietnamese ground forces.

These struggles have been over territory of no strategic significance. They have stemmed from the view that military victories would be translatable into "political advantages" that would determine the "character of Lao neutralism" at some future settlement on a coalition government.

Argument Recalled

It is startling to see what the U.S. Government spokesman responsible for all the quotations thus far, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William H. Sullivan, was arguing in 1968.

He argued that the extent of the then-current Communist gains should be discounted, because "75 or 80 percent" of the population were under Laotian government control in the Mekong Valley! He indicated it would be easy to defend the valley.

A Communist invasion of the lowlands would have to be in "quite considerable force" and would be "susceptible to" effective Lao air force action. And such Communist attacks would be further deterred by the realignment that they would present such a "direct threat" to neighboring Thailand as to force America into hard choices involving risks for all concerned.

In other words, we could simply have refused to play this game of challenging Communist control of less-populated — and much harder to hold — highlands in which the fighting was taking place. Securely holding a clear majority of population, we could have denied that any important change in the internal political balance had taken place.

Blunder Charged

Indeed, it is increasingly evident that it has been a political-strategic blunder to place such emphasis on territory which the royalist and Meo forces patently cannot hold, even with the full weight of U.S. support. Recently, through easy-to-

achieve diversions of troops to Laos, Hanoi has been able to raise the specter in Washington of a widening Indochinese war. This has permitted Hanoi to outflank psychologically the Administration policy of Vietnamization and withdrawal.

Thus, in Hanoi's view, the fight for control of central northern Laos provides a ready and necessary tool to keep the Nixon Administration off balance.

Counter Productive

As the Administration itself asserted in these hearings, the North Vietnamese "orchestrate" the Laotian struggle and consider it "part and parcel" of the effort to achieve a Vietnamese settlement.

After all, from Hanoi's point of view — and from that of a sizeable segment of American opinion — the Administration intends, if it can, to withdraw troops from South Vietnam only by such fits and starts as will maintain our military preponderance.

Thus, we have waged an unnecessary struggle, with tactics increasingly counter productive. This struggle has made one Laotian in ten a refugee.

And, by many accounts, it has reduced the Meo, who have borne the brunt of the fighting, to a society without able-bodied men, mounting an army of the too young and the too old, and questioning whether they joined the right side in the first place.

Coalition Feared

The Administration has no justification for this northern war. In the President's white paper of March 6, the Administration argued that its goal in Laos "above all" was to save American and Allied lives in South Vietnam by bombing the trails in northern Laos.

The Administration fears that a new coalition under Communist control might call upon the United States to stop bombing the trails.

But the United States need not fight in the highlands to prevent such a coalition. It can prevent the formation of a new coalition — as in effect it is

now doing — by insisting that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma avoid such negotiations until the Vietnamese war ends.

Buffer Wanted

The defense of Thailand is sometimes given as "one of the reasons" why we are "in Laos." But, in saying so, Assistant Secretary Sullivan was careful to indicate that what was wanted was a buffer. The Mekong Valley, which lies between Thailand and the highlands, could serve as a buffer, making it unnecessary to fight over the highlands.

The President's only other white paper reason for this fighting was to support the "independence and neutrality" of Laos, as set forth by the Geneva accords of 1962. But the same white paper conceded that Hanoi's goal was to pave the way for the eventual establishment of a government "more amenable to Communist control."

This is, as noted above, only a question of the political character of the Laotian government. It is a question of how many government ministerial portfolios, and which ones, the Pathet Lao forces get. Such questions are not treated in the 1962 accords, which simply guarantee and impose upon Laos the kind of military neutrality we know in Switzerland.

Previous Chaos

We are making again the mistake we made in 1959-1961. Scholars agree widely that it was our CIA-financed effort of that time to supplant Souvanna Phouma's middle-of-the-road regime by a clearly pro-Western regime which brought on the political chaos that made the 1962 Geneva conference necessary.

We should pay much less attention to the internal political character of the Laotian government and to the negotiations that precede its coalition government.

The Symington report makes it evident that our goal should be simply to prevent the military conquest of the Mekong Valley, pending an end of the Vietnamese war.

There is no moral, political, or strategic reason for our fighting, or encouraging Laotians to fight, in the north.

This fact has been long hidden by the failure of the Executive Branch to permit — and of the Congress to demand — a public and comprehensive review of the U.S. Laotian policy.

—Dispatch News Service

25 APR 1970

SANE urges no arms to Cambodia

STATINTL

By TIM WHEELER

WASHINGTON, April 24—The SANE Committee sent a telegram yesterday urging that President Nixon refuse arms to the Lon Nol junta in Cambodia.

"We urge you to reject Cambodia's request for military aid direct and indirect," says the telegram, addressed to Nixon's foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger. It was signed by Sanford Gottlieb, executive director of the anti-war group.

The telegram said that U.S. military aid "would lead to further embroilment in widening war and violate the sense of the Senate (Commitments Resolution)."

This was the resolution passed 70 to 16 by the Senate last year forbidding the President to commit the U.S. to military actions abroad without the consent of Congress.

While the peace movement and a large fraction of the Senate warned Nixon against intervening in the Cambodian crisis, U.S. advisers and arms were already embroiled in expanded aggression inside Cambodia.

The peace movement here warned that this is an exact replay of the Vietnam war scenario in which the Pentagon secretly embroiled the U.S. in war by sending so-called advisers, then handed the people a fait accompli. The result was five years

of war and 45,000 Americans dead.

Nixon meanwhile, in a play for time, canceled a National Security Council meeting today. Observers believe that Nixon would prefer to set up a puppet operation to cover expanded U.S. aggression in Indo-China rather than send U.S. troops.

But Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) warned recently, "It has been reported and photographs have been made showing that armed American military personnel have already crossed into Cambodian territory several times in recent days." Presumably this refers to Green Beret and CIA advisers who are leading forays against pro-Sinhouk liberation forces in Cambodia.

Church, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has joined with Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to introduce a resolution "prohibiting the introduction of American combat troops" into Cambodia. He said the developments in Cambodia "create dangerous pressures for deepening America's involvement" and will "add fuel to this spreading fire."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, unhappy with the level of intervention, are stepping up pressure here for a full scale adventure in behalf of the Lon Nol junta.

Alarmist reports, inspired by "top officials" in off-the-record interviews with the press corps, predict the imminent collapse of the junta and a "Vietcong takeover."

The hysteria-mongering is coupled with arguments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "swift and substantial" intervention in Cambodia will enable the U.S. to "smash the Vietcong sanctuaries" and bring quick victory for the U.S. in Indo-China. But Sen. Ja-

Vietnam war would be strongly opposed in Congress and the nation as a whole. In strictly military terms, 'victory' would likely prove to be at least as illusory in Laos and Cambodia as it has proven in Vietnam."

OTTINGER CHARGES CIA PUSHES SECRET LAOS WAR

NEW YORK, April 24 (UPI)—Rep. Richard L. Ottinger, D-NY, today accused the CIA of conducting, with Presidential approval, a "secret, illegal war in Laos" that could plunge the United States into "another major, bloody land war in Asia."

He said he based his charge on on-the-spot information gathered by his aides.

Ottinger, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the U.S. Senate, charged Nixon and the CIA with working out "a new formula" for conducting a secret military operation in Laos "without risking public or congressional scrutiny."

CIA trained Cambodia killers

By Wilfred Burchett

Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

STATINTL

The horrifying massacres of Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia are being carried out by American CIA-trained "Khmer Serei" ("Free Cambodia") traitor troops until recently stationed in Thailand.

The U.S. organized them, paid them, armed them and most probably sent them on their mission of death against thousands of unarmed Vietnamese within Cambodia's borders.

According to Cambodian sources in Paris and travelers reaching here from Phnom Penh, these commando-type mercenaries are playing the same role in Cambodia as the CIA-trained "Vang Pao Meo" mercenaries in Laos, which were also stationed in Thailand.

The Khmer Serei, brought back to Cambodia to lead in the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's neutralist regime last month, had previously been based in South Vietnam. Their main bases were overrun by the NLF and they were transferred to Thailand.

Their previous raids into Cambodian territory invariably failed. Large numbers were captured, a few leaders executed, others jailed.

In 1969, there were mysterious large-scale defections—whole companies and even battalions—to the Cambodian government. In one day, 700 crossed the border from Thailand and gave themselves up. Credit for the "defections" was given to Gen. Lon Nol, then Defense Minister, now heading the largest group that overthrew Sihanouk. The deserters were welcomed by the Cambodian government at the time, given cash awards and even decorations.

In fact they were decisive CIA contributions to the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak conspiracy. They were the stormtroopers who spearheaded the attack on the embassies of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Provisional Revolutionary Government in Phnom Penh and on whom Lon Nol mainly relied for his coup.

One of the first acts of the new regime was to release "political prisoners." It was claimed that "progressives" jailed by Sihanouk were being freed. In fact a few were, but the majority freed were the Khmer Serei recruits for the Lon Nol stormtroopers. And for every progressive released a dozen more took their places in the jails or concentration camps to await execution.

The counterpart of the lie that it is "North Vietnamese" and "Vietcong" troops that have liberated large areas of Cambodia is that it is "only" Vietnamese who are being executed. In fact, although the Lon Nol regime has incited Nazi-type racial pogroms against anyone of Vietnamese origin regardless of sex or age, Cambodian leftists are also being rounded up and murdered in cold blood by Khmer Serei execution squads.

The Lon Nol regime in Cambodia is trying to repeat the type of bloodbath that General Suharto perpetrated in Indonesia, substituting Vietnamese for Chinese. But Cambodia is not Indonesia. There are two important differences which even President Nixon's CIA experts must take into account. Cambodia is neither geographically or politically isolated as was Indonesia. And the general staff of the Cambodian progressive movement never came out into the open to reveal itself and be decapitated as did the leaders of the Indonesian Communist party.

The old resistance bases which the French were never able to liquidate in Cambodia have remained intact since going underground in 1954. So has the old political and military infrastructure, including its key cadre. So too, has the traditional solidarity between Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and their resistance movements.

intact since going underground in 1954. So too, has the traditional solidarity between Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and their resistance movements.

It is for this reason that vast areas of Cambodia have already been converted into liberated zones, controlled by the National United Front. Even Lon Nol has had to recognize that the key provinces of Ratamkiri, Mondulkiri and Svay Rieng, which adjoin South Vietnam and Laos are "almost entirely" controlled by the Cambodian resistance forces. Another five provinces which have common frontiers with the rest of South Vietnam and the southern coastal areas of Cambodia are "half controlled."

All battalions of Lon Nol's forces, including the battalion assigned to the defense of Phnom Penh itself, have defected to the Cambodian resistance movement. Virtually all the territory east of the Mekong River is now firmly in the hands of the Cambodian National Liberation Army.

The massacres are a measure of the frustration of the Lon Nol regime and the refusal of an increasingly large part of his armed forces to play the part of U.S. puppets in a civil war. The armed forces in the past have shown little enthusiasm in fighting against their compatriots who had taken to arms and even less today when their resistance has the official blessing of Sihanouk and is clearly aimed against U.S. imperialism.

In a little over one month after the coup the situation has developed exactly the opposite to that planned by Lon Nol and his American backers. Instead of catching NLF forces in the frontier areas in a trap, and cutting off their quite legal rice supplies from Cambodia—paid for in hard cash at top prices when Sihanouk was in power—these areas are now firmly in hands friendly to the NLF. It is the Lon Nol troops that are caught in a trap between the South Vietnam and Cambodian liberation armed forces.

25 APR 1970

STATINTL

Ottinger: CIA Involved in Laos

By THOMAS POSTER

Westchester Rep. Richard Ottinger charged yesterday that the Central Intelligence Agency, with President Nixon's approval, is directing secret military operations in Laos that may provoke "another major, bloody war in Asia."



Rep. Richard Ottinger
Fears another Asian war

Ottinger, a Democratic contender for the United States Senate nomination, called for a congressional investigation based on reports brought home from Laos by two of his aides.

Sees Violation of Law

He said that 30,000 American troops are now involved in combat operations in Laos in violation of the National Security Act of 1949.

Ottinger's aides, Peter Decker, 34, and Ronald Richenbach, 26, spent several years in Laos before making their three-week study of U.S. military involvement last month.

"I'm going to blow the whistle on what's happening because we are now on the brink of another total war like Vietnam," Ottinger said.

On another front, some supporters of former Controller Mario A. Procaccino began circulating petitions for him to enter the June 23 Democratic primary for governor. Procaccino said they were doing so without his approval and that he is still considering running.

Spokesmen for the three gubernatorial contenders, Arthur J. Goldberg, Howard Samuels and Robert M. Morgenthau, said response to the candidates' first television debate Thursday night on WPIX was "less than enthusiastic." Samuels and Morgenthau urged more debates.

A Goldberg aide said only two more are planned before the June 23 primary.

STATINTL

APR 24 1970

The coup that got out

Cambodian whirlwind catches U.S., Reds by surprise; even generals who ousted Sihanouk may be sorry now

Daily News Foreign Service

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — "It is perfectly clear," Prince Norodom Sihanouk wrote to the Paris newspaper LeMonde in 1968, "that Asian communism does not permit us any longer to stay neutral and withdraw from the conflict between the Chinese-Vietnamese and the Americans."

"Not being able to make us into allies offering unconditional support, Asian communism strives to overthrow our regime from within."

"The tournament has only just started."

THE TOURNAMENT ENDED for Sihanouk on March 18. While he was in France on one of his periodic "health cures," he was stripped of power. He had ruled his country almost singlehandedly for nearly 30 years. But Sihanouk's ouster — and he may yet return to Cambodia to reclaim what he considers rightfully his — does not dim the luster of his prophecy.

With the possible exception of Singapore's irascible Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Sihanouk was the shrewdest judge of communism in Southeast Asia. He was also shrewd enough to predict his own downfall.

"When resistance will no longer be possible," he said, "Sihanouk will withdraw and the army, which is anti-Communist, will take over."

Sihanouk did not withdraw. He was kicked out. But with that difference, his forecast was correct. The army, headed by Gen. Lon Nol, is in control of the government, and Cambodia, which for more than a decade managed to remain a tranquil island in the heart of seething Southeast Asia, has at last been drawn into the war it sought so desperately to avoid.

Insight

Veteran correspondent Keyes Beech has been covering the deepening crisis in Cambodia for The Daily News. In this dispatch, he puts 'Prince' Sihanouk's ouster in perspective and explores its effect on the war in Vietnam.

ONE MONTH AFTER the event, it seems that Sihanouk's ouster was not a very good idea: Cambodians have turned against Cambodians; more Cambodians are fleeing the Vietnamese Communists, and Vietnamese civilians are fleeing a vengeful Cambodian bloodbath. Nobody is happy. Not Peking, which regards the new regime as downright hostile, and certainly not the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, who have reacted vigorously to the threat to their Cambodian sanctuary. Four of Cambodia's most populous provinces bordering on South Vietnam are for the most part under Communist control.

If the Communists aren't happy, neither are the Americans. The United States is faced with a wider war at a time when it is disengaging from South Vietnam, and President Nixon is faced with the agonizing decision on whether to grant Cambodia's request for arms at the risk of provoking a flare-up in domestic antiwar dissent. It is difficult, however, to see how he can refuse if his Guam Doctrine is to mean anything, for if ever a country was the victim of Communist aggression from both within and without, it is Cambodia. Yet it is legitimate to ask if Amer-

and? It also is legitimate to ask if arms alone will do the trick. No experienced observer who has seen the Cambodian army in action or inaction can doubt that it would be a pushover for disciplined Vietnamese Communist regulars.

Mass Red intrusions

All this would seem to be a high price to pay for the overthrow of Norodom Sihanouk. So it is, but it isn't all that simple.

Disastrous as the events of the last month may be, they should not be allowed to obscure one very important thing. Cambodia is in this mess it is today because of mass Vietnamese Communist intrusions, not because of the United States or South Vietnam or for that matter Thailand. Except for occasional border incursions in the heat of battle — for which the United States duly apologized and often paid indemnities — the United States respected Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity. The Communists did not.

By Sihanouk's own estimate, Hanoi poured more than 40,000 North Vietnamese troops into their Cambodian sanctuary to wage the war in South Vietnam. If Cambodia managed to stay out of the Vietnam War during the last five years, it was as much due to American forbearance as it was to Sihanouk's political cunning.

NOR CAN SIHANOUK escape blame for his country's agony. Intoxicated by his own cleverness, he played one side against the other in a dazzling display of diplomatic pyrotechnics. When he thought the Communists were going to win in South Vietnam, he compromised his own neutrality by giving them sanctuary. Not only that, he supplied them with rice and allowed Chinese-owned trucks to move arms from Sihanoukville to Communist staging

STATINTL

BUFFALO, N.Y.

NEWS

APR 23 1970

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Disturbing Facts on Laos

At last — long after most of the story has been ferreted out by newsmen — the details of the secret American involvement in Laos are being officially released. It was already known that the United States had been providing air support to the Laotian forces and that the CIA and the Green Berets had trained a supposedly elite Laotian army.

Now the released testimony to a Senate subcommittee reveals that American participation dates back to 1962, the year when Laos was supposed to be neutralized under the Geneva agreement. Since then about 100 Americans have been killed in Laos—half of them pilots based in Thailand, but the rest stationed right in Laos.

Far from maintaining an aloof advisory role as officials of the past two administrations have implied, the U. S.

mission in Laos took an active role in selecting targets and carrying out bombing runs.

This incredible state of affairs started under the Kennedy administration but developed mainly during the Johnson administration. President Nixon, while overly reticent about revealing the facts, has apparently been waiting to scale it down. The U. S. claims no vital interests in Laos, and even if we had them it would be inexcusable to mount such a military operation without the knowledge of Congress or the American people. It is easy to imagine how our creeping involvement in Laos could have become another Vietnam-type war. Under the new Nixon Doctrine, that prospect is now remote, and presumably our Laos adventure will be phased out along with the Vietnam war.

April 23, 1970

S 6136

the child feeding programs; fortunately, the funding of lunches served free or at reduced prices to needy children actually is raised by about \$94 million.

However, \$94 million is not nearly enough. If 2.8 million more needy children are to be supplied lunches free or at reduced prices, the projected increase in program costs will be \$300 million. Some of this may be trimmed by new developments which will lower production costs, although the escalating costs of food, labor and equipment will make it difficult to achieve net savings.

It is the deficit between the Administration's \$94 million and the actual cost of \$300 million which must be supplied by the Congress, or the states, or local governments, if the Christmas promise is to become edible.

The gap may be even larger than \$206 million. The fiscal 1971 budget estimates the special assistance program will reach 5.5 million children a day. This program is budgeted for \$200 million in fiscal 1971, or an average federal reimbursement of 20 cents per meal. Assuming the U.S. Department of Agriculture will provide seven cents in commodities for fiscal 1971 just as it did in fiscal 1970, the total federal contribution for these 5.5 million daily lunches next school year will be 27 cents, leaving a total of 33 cents per meal to be provided by state and local governments. This will cost \$209 million that must be provided from sources other than the children.

If the number of free and reduced price lunches is increased to 6.6 million—still too few—as pledged by the White House on Christmas eve, the additional cost to state and local governments will be \$392 million.

For almost one quarter of a century, the country has been on record with a pledge to "safeguard the health and well-being of the nation's children" through the school lunch program. We went even farther: We promised to provide lunches free or at reduced prices without discrimination to all children "who are determined by local school authorities to be unable to pay the full price." The quotations are from the National School Lunch Act of 1946.

The Congress is moving to help the President carry out his pledge. In the week following Washington's birthday, the Senate passed a bill proposed by Senator Herman Talmadge, with amendments submitted by Senators McGovern, Javits and Kennedy. The legislation, which now goes to the House, shifts most of the cost for free lunches to the federal government, makes these lunches available to children whose parents earn less than \$4,000 a year, and requires a plan to be developed and sent to Congress for extending food service to all children in schools. The legislation stands a good chance in the House, which last year passed a bill submitted by Representative Carl Perkins containing similar proposals. It will face a far better chance with a push from the White House.

The White House has moved us onto an even higher level—orally. This is not a small matter because it places the President's word and prestige on the line. Clearly, if he puts the full power of his office behind a national, state and local drive, the promise can be kept.

DISCLOSURE OF KEY FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITIES

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, frank disclosure by the executive branch to Congress of key foreign policy activities—in executive session if necessary—is one basic necessity for the continued functioning of our form of democratic government.

Among the several important issues raised in the recently released Laos transcript of the Symington subcommittee of

the Foreign Relations Committee is that of the questionable nature of that disclosure when it came to U.S. activities in Laos.

This issue was discussed on Tuesday, April 21, by two perceptive Washington journalists, Murrey Marder, of the Washington Post, and Tom Wicker, of the New York Times.

I recommend both articles to Senators for the problem they discuss is as applicable to facts developed or held by the administration on ABM capabilities as it is to our military adversaries' activities in Laos.

It also is particularly pertinent today to any present or planned military assistance activities the United States may undertake in Cambodia.

I would remind the administration that the Foreign Relations Committee expects to be consulted before this Government takes that first step—however small it seems.

The history of Vietnam and the recently disclosed story of Laos reveals a pattern of constantly escalating involvements which grew uncontrolled from small steps first taken without full public debate of future consequences.

I ask unanimous consent that the articles be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Apr. 21, 1970]

DECEPTION IN LAOS A DELIBERATE ONE (By Murrey Marder)

For more than six years, the Symington Subcommittee's report on Laos shows, the United States practiced a policy of official deception about its extremely extensive military operations in Laos.

It did not do so idly or haphazardly. The policy of official deception was carried out deliberately and systematically, for what officials at the highest levels of government were convinced were sound reasons of national security. Many of those officials are still just as convinced that the reasons for deception were and are fully justified, and that U.S. operations in Laos are a "model" of an efficient, successful, relatively low-cost, effectively clandestine, counter-guerrilla operation.

On the last count, the officials may be right—the Laos operations may be a model of a successful, secret operation against tough odds. But that by no means answers the real question which is whether a handful of counter-insurgency zealots should have the right to define our national interests for us in this fashion, and then involve us in a dangerous and entangling mission without the public knowing anything about it. This is the critical moral issue raised by the Laos hearings and toward the end of the censored transcript Sen. Stuart Symington, who is anything but anti-military, and who knew from visits to Laos as much as any Senator did about the U.S. role there, raises the matter in blunt terms:

"We incur hundreds of thousands of U.S. casualties because we are opposed to a closed society. We say we are an open society, and the enemy is a closed society.

"Accepting that premise, it would appear logical for them not to tell their people (what they are doing); but it is sort of a twist on our basic philosophy about the importance of containing communism.

"Here we are telling Americans they must fight and die to maintain an open society,

but not telling our people what we are doing. That would seem the characteristic of a closed society."

The situation recalls a comment made in private, by a Western European friend who is extremely pro-American and who was troubled by the international moralistic consequences of the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic in April, 1965. When the Johnson administration was caught lying about its original rationale for the intervention ("to save American lives"), this man remarked in dismay:

"This will secretly please a lot of Europeans."

"Because," he answered, "they always have resented the hollow-though American attitude about intervention, about imperialism, about your claim to a 'higher morality.' Now you are down in the gutter with us. The U-2 (spy-plane) flights over the Soviet Union affair was the first blow to American 'virginity'; this is the second. Now we are all moral prostitutes."

Later that year came the major American slide into Vietnam, then afterward, increasing unofficial disclosure of the clandestine American involvement in Laos.

Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearings on Laos showed how Congress itself is misled by artful or deliberately technical official replies to questions.

In 1968, the Laos transcript reveals the parent committee was informed that: "... We do not have a military training and advisory organization in Laos." The Laos inquiry confirmed that there are hundreds of U.S. "advisers" in Laos and at training bases for Laotian forces in Thailand. The Symington Subcommittee demanded an explanation.

There is no inconsistency, government witnesses responded; in military parlance, "an advisory group's" sole mission is "to provide advice... down to lower unit levels," came the explanation. U.S. military personnel in Laos provide "advice," but officially do not constitute "an advisory group."

His committee, Sen. Fulbright protested, was victimized by "semantics."

It is argued by many officials, members of Congress—and even newsmen as well—that nothing vitally new has been disclosed about U.S. operations in Laos that was not, or should not have been, known to any careful reader of his daily newspaper.

This is basically correct. But there is a fundamental difference in a nation that claims a standard of "higher morality" between admitting its actions officially, and having knowledge of them seep out.

In fact, this is precisely the case that the United States government argued for maintaining officially secrecy for six years, as the testimony shows: to take "official cognizance" of what it was doing in Laos carried a whole range of possible international repercussions.

Newspaper accounts can be disavowed; a report that is inaccurate even fractionally—as accounts of secret operations are very likely to be—can be officially dismissed as containing "innumerable inaccuracies." This often has been the official response to enterprising news reports about Laos—or Vietnam, or Cambodia. It is hardly a satisfactory answer to the national moral questions raised by such clandestine military operations, therefore, to counter that "everyone" knew about them anyhow, so there was an real deception.

Nor is it any moral "out," as Sen. Symington noted, to shift blame to the Central Intelligence Agency for operational activities it was directed to perform by the nation's leadership. The moral responsibility is government-wide.

Those who express bafflement about why a younger generation loses faith in the words of its leaders will find some answers in the Laos transcript.

INDOCINA SENZA PACE

Laos: paradiso per spie (USA)

STATINTL

● *Sotto il controllo diretto di Lawrence Devlin, capo della CIA a Vientiane, una fitta rete di informatori e di « consiglieri militari » - Ma il Pathet Lao ha praticamente nelle mani il Paese*

Dal nostro inviato

VIENTIANE, aprile — L'onesto inviato che sbarca in questi giorni nella capitale del Laos il più delle volte non perde nemmeno tempo per lavarsi le mani nella sua camera del « Lan Xang » o del « Constellation », i due alberghi della colonia giornalistica di Vientiane, ridiventata foltissima. Subito si mette in giro a caccia di notizie o al primo collega che incontra domanda: « Dov'è il Pathet Lao? ». Le notizie sull'avanzata delle forze partigiane al di qua della mitica Piana delle Giare, sulla direttrice di sud-ovest — ossia verso Vientiane, capitale amministrativa — o sulla direttrice di nord-ovest — ossia verso Luang Prabang, capitale reale — sono considerate infatti generi di prima necessità e sembrano consentire, di questi tempi, la costruzione di ogni ipotesi strategica e di ogni previsione politica non solo per il Laos ma per tutta l'Asia del sud-est. Ma siccome tali informazioni o sono false o esistono soltanto per potere essere subito contraddette da altre informazioni diametralmente opposte, le sorti di questo paese stravagante che è il Laos, con un re, due capitali e tre raggruppamenti politici, ciascuno dotato di un proprio esercito, mutano, nelle previsioni degli osservatori, da un giorno all'altro e quasi d'ora in ora. Il che non toglie che cer-

care di sapere dove si trovi il Pathet Lao, ossia il braccio armato del Neo Lao Hak Xat (traduciamo, per brevità e chiarezza: Fronte della sinistra laotiana), rappresenti una curiosità perfettamente giustificata.

L'ineffabile « ufficio forniture »

Ma la sorpresa dell'interrogante non è poca quando si sente rispondere dal proprio interlocutore che il Pathet Lao si trova dietro l'angolo, subito dopo l'Arco di trionfo (squallida reminiscenza della dominazione francese) a trecento metri dall'ambasciata americana. Basta seguire le indicazioni per rendersi conto che non si tratta di uno scherzo. Dietro l'angolo, subito dopo l'Arco di Trionfo, a trecento metri dalla ambasciata americana infatti, circondata da uno steccato e oltre un polveroso giardino, pieno di alberi ma trasformato in una area di parcheggio per jeep, sta una bassa e larga costruzione in muratura in cui ha sede la rappresentanza permanente del Pathet Lao a Vientiane, guidata dal col. Soth Pethrasi e presidiata in armi da un distaccamento di 120 uomini dell'esercito partigiano. Due di essi, impeccabilmente sull'attenti, montano la guardia davanti all'Arco di trionfo, e un altro si

time carabine semiautomatiche AK 47 di fabbricazione cinese. Per la strada passano, ridenti e chiassosi, dei ragazzoni biondi in borghese con vistosi giubbotti in pelle, da aviatore. Sono piloti e navigatori di Air America e del Continental Air Service, le due compagnie aeree create di sana pianta dalla CIA e destinate a ogni traffico giudicato necessario dalla centrale americana di spionaggio e sovversione. Diciamo subito che questi traffici sono infiniti e imprevedibili: dal trasporto dell'oppio coltivato dai montanari Meo sulle alteterre del nord-ovest e venduto poi al mercato di Vientiane, assieme a frutta e verdura, fino allo spostamento, a mezzo di elicotteri il più delle volte, dei commandos di « berretti verdi ».

I « berretti verdi » che sono, per chi non lo sapesse, gli uomini delle « forze speciali » dell'esercito statunitense, non hanno diritto di avere il loro comando e la loro sede qui a Vientiane, così si sono piazzati a Udorn, al di là del Mekong, fiume di confine. Udorn è una delle basi thailandesi che gli Stati Uniti hanno costruito, senza badare a spese, per la loro aviazione. Quando vengono a Vientiane — e

ci vengono spessissimo — non portano distintivi né divise ma una semplice tuta di fatica e fanno capo a uno strano luogo, un po' in periferia, dove ha sede un anodino servizio detto « Ufficio forniture » che non è se non un'altra delle trasfigurazioni della CIA. Sotto il controllo diretto di Mr. Lawrence Devlin, capo della CIA a Vientiane con la innocente copertura di « consigliere politico » all'ambasciata USA, questo ufficio tiene fede assai bene al suo nome potendo « fornire » in effetti qualsiasi cosa, da uno stock di armi modernissime per ogni uso, a un gruppo di uomini per una azione di commando fino a una incursione di B.52. Pare che una delle maniere migliori per sapere se qualcosa di importante bolle nella pentola dei « servizi speciali », sia di non perdere di vista le ragazze della « Rosa Bianca », il più prestigioso bordello di Vientiane, di cui i « berretti verdi » sono accaniti frequentatori e dove si può acquistare di tutto, da un panetto di oppio a un lingotto d'oro, oltre, com'è ovvio, ai servizi naturali in tale tipo di istituto.

Laotiani di destra, laotiani neutralisti, laotiani di sinistra, vietnamiti del nord e del sud, sovietici e cinesi, americani e francesi, uomini della CIA e dei servizi speciali statunitensi, vivono insomma a Vientiane, all'altro,

continua

ASHVILLE, N.C.

CITIZEN

M - 47,151

CITIZEN-TIMES

S - 67,768

APR 22 1970

The U. S. Is Directing A Secret War In Laos

A few weeks ago, to discount reports that the United States is actively engaged in the war in Laos, President Nixon said that no combat troops are involved and that "fewer than 50" Americans — civilian and military — assigned to the U. S. mission in Laos have lost their lives as a result of enemy action.

This week it was disclosed that about 200 have been killed and 200 others are missing or prisoners as the result of a secret U. S. military operation in Laos known as Project 404.

Why did the President lie?

The existence of the operation was disclosed in testimony taken last fall by the Senate subcommittee on security agreements and commitments abroad and just now released, in censored form, by committee officials.

This clandestine maneuver has been directed, for the last four years, by the U. S. Embassy in Vientiane, unknown to the Congress and to the American people. It is administered by the U. S. ambassador and involves some of the 2,000-member U. S. mission in Laos. It includes more than 100 military attaches who fly with the Royal Laotian Air Force and direct Laotian pilots to their targets. Moreover, the ambassador personally reviews all proposed U. S. air strikes (from Vietnam and Thailand) against Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese positions, passing reports along to the U. S. Air Force commanders.

No cost estimates were released.

But the U. S. bombing raids in Laos cost, on the basis of simple arithmetic, more than \$1,300,000 daily.

Why have these operations been shrouded in secrecy? Because they are a direct violation of the treaty that declares Laotian neutrality. The Administration didn't even want any of the Senate subcommittee testimony disclosed because of the fear of a Russian protest.

But Senator Stuart Symington insisted. "If we can get the facts out to the people," he said, "I believe there is a chance of avoiding another Vietnam war. If we don't get the facts out, I don't believe there is a chance."

Well, the facts are out — 90 per cent of them anyhow. But the operation is apparently continuing.

"It is not a question whether it is right or it is wrong," added Symington. "The point we are trying to bring out is that this is true. And neither does the Congress — and neither does the committee nor the Senate Armed Services Committee know all the facts."

The U. S. has involved itself in a lot of trouble in Southeast Asia; nobody is yet aware how deep it is, how extensive the commitments. The wars there, the fighting, the intrigue are being run by the Pentagon, by the White House, by commanders in the field, by the Central Intelligence Agency, and now — it develops — by the embassies. Small wonder the outcome has been so frustrating.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
DISPATCH

E 130 292
APR 22 1970

More Light on Laos

It took a Senate subcommittee six months of battling with the Defense and State Departments to blast loose facts about clandestine American war activities in Laos during the past several years. These operations, kept secret until now from the American people, have cost the taxpayers billions of dollars, and American lives have been lost.

The whole Laos story has not yet been revealed, but at least the subcommittee headed by Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri has managed to rip away most of the curtain of censorship behind which the Executive Department has hidden its operations.

✓ Although the State Department is supposed to devote itself to nonmilitary activities, it was revealed that the American ambassador in Laos supervises and directs Army personnel and passes on bombing targets. In addition the Central Intelligence Agency finances an


"irregular" Laotian army force. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has a group of retired army officers headquartered in Thailand which has trained and equipped other military groups active in Laos. An extensive network of undercover projects has been in existence since 1962.

A strange excuse is given by Administration officials to justify their stubborn devotion to secrecy. It is that the government should not indicate to the Soviet Union that the United States may have violated the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laotian neutrality. But Russia has known all along just what the U.S. has been doing. It is only the American public which was kept in the dark.

American military interventionism in Asia is too important a matter to be concealed from its citizens. Senator Symington's committee has done well to let in the light.

22 APR 1970

STATINTL



Richard Harwood

U.S. Role in Laos Is Story Of Intrigue, Broken Promises

ON JULY 23, 1962, the Communist and non-Communist powers in Asia — including the United States — signed the Geneva Accords to create a neutral Laos. The foreigners agreed to withdraw their military forces from the little country and promised never to send any more troops — not even military advisers.

The Russians pulled out their 500 troops. The Americans pulled out the 750 they had, including 450 Green Berets who had been operating in the boondocks as White Star Teams. The North Vietnamese, who were always known as the bad guys, pulled out 16 men and left 6,000 others behind in their lair in the northern provinces.

The agreement was hailed as a triumph of reason over passion and as a great diplomatic coup for President Kennedy.

We are now learning from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there was less to that agreement than met the eye and that within 60 days after it was signed, the United States was embarked upon a series of secret activities designed to violate every promise this country had made.

It is a delicious story of intrigue, black tricks, cover operations, secret agents, phony agencies and code names like Golden Eagle, Operation Triangle, Seacord, DEPCHEIF, and Project 404.

The first fact that emerges from the committee's hearings is that the Americans never left Laos as they had promised to do. CIA operatives remained in the hills to provide "sustenance" to their allies among the Meo tribesmen led by General Veng Pao, whose virtue always had been that he likes to fight.

THE REST of the American government started getting involved in September, 1962 when the new Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma, asked both the Russians and the Americans for military equipment.

The Russians turned him down. The Americans didn't and agreed to put into the country 1,100 tons of military equipment each month. That was a marginal violation of the Geneva Accords, but it set in motion other activities that were a clear violation of our promises.

Somebody had to find out what kind of equipment the Laotians really needed. So the United States recruited retired military men, put them in civilian clothes and sent them into Laos as employees of a new branch of our AID mission — the Requirements Office.

Somebody had to stockpile, maintain, process and transport this equipment. So the United States created another new agency. It was called Deputy Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Group, Thailand, or DEPCHEIF, as it was known in the trade. Its mission was classified and its headquarters was across the border in Thailand.

Somebody had to check on the Laotians to see that they were using their new weapons properly and to give them advice. So the United States set up another cover operation—Project 404. This was the code name for the Army and Air Force advisers sent into the country to "supplement" the attache staff at the American embassy in Vientiane.

IT WAS SOON obvious that the Laotians could use additional training. DEPCHEIF took on part of that job, to supplement what the CIA already was doing with Veng Pao's troopers.

The next development should have been predictable. The Laos needed more direct forms of American help—active combat support. So in 1964, months before ground troops were sent to Vietnam, the Air Force began providing air reconnaissance, then air cover, then air strikes, then close support. To get this job done, it was necessary to send in American ground controllers and airborne spotters to manage the strikes.

By 1966, the Special Forces wanted a piece of the action and proposed a Golden Eagle operation that involved, presumably, the insertion of Green Beret teams into the countryside. That was turned down.

But the air support, the CIA operations with the Meos, the use of Army and Air Force "coordinators," the various missions of DEPCHEIF and other American activities have mushroomed into a "billion" annual enterprise. The figure is classified.

All the while and right up to today, Article 4 of the Geneva Accords remains in effect:

"The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign paramilitary formations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited."

E - 216,949

S - 315,342

APR 21 1970

Special Report**Private Airline
Pilots Fly Deep
In Laotian Bush**

By FRANCOIS SULLY

News American-Newsweek Correspondent

VIENTIANE, Laos — Early every morning, 70 small, highly powered planes roar off from the Vientiane airport and head for "Old Sam Soak Strip" or "Pop's Field" or certain other tiny clearings deep in the Laotian bush.

"Sometimes no one can tell whether a site is closed or open," says one of the pilots. "You get there and circle the place, looking for any suspicious sign. If no one shoots, you take your chance and land and keep the engine running until a friendly face shows up."

The planes bear the discreet markings of Air America — better known in some circles as "CIA Airlines."

Nominally, Air America is a privately owned company which does all its flying in Southeast Asia and all of it under contract to the U.S. government.

ACTUALLY, ITS MAIN assignment is to assist in the half-acknowledged U.S. war commitment in Laos. As a civilian organization, it can circumvent the 1962 Geneva accords which bar foreign military aircraft from Laos but permit air activity by civilian planes.

And Air America is about as active as an airline can be. Indeed, it is one of the largest of U.S. lines, ranking just behind National and ahead of Northeast in the number of its planes and personnel.

Last year Air America carried 11,000 passengers, 16,000 refugees and 6,000 tons of cargo. It also dropped \$4 million worth of rice to 150,000 refugees in Laos, and flew in several hundred Thai troops to help defend the Long Cheng outpost against Communist attack.

MORE TO THE clandestine point, the airline is available to drop individual agents behind the North Vietnamese lines in Laos — and pick them up when their mission is completed.

It has also been used by the CIA in Vietnam to fly out high-level Viet Cong prisoners, and by the Green Berets to supply Montagnard mercenaries.

Well-informed observers believe that Air America has gone even further: that it regularly picks up agents in North Vietnam, that it puts U.S. Special Forces teams into Laos, that it parachutes infiltrators into Cambodia and that it flies intelligence missions along the Chinese coast.

All this, and private enterprise, too. For Air America is part of a complex corporate organization, headed by the Pacific Corp., with headquarters in Washington, D.C. Its president is George A. Doole Jr., 60, a large, amiable ex-Pan American pilot who has a special sort of used-car salesman touch as he avoids answering questions

"WHAT WE DO," he says, "is best described as utility flying. We carry people and things — whatever the customer has for us. A lot of romance gets around about our activities, but they're much more routine than you would think." Air America is an offspring of Civil Air Trans-

port (CAT), the company formed by Gen. Claire Chennault and some of his Flying Tigers after World War II.

In its early days, during the Chinese revolution, CAT did a brisk business flying relief supplies into China—and fallen war lords and their loot out to safety. Later Chennault sold out, and since then the line has been involved in most of the wars in Southeast Asia. It ferried supplies into the French in Vietnam in the '50s and has been supplying anti-Communist forces in Laos at least since 1962.

NOWADAYS, Air America uses twin-engine Volpar Beechcrafts and Swiss-built Pilatus Porters. It has about 150 of them and some 600 pilots to do the flying.

Some of the executives like to say the pilots are recruited mostly among civilian cropdusters, Alaskan bush pilots and similar figures from the seat-of-the-pants flying era. Actually, most are service veterans, and in some cases even their "veteran" status is in doubt.

Pilots have moved directly from the Air Force into Air America and then back into the service again. Some have even been given

U.S. decorations—albeit in private ceremonies—for their heroic performances while serving in the private organization.

The heroism is often very real. Pilots have been killed on missions, have been captured, executed or have simply disappeared. They earn their relatively high pay—up to \$25,000 a year, untaxed.

MANY OF THEM fly for the money, but perhaps more do it for the adventure—or simply for the joy of flying without having to obey the bureaucratic rules imposed on military pilots. And some look upon it as simply another job.

Lanky, 49-year-old Clyde Morehouse, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, spends a good portion of his time ferrying Laotian officers to remote outposts in the hills—and manages to seem bored by it all.

"Once you've seen a couple of these mountain valleys, you've seen them all," he says.

Frequently, the aircraft have been mobbed by panicky Meo tribesmen, anxious to escape from a village before the arrival of Communist troops. When this happens, the pilot pulls up the ladder and battens down the aircraft until things quiet down on the landing strip.

"THESE MEN are highly experienced professionals," says one executive. "They fly eight to ten hours a day over mostly uncharted mountains with almost no navigational aids. They face slick landing strips, treacherous approach winds, rough terrain, bad weather in the rainy seasons and blinding fog in the dry seasons."

Mostly, however, the men who run Air America play down the drama, along with the CIA connections.

"We operate on a you-call-we-haul basis," says the line's general manager in Vientiane, James A. Cunningham Jr. "We don't go into details. We don't ask for credentials."

And wordlessly he gestures toward a placard emblazoned with Air America's motto: "Anything, Anytime, Anywhere Professionally."

Newsweek Feature Service

21 APR 1970

Laos, Cambodia—and now Cuba

Having been caught in one lie after another about the U.S. secret intervention in Laos, the Administration is now clamming up about the latest attack on Cuba with its usual disclaimer of "Who, me?"

The fiction which Administration myth-makers want us to believe is that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon brass are independent agencies operating on their own, with no direction or control from the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the government.

But self-exposure of this deliberate Administration policy of trying to gull the U.S. population is increasing. It is patently evident that no "invasion" of Cuba could have occurred without funds, arms, protection and instigation by agencies under direction and control of the Nixon Administration.

The aim of all this humbug is to divert attention from the sinister meaning of the so-called "Nixon Doctrine" which the President set forth at Guam.

The doctrine is operating this moment in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Now it has been applied to the first socialist state in the Western Hemisphere, and as applied to Cuba, it means paying and directing Cubans to kill Cubans, Latins to kill Latins to fatten the swinish U.S. monopolies that feed off the misery of the Latin American peoples.

Soon or late, unless the monopolies are curbed, unless the Nixon gang in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government are thrown out by the electorate, unless the military brass are brought under civilian control—unless the people mobilize and organize to bring about these results, the Nixon Doctrine could come to mean increasing numbers of Americans paid and directed to kill other Americans:

A first step toward preventing such a culmination is an increase of the popular movement to end the aggression against the peoples of Indo-China, and to demand hands off Cuba now!

21 APR 1970

U.S. war in Laos bared to Senators

Daily World Foreign Department

Senate testimony released yesterday on the eve of President Nixon's report to the nation on Southeast Asia revealed that the U.S. ambassador to Laos has been directing a secret military operation and that a clandestine U.S. group in Thailand has been training and equipping Laotian troops.

This testimony had been given at hearings held last fall by the Senate subcommittee on security agreements and commitments abroad. The Nixon administration had up to now forbade any of it to be made public.

Walter Pincus, a member of the Senate subcommittee staff, declared that some of the testimony which the people "have a right to know" is still undisclosed. Pincus made his statement in a letter to subcommittee chairman, Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo).

The "secret military operation" referred to in the testimony made public was called "Project 404," and began on October, 1966, with 117 military and five civilian personnel being assigned to the U.S. Embassy in the Lao capital, Vientiane. The project personnel fly missions with the "Royal Lao" air force and they spot targets for air strikes.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William H. Sullivan, U.S. ambassador in Laos, 1964-69, said: "The ambassador approves or disapproves whether a strike can be made." If it is approved, then the request is passed on to the

U.S. Air Force in Thailand or Vietnam. Sen. Symington said this means the ambassador has become a "military proconsul," in Laos instead of a diplomat.

Sen. J. William Fulbright, (D-Ark) chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said: "I have never seen a country engage in so many devious undertakings as this."

Administration officials testified they did not want to be accused of violating the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos.

The 1962 agreements prohibit foreign military forces of any kind from operating in Laos.

The testimony also showed that "Royal Lao" forces are trained and equipped by a secret "Special Requirements Organization" based in Thailand and run by "retired" U.S. military personnel. Much of the testimony confirmed aspects of U.S. involvement in Laos long ago uncovered by U.S. and other newsmen.

Still secret

Pincus, in his letter to Symington, said the still-secret material in the testimony covers:

—U.S. government support for

the clandestine army of General Vang Pao, a force of some 15,000 Meo tribesmen and opium smugglers run by the CIA in northern Laos.

—Adequate information about increased U.S. combat sorties over northern Laos.

—Cumulative U.S. military aid since 1962 to Lao regular and irregular forces.

—"The millions of dollars it has and is costing for U.S. air combat operations over northern Laos."

—U.S. air bases in Thailand used to bomb Laos.

—"The financing by the U.S. of third-country nationals in the war in North Laos." ("Third-country nationals" probably refers to the Filipinos, Thais, Vietnamese, Australians and Chinese Nationalists the U.S. is using in its operations in Laos.)

The Senate testimony also included the disclosure that "something under 200" U.S. military personnel had been killed in Laos, about a quarter of them in northern Laos. President Nixon had claimed earlier that no U.S. ground combat forces had been killed in combat in Laos.

STATINTL

NEWS

E - 592,616

S - 827,086

APR 21 1970

War in Laos hardly a secret

Unknown to Congress and the American people, a secret anti-Communist military operation has been directed by the American embassy in Laos for the last four years, it is charged. But how substantial is that accusation?

We don't know who named the operation "Project 404," which is rather James Bondish, but if it was supposed to be secret it has been the worst kept military secret of the century.

A vast amount of material — facts, figures and some intelligent guesswork—has been printed from correspondents whose beat has been Laos even when the guerilla war there was fairly quiescent. And since the indigenous Pathet Lao (Communist) Party and 67,000 North Vietnamese regulars turned on the heat in Laos a few months ago, there has been a spate of reporting.

The President himself on March 6 made a statement on the history and current motive of our involvement in which he said we were supporting the independence and neutrality of Laos as set forth in the Geneva accords of 1962.

He added: "In addition to our air operations on the Ho Chi Minh trail, we have continued to carry out reconnaissance flights in north Laos and fly combat-support missions for Laotian forces when requested by the Royal Laotian government."

That's an astonishing admission from a President who is trying to

keep this Laotian sideshow a secret war, which is what the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Agreements Abroad is suggesting. Short of announcing weekly war communiques, what does the committee want?

As the press has faithfully reported, Americans have been involved with air controllers to pinpoint targets for the fledgling Laotian air force, ground combat instructors, the CIA and two American airlines for logistics and support.

But even in an openly declared war you don't announce the tonnage of every bomb you've dropped, how many air missions were aborted, what the state of your logistics backup is. We do reveal air casualties, on Mr. Nixon's order, and we don't have any GI's committed in combat.

Because the Reds are making war clandestinely despite their signature on the 1962 accords, we have to counter to keep faith with our signature pledging Laotian independence. This administration, as its predecessor, wants to avoid making headlines out of every military move because one day everyone probably will have to return to the 1962 pact terms. It's the best formula for peace and peace there would be if the Reds acquiesced.

Instead, Hanoi has never admitted a single one of its soldiers is aggressing in Laos. Perhaps the senators could better direct their charges about secrecy to Hanoi—for all the good that would do them

Cite Rationale for Involvement and Secrecy

21 APR 1970

BY TED SELL
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—A special Senate subcommittee investigating U.S. commitments abroad Sunday brought out—after a five-month battle with State Department censors—a long-awaited study on U.S. involvement in Laos.

The 236-page report said little that has not previously been published about the U.S. role in Laos. About 10% of the text remained deleted for security reasons.

What was new, however, was the rationale of the State Department, first, for the initial U.S. commitments in Laos after the 1962 Geneva agreements forbade outside intervention and, second, the reason the executive branch has steadfastly kept secret the extent of involvement and its reasons for official secrecy.

U.S. Aim Served by Secrecy

Secrecy imposed on the U.S. role—even though American actions are highly visible in the landlocked little country—serves the U.S. aim because it means that the Soviet Union, a cochairman with Britain of the 1962 conference, does not have to acknowledge formally that the United States is in violation of the Geneva agreement, Walter Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said.

This permits Russia to continue to be available as a prospective peacemaker in Laos, according to the State Department.

Another reason for secrecy was the wish of Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Laotian neutralist leader, that the extent of U.S. air activity in Laos not be publicized.

Sullivan said the U.S. action was prompted by massive North Vietnamese intervention and was aimed partly at protecting Laos as a buffer state.

The transcript also contained these points:

—U.S. air action in Laos began in June, 1964, even before that U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

—The American ambassador directs the U.S. operations, called "Project 401," in Laos. In this capacity the ambassador supervises the 2,000

and oversees the work of more than 100 military attaches.

—"Something under" 200 U.S. military personnel have been killed in the years of U.S. military involvement in Laos. Most of these were airmen, but nearly 50 were listed as "civilian and military" personnel assigned to the U.S. mission there.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's special subcommittee on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad, said his group's purpose was to try to make public facts previously shrouded as classified.

"If we get these facts out to people," Symington said, "maybe we can avoid more Vietnams."

Symington has repeatedly said that the nation's military budget is keyed directly to the forces considered necessary to meet expressed and implied commitments. Hence, any move to reduce the defense budget should start with an exploration of precisely what U.S. obligations are to allies, he said.

Witnesses before Symington's group were from the State Department, Air Force, Army, U.S. Information Service, the Agency for International Development and Central Intelligence Agency.

The entire testimony of Richard B. Helms, CIA director, was deleted—even to his name as the witness on the final day of the closed hearings.

CIA Financing

It was understood, however, that much of Helms' testimony related to support of the mercenary Meo tribesmen army led by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao.

The omission indicated that whereas normal U.S. Military Assistance Program funds—which run about \$90 million a year—go to support the Royal Lao regular army, the Meos are financed by in-

telligence money. That is estimated to cost \$50 to \$60 million additionally a year. The two figures together are approximately equal to the entire \$150 million a year Laotian gross national product.

U.S. economic aid, which runs around \$70 to \$80 million annually, is on top from 1946 through 1968 of this. Total economic aid

The combination of military and economic assistance brought demands from Symington and from Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the full committee, for an accounting of what purpose had been served by this expenditure of what Symington called "billions of U.S. dollars."

Sullivan repeatedly replied that the U.S. aim in Laos was to support the independence of the country, led by the neutralist Souvanna Phouma government.

Sullivan, who was ambassador to Laos from November, 1964, to April, 1969, insisted the United States had no formal commitment to defend Laos. That, he said, was eliminated by the 1962 agreements in which Souvanna Phouma expressly agreed

not to call on the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization for military assistance.

Under the 1954 agreements ending the Indochina war and creating an independent Laos, that country was designated one of three Southeast Asia "protocol states" which SEATO nations bound themselves to assist.

The United States intervened in Laos, Sullivan said, in response to massive North Vietnamese intervention. And the U.S. action, Sullivan said, was aimed partly at protecting Laos as a buffer between China and North Vietnam on one side and Thailand on the other.

Symington and Fulbright, however, question whether the actual participation of more than 200 American military men in the Laotian war—even though not in ground combat—does not constitute both an implied commitment and the possibility of the United States being drawn into a major new Vietnam-type war. There was no resolution of the argument.

Symington and committee sources said that even with the argument unresolved, the subcommittee's aim had been served—to bring to public light in an official paper the extent of the American commitment.

The actual combat commitment, however, was not made public. Almost all statistical references to the huge American air effort were deleted by censors. One that did remain was that each aerial sortie cost an average of \$3,190 in ordnance alone—not counting costs of approximately 400 planes which have been lost over Laos since 1964.

But the sortie number was deleted. A rough figure for numbers of sorties over northern Laos—Symington specifically excepts those over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos as being part of the Vietnam war—has been 500 a week.

For bombs, bullets and napalm alone that would add about \$90 million a year.

Not Counted

Because all but forward air controller missions are flown from bases outside Laos—in Thailand, South Vietnam and from 7th Fleet aircraft carriers—the men assigned to strike Laotian targets are not counted in the U.S. manpower commitment.

The report pointedly notes that the air war in northern Laos began in the middle of 1964—well before the U.S. Gulf of Tonkin retaliatory raids against North Vietnam or the commitment of American ground troops in South Vietnam and even before U.S. raids against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the southern Laos pan-handle.

21 APR 1970

Deception in Laos A Deliberate One

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

FOR MORE than six years, the Symington Subcommittee's report on Laos shows, the United States practiced a policy of official deception about its extremely extensive military operations in Laos.

It did not do so idly or haphazardly. The policy of official deception was carried out deliberately and systematically, for what officials at the highest levels of government were convinced were sound reasons of national security. Many of those officials are still in the government today. They are still just as convinced that the reasons for deception were and are fully justified, and that U.S. operations in Laos are a "model" of an efficient, successful, relatively low-cost, effectively clandestine, counter-guerrilla operation.

On the last count, the officials may be right—the Laos operations may be a model of a successful, secret operation against tough odds. But that by no means answers the real question which is whether a handful of counter-insurgency zealots should have the right to define our national interests for us in this fashion, and then involve us in a dangerous and entangling mission without the public knowing anything about it. This is the critical moral issue raised by the Laos hearings and toward the end of the censored transcript Sen. Stuart Symington, who is anything but anti-military, and who knew from visits to Laos as much as any Senator did about the U.S. role there, raises the matter in blunt terms:

"We incur hundreds of thousands of U.S. casualties because we are opposed to a closed society. We say we are an open society, and the enemy is a closed society.

"Accepting that premise, it would appear logical for them not to tell their people (what they are doing); but it is sort of a twist on our basic philosophy about the importance of containing communism.

"Here we are telling Americans they must fight and die to maintain an open society, but not telling our people what we are doing. That would seem the characteristic of a closed society."

THE SITUATION recalls a comment made in private, by a Western European friend who is extremely pro-American and who was troubled by the international moralistic consequences of the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic in April, 1965. When the Johnson administration was caught lying about its original rationale for the intervention ("to save American lives"), this man remarked in dismay:

"This will be the end of the American dream."

"Because," he answered, "they always have resented the holier-than-thou American attitude about intervention, about imperialism about your claim to a 'higher morality.' Now you are down in the gutter with us. The U-2 (spy-plane flights over the Soviet Union) affair was the first blow to American 'virginity'; this is the second. Now we are all moral prostitutes."

Later that year came the major American slide into Vietnam, then afterward, increasing unofficial disclosure of the clandestine American involvement in Laos.

Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearings on Laos showed how Congress itself is misled by artful or deliberately technical official replies to questions.

In 1968, the Laos transcript reveals the parent committee was informed that: "We do not have a military training and advisory organization in Laos." The Laos inquiry confirmed that there are hundreds of U.S. "advisers" in Laos and at training bases for Laotian forces in Thailand. The Symington Subcommittee demanded an explanation.

There is no inconsistency, government witnesses responded; in military parlance, "an advisory group's" sole mission is "to provide advice . . . down to lower unit levels," came the explanation. U.S. military personnel in Laos provide "advice," but officially do not constitute "an advisory group."

His committee, Sen. Fulbright protested, was victimized by "semantics."

IT IS argued by many officials, members of Congress—and even newsmen as well—that nothing vitally new has been disclosed about U.S. operations in Laos that was not, or should not have been, known to any careful reader of his daily newspaper.

This is basically correct. But there is a fundamental difference in a nation that claims a standard of "higher morality" between admitting its actions officially, and having knowledge of them seep out.

In fact, this is precisely the case that the United States government argued for maintaining officially secrecy for six years, as the testimony shows: to take "official cognizance" of what it was doing in Laos carried a whole range of possible international repercussions.

Newspaper accounts can be disavowed; a report that is inaccurate even fractionally—as accounts of secret operations are very likely to be—can be officially dismissed as containing "innumerable inaccuracies." This often has been the official response to enterprising news reports about Laos—or Vietnam, or Cambodia. It is hardly a satisfactory answer to the national moral questions raised by such clandestine military operations, therefore, to counter that "everyone" knew about them anyhow, so there was no real deception.

Nor is it any moral "out," as Sen. Symington would say, that the Central Intelligence Agency, for operational activities,

it was directed to perform by the nation's leadership. The moral responsibility is government-wide.

Those who express bafflement about why a younger generation loses faith in the words of its leaders will find some answers in the Laos transcript.

APR 20 1970

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The War Abroad

Melvin and the

Pirates

The planet Uranus was discovered by the astronomers because, observing the conduct of other planetary phenomena, it had to be there. By much the same type of logic, the ordinary citizen may detect the presence of America's department of subversive services, the Central Intelligence Agency.

Restating the planetary logic as it might apply to international intrigue: An invisible organization is likely to be doing what it might be expected to do even while spreading denials that it is doing it. A corollary: Coincidence is the last explanation of fortuitous events.

IT IS LEFT to some remote archivist to describe the development of the C.I.A. role in the Cambodian coup d'etat. Years from now, when the reputations and policies have passed which today engage so much passion, the declassification of official documents (those not destroyed) will reveal the only remaining identifiable traces of this violent passage, while the consequences of intervention merge into the stream of history.

But it is rather surprising that there has been so little speculation on the visible course of events. Has the usually cynical press caught napping? It is true that several Senators quickly denied that the C.I.A. was involved. But the Senators who might complain are not informed of Guatemala's in advance and those that might be are quite capable of mendacity in the national interest.

The observations upon which an assertion of clandestine involvement depends, do not include the strange piracy of the Columbia Eagle. But that episode was surely eccentric enough to arouse at least the suspicious of the most credulous reporter. How strained is the co-incidence that two treasonous defectors would successfully seize a handy munitions ship and flee to Cambodia on the eve of revolution from the Right, thence conveniently disappear-

ing from sight? A modest fancy can conjure up a picture of the origins of this episode. A select handful of counter-intelligence specialists on the west bank of the Potomac hunched over Contingency Plan 3, code name, "Operation Eagle's Eggs."

But the persuasive evidence of the C.I.A. presence does not depend on flight of fancy. Much more convincing is the fruit of policy analysis. Policy determines action. If events evolve which promote the ends of a particular policy, it is probable that the events were predetermined by the advocate of that policy.

Policy Profiles

By John Havelock

In 1953 the announced policy of North Korea was reunification of North and South Korea under a northern style regime. At the opening of that war, each side accused the other of invading its territory. The South Korean Army caved in almost immediately. The North Koreans swept swiftly down most of the length of the Korean peninsula.

The safe conclusion: The war was initiated by the North Koreans.

The policy context of the coup d'etat in Cambodia is a little more complex because neither side has been quite so clear in its policy pronouncements. In the last months of the Johnson administration, policy was in flux. In the first year of the Nixon administration we must search for policy indications preceding the Nixon inaugural.

The selection of Melvin Laird in 1968 as Secretary of Defense designate was widely considered as a triumph for policy positions with which he had expressed sympathy as a member of Congress. In his role as leader of the opposition for military affairs in the House of Representatives, Laird, an anti-interventionist, had developed personal alliances with those military officers who had grown most

under the control of the McNamara defense department.

Within the Pentagon, as publicly, the question of hand-tieing came down to whether you viewed the Viet Nam war as a hot center surrounded by diplomatic political and territorial grey zones of decreasing temperature or whether the grey zones were viewed as sanctuaries for the enemy.

The extreme positions of each view were equally untenable. Every war short of nuclear holocaust will have its sanctuaries, a borderline of conduct that is not passed for fear of provoking conflict in a broader arena. In the 60's, neither the North Vietnamese nor ourselves waged all out war. Popularly denounced among the unleash-the-military school were the bomb moratorium on Haiphong Harbor in North Vietnam and restrictions on operations against North Vietnam Army supply lines in Laos and the staging areas for Viet Cong guerrilla operations in Cambodia. Less publicized in this country were sanctuaries recognized by the North Vietnamese. Our aircraft carriers, which were (and still are) targets vulnerable to short range missiles, were left alone. Saigon could, in practice, be made all but unlivable by Viet Cong rocket attacks. A Viet Cong initiative to do just that was quickly cooled when our President indicated he was considering trading off of their sanctuaries for this unwelcome innovation.

On the other hand, the advocates of the grey zone approach frequently overestimate American capabilities to wage the new style of warfare. Wars of attrition, wars without territorial boundaries, wars with more than one set of rules, wars fought with political means are alien to the American temperament. We understand the nineteenth century military strategy. "War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means." But we are in a contest in which war

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APR 20 1970

MASSIVE LAOS

AID BARED

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Secret Report Reveals Costs

BY JAMES YUENGER

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

Washington, April 19 — A carefully-censored transcript of secret Senate testimony, released today, discloses that the United States has sunk billions of dollars into the war in Laos without a formal commitment to help that country.

Testimony about American military involvement in Laos was given by administration officials behind closed doors last October to the Senate subcommittee on commitments abroad. Fourteen state and defense department censors went over the transcript before agreeing to its publication.

The material that was deleted made it impossible to learn the precise amount of money America has spent helping the Laotian government battle Pathet Lao guerrillas and North Vietnamese troops on its own territory.

Indications of Expenditures

But there were small indications of what has been spent, for example:

"The total cost of all United States activities in Laos, including air operations against the Ho Chi Minh trail is about [deleted] billion a year. Of this, approximately [deleted]



Sen. Symington

billion is related directly to our efforts in South Viet Nam."

The major missing ingredient in the cost was the amount spent on bombing raids against both the Hi Chi Minh trail in the south and troop concentrations in the north by jet fighters based in Thailand, South Viet Nam, and carriers off the Vietnamese coast.

The cost of one air strike was given as slightly more than \$3,000. News accounts from Laos have said that up to 500 sorties are being flown daily. This would add up to 1.5 million dollars a day for that item.

200 Killed in Laos

It was revealed that some 200 Americans were killed in Laos from 1962 to 1969 and another 200 were either missing or known captured.

Altho this information was provided last October, the White House at one point last month said the casualty figure was less than 50. Subsequently it issued a new figure in conformity with the one given to the subcommittee, but the lag prompted Sen. Stuart Symington [D., Mo.], subcommittee chairman, to remark:

"In this case, the White House did not have the best information."

Still off the record are lists of personnel killed in Laos and details about Thai troops in

Laos. The record showed, however, that the United States had given Thailand new planes to replace some which Thailand had given to Laos.

CIA Activities Deleted

Deleted completely from the report was an account of activity in Laos by the Central Intelligence agency. Richard Helms, CIA director, appeared before the committee but is not even identified by name in the transcript as a witness.

One previously unknown element that emerged was a so-called "Project 404" arrangement in which the American ambassador in Laos maintained tight control over American military activity.

This includes supervision of pilots in small spotter planes who sight targets for Laotian bombers. The ambassador also has a say—for "political reasons"—over all proposed American air strikes. His judgment is passed to air force commanders in Thailand and South Viet Nam.

Likely to Prolong Criticism

The administration's insistence on secrecy over basic facts and figures seems likely to prolong the criticism of congressional doves who maintain that the American public should know what the United States is doing in Laos.

S 5988

REFUGEES AND CIVILIAN WAR
CASUALTIES IN LAOS

Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. President, one of the more distressing aspects of the war in Laos is the plight of the Laotian people, who, like their neighbors elsewhere in Indochina, are paying a heavy toll not only from insurgent attack, but also from the nature of our own military activities. As chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, there is little doubt in my mind that the escalation of these military activities is following the familiar pattern of Vietnam in the destruction of the countryside, the generation of refugees, and the occurrence of civilian war casualties. The subcommittee is pursuing this significant aspect of our involvement in Laos, and, as I suggested last week, will, it is hoped, hold hearings within the very near future.

Some recent press articles detail the current situation among the people in Laos. Because of the broad congressional and public interest in this matter, I ask unanimous consent that articles from the March 14 issues of the Christian Science Monitor and the Manchester Guardian weekly, from the New York Times of March 15, from the Washington Post of March 26, from the Washington Evening Star of March 27, from Life magazine of April 3, and from the Washington Sunday Star of April 19, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 14, 1970]

WHAT U.S. BOMBING FEELS LIKE TO LAOTIANS
(By Daniel Southard)

BAM NOM XAY, LAOS.—The old woman said she had been through several wars but that this was the most destructive and terrifying—because of the bombing.

"In the other wars, I didn't have to leave my home," she said.

"When the soldiers came on the ground to fight, I wasn't so afraid," she said. "But when they came in airplanes, it was terrible."

The 70-year-old Lao woman was one of some 14,000 refugees evacuated from the Plain of Jars prior to the Feb. 21 recovery of that area by North Vietnamese forces and the Lao rebels, the Pathet Lao.

Few civilian inhabitants, if any, were left in the Plain of Jars following the evacuation of the refugees.

In 1960, the plateau itself and its surrounding ridges and valleys had supported an estimated 150,000 people. But a decade of war has taken its toll.

The old woman and some 750 other persons from her native village were moved by plane and then by truck last months to this refugee camp with its bamboo-and-straw huts, about 40 miles east of Vientiane.

AIR POWER REDIRECTED

The correspondent visited four refugee camps and talked with refugees from six different locations in and around the Plain of Jars.

After questioning a large number of them, it was possible to get a picture of the devastation unleashed by American fighter-bombers in northeastern Laos over the past two years, and it is not a pretty one.

After the United States halted its bombing of North Vietnam on Nov. 1, 1968, it stepped up as much as 10-fold its bombing raids—support which started on a minor scale in mid-1964—against Pathet Lao-occupied northeastern Laos. The number of

bombing sorties by United States Air Force and Navy jets rose to as many as 300 a day.

This bombing campaign, code-named Barrel Roll, is separate from the other, more publicized campaign. The latter, code-named Steel Tiger, is directed against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos.

The refugees said about 9 out of 10 of the bombing strikes flown over the past two years in the Plain of Jars area were carried out by American jets and the rest by propeller-driven Royal Lao Air Force T-28s.

In most areas of the plain, the bombing forced the people to move out of their homes and into trenches, caves, and bunkers where they lived for the most part for two years.

HIDDEN BY DAY

They throw corrugated iron over the trenches and covered it with dirt, topped with branches for camouflage. Many said they ventured out to farm only at night because of the bombing.

By all accounts, the situation has been somewhat similar for the estimated 192,000 people living in Houa Han, or Sam Neua Province to the northeast of the Plain of Jars, although information is more difficult to come by on that area.

One Western diplomat reported, however, that in some areas of that province "whole communities are living underground."

It has been a similar story, also for villagers living in the vicinity of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southeastern Laos, where refugees and North Vietnamese prisoners and defectors say many villages have been destroyed.

In all of these places, the bombing stepped up greatly after the cessation of the attacks against North Vietnam.

In the Plain of Jars area, the bombing destroyed the main towns of Xien Khouang, Khang Khay, and Pmongsavan. The refugees said the bombs flattened many villages in and around the plain and heavily damaged others. They said no villages they knew of escaped the bombing.

The refugees said they were sometimes forced to leave their villages and bunkers to do portage—carrying rice and ammunition—for the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. But they added that in many bombing raids there were no Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese troops near their villages.

RAIDS DAILY OR OFTENER

As the bombing increased, they said, the troops moved farther away from the populated areas.

In 1969, they said they saw the bombers every day when the weather was clear, sometimes so often they could not count the number of raids. The planes tended to fire at anything that moved, they said.

For the most part, however, the attackers apparently spared their buffaloes and cows, although some refugees felt that even these were sometimes targets.

One man said he narrowly escaped being blasted to pieces on six separate occasions when bombs fell near his hole, several times knocking him unconscious. But while he escaped death, there was one thing he could not escape—fear. It stalked him day in and day out.

CIVILIAN TERRORS DESCRIBED

Some refugees said they moved four or five times, each time farther away from their villages, to escape the bombing. But the bombs always followed them. Even at night the bombers came, and finally, even the rice fields were bombed.

"There wasn't a night when we went to sleep that we thought we'd live to see the morning," said one refugee. "And there wasn't a morning when we got up and thought we'd live to see the night."

"It was terrible living in those holes in the ground," said another. "We never saw the sun. Our hair was falling out."

"My wife and three children were killed," said a man in his thirties. "There were no troops [Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese] anywhere near our village."

All this raises some basic questions about the bombing in northeastern Laos. What has been its purpose?

It is impossible to get the United States Government side of the picture in any detail because American officials refuse to discuss except in the vaguest generalities the activity in Laos.

PILOTS PLEDGED TO SECRECY

The pilots who fly the raids from air bases in Thailand and South Vietnam and from carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin are under instructions not to discuss the details of their missions.

For years, the United States maintained the fiction that it was only flying "armed reconnaissance" missions over northern Laos.

The most candid official acknowledgment that something other than "reconnaissance" was going on came in President Nixon's March 8 statement when he said for the first time that the United States had been flying "combat support missions" in northern Laos when requested to do so by the Royal Lao Government.

"The level of our air operations has increased only as the number of North Vietnamese in Laos and the level of their aggression has been increased," the President said.

BUILDUP ADMITTED

On this point, there is no question that there has been a continuing North Vietnamese buildup in northeastern Laos. This buildup has been in direct violation of the 1962 Geneva accords and has allowed the Pathet Lao, heavily supported by the North Vietnamese, to solidify their control there.

But has the bombing been a justifiable or effective response? A number of well-qualified military sources feel the bombing's effectiveness in cutting enemy supply lines and slowing down the North Vietnamese has been in general greatly exaggerated, just as it so often had been in both North and South Vietnam.

BOOMERANG EFFECT?

According to the refugees from the Plain of Jars, the bombing may even have had a boomerang effect in some areas.

One refugee said that as the bombing increased, the Pathet Lao forces in his district started getting more volunteers, whose attitude was "better to die a soldier than to stay at home waiting for the the airplanes to kill you."

He also said the bombing tended to heighten the fighting spirit of the Pathet Lao—no mean achievement given the Lao propensity for avoiding battle.

Whatever the effects of the bombing on enemy military forces in Laos—still a subject for much debate—there is no doubt as to its effectiveness in completely disrupting civilian life.

TRANSPORTATION HALTED

Whereas the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao soldiers are capable of moving into the protection of the forests and living off supplies shipped in from neighboring North Vietnam, the civilians are tied to their rice fields, their livestock, and the rest of their belongings and are thus exposed more constantly to the bombing than the soldiers.

A refugee from Phongsavan said the bombing put a halt to all civilian motorized transportation in his district and caused markets to open only in the predawn darkness and to close before sunrise. Schools were destroyed, and there was a general shortage of everything from clothing to bicycle parts.

Sometimes it took some prodding and a lot of patience to get the refugees to talk

20 APR 1970

Clandestine Militarism

The United States today is largely run by the military services and the Central Intelligence Agency. The ordinary citizen doesn't see this, but just two items appearing in *The New York Times* on April 5 should have opened his eyes: Richard Halloran's story, "Air America's Civilian Façade Gives It Latitude in East Asia" and Peter Grose's "Pentagon Slips Its 'Goodies' to Its Friends."

Reporters must watch their wording when they write stories of this type. Thus Halloran, noting that Air America and subsidiaries, with 167 aircraft and 9,300 employees, performs diverse missions, ranging from Korea to Indonesia, says cautiously that it "is believed to be a major link for the CIA's extensive activities throughout Asia." His long story leaves no doubt that Air America is a major airline in personnel, aircraft and ground facilities, and if the reader questions that it is a CIA operation he must also question that the moon is a satellite of the earth. Who but the CIA would be parachuting Meo tribesmen and assorted secret agents behind North Vietnamese lines in Laos, or training mechanics for the aviation division of the national police in Thailand,

ferrying U.S. Air Force men from Okinawa to Japan and South Korea, and dispatching intelligence flights from Taiwan toward or over Communist China?

One of the excuses for keeping these operations under a flimsy civilian cover is that it enables the U.S. Government to disclaim responsibility when certain "dirty tricks" miscarry. But the cover is itself a dirty trick on the American people and, to some extent, the Congress. In the March 9 *Nation*, Michael Klare described "The Great South Asian War." Air America is a key organization enabling the military (including the CIA) to carry on that war with a minimum of publicity. Of course, this is done with the approval of the Nixon Administration, as of the Johnson administration before it, but a large degree of initiative and operational freedom remains with the military, who can get credit in Washington for their successes and play down their failures.

The other story was largely covered in a *Nation* editorial, "The Phantom Phantom Jets" (February 2) and is further amplified by Rep. Silvio O. Conte (R., Mass.) who discovered by accident that nearly \$160 million worth of military equipment had been slipped to Chiang Kai-shek's government on Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalists are not the only beneficiaries of this Pentagon gimmick. The technique is to declare items as surplus, whereupon they may be disposed of on an accounting basis of one-third their value, or less. Congress has been cutting down on the Military Assistance Program (MAP). By discounting its equipment, the Pentagon can triple the amount of hardware it distributes to anti-Communist governments without exceeding the dollar ceiling. Thus Greece, Turkey, South Korea and Nationalist China receive large stocks of military equipment practically free.

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APR 20 1970

U.S. Envoy Directed Laos War

Examiner News Services

WASHINGTON — Newly released congressional testimony today revealed new aspects of U.S. involvement in Laos: The American ambassador there has been directing a secret military operation, and a clandestine U.S. group in Thailand has been training and equipping Laotian troops.

The Nixon Administration is reported escalating the clandestine war in Laos while attempting to scale down the conflict in Vietnam, the Senate testimony has revealed.

Last October

About 200 Americans were killed in the Laotian conflict from 1962 to 1969, the testimony disclosed, and approximately 200 more Americans are listed as missing or prisoners of war.

The figures contrast sharply with a recent White House announcement that American military and civilian deaths in Laos due to enemy action totaled fewer than 50.

The extent of the U.S. involvement in the Southeast Asian nation came to light yesterday when Sen. Stuart

Symington (D-Mo.) released the heavily censored transcript of Senate foreign relations subcommittee hearings into American involvement in Laos. The hearings were conducted last October.

About 150 of the approximately 200 Americans killed in Laos were airmen based in Thailand or aboard U.S. Navy carriers, testimony revealed. The remainder were described as U.S. civilians and servicemen based in Laos.

No clear estimate was made of the cost of the U.S. involvement in Laos. But the Defense Department did submit the following statement:

"The total cost of all U.S. activities in Laos including air operations against the Ho Chi Minh trail is about (deleted) billion a year. Of this, approximately (deleted) billion is related directly to our efforts in South Vietnam."

The Embassy-headquartered operation in Vietiane, called "Project 404," involves part of the 2000-man U.S. Mission in Laos.

The ambassador supervises more than 100 military attaches, some of whom fly with the Royal Laotian Air Force and direct its pilots to targets. In addition, the ambassador personally reviews air strikes in Laos by U.S. planes sent in from Thailand and Vietnam.

The project has been going on for the past four years.

The transcript disclosed that Laotian forces are trained and equipped through a secret American group called "Requirements Organization" operating out of Thailand, nominally under the U.S. Agency for International Development. It is run by retired U.S. officers.

Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) said, "I have never seen a country engage in so many devious undertakings as this."

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William H. Sullivan, who was the ambassador in Vientiane from 1964 until one

year ago, said the U.S. advised Laotian forces suggest possible bombing targets to the Embassy and "the ambassador approves or disapproves whether a strike can be made." If approved, the request is passed on with the ambassador's recommendation to the 7th Air Force.

Symington said the ambassador has become virtually a "military proconsul."

Col. Robert L. F. Tyrell, chief U.S. air attache in Laos, testified the U.S. air strikes in Laos were increased "roughly 100 percent" as a result of a request for a heavy stepup in air support from Laotian forces headed by Gen. Vang Pao.

Symington said the "figures which Col. Tyrell shows emphasize there has been a heavy escalation of our military effort in Laos."

Escalation of the Laotian war came after the U.S. halted the bombing of North Vietnam in the fall of 1968, the testimony says.

Saying the Nixon Administration has emphasized the de-escalation of the Vietnam conflict at the same time it has heavily escalated U.S. military effort in Laos, Symington said:

"It is not a question of whether it is right or wrong. The point we are trying to bring out is not only that the American people have no knowledge at all that this is true and neither does Congress — and neither does this committee nor the Senate Armed Services Committee. It could run us into new problems for this new Administration."

All testimony before the committee by Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and his staff was censored.

Questions about Thai troops in Laos also were deleted. But the record revealed that the United States had given the Thai government new planes to replace those turned over earlier to the Royal Lao Air Force.

20 APR 1970

STATINTL

CIA's Testimony On Laos: (Deleted)

The Central Intelligence Agency, the most clandestine operating group in the secret war in Laos, virtually escaped mention in the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee inquiry on U.S. involvement in Laos.

Subcommittee Chairman Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), in defense of bowing to the Executive Branch's demands in the battle over clearing the hearing transcript, said:

"Well, the CIA is an agency that operates on the instruction of other people . . . My experience is that if anything goes well, someone else takes the credit for it; if it goes badly, they try to put the blame on the CIA."

Although the transcript doesn't show it, it is known

that CIA Director Richard Helms was the witness on Oct. 28, 1969. Here is the full published text of that morning's transcript:

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Symington, Fulbright, Mansfield, Aiken, Cooper and Case.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Pincus, and Mr. Paul of the committee staff.

Senator Symington. The hearing will come to order. (Deleted.)

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)

20 APR 1970

STATINTL

U.S. Escalates War in Laos, Hill Discloses

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States is engaged in "heavy escalation" of its air war in Laos while trying to de-escalate the war in Vietnam, a Senate inquiry disclosed yesterday.

When the American bombing of North Vietnam ended on Nov. 1, 1968, U.S. air power shifted to hit the predominantly North Vietnamese troops in Laos, the record shows. The U.S. bombing of Laos, secretly begun in 1964 by President Johnson, was reported to have doubled in May, 1969, and nearly tripled last August.

A Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee headed by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) yesterday made public the censored results of a six-month struggle with the Executive Branch over releasing testimony taken last October about the secret U.S. role in Laos.

It shows that by agreement with Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma, the United States responded in 1964 to Vietnamese Communist violations of the 1962 Geneva accords on Laotian neutrality by violating them too. The U.S. share of this decision has cost "billions of dollars," and about 200 American lives, the record indicates.

Under the covert U.S. operation, the American Ambassador in Vientiane virtually has operated as co-commander of the war in northern Laos: he controls a U.S. mission of air, ground and intelligence advisers that coordinates American and Laotian air and ground operations in northern Laos; arranges for the training (primarily at American bases in Thailand) of Lao troops, and supplies American military and economic funds to Laos that are larger than the Laotians' own contribution to their nation's economy.

The Laotian Premier "made it clear that he wanted us to say as little as possible about American military action in

Laos, testified William H. Sullivan, former ambassador in Laos and now assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

After more than 100 meetings with administration officials, Symington's subcommittee on U.S. commitments abroad salvaged 237 pages of censored transcript.

President Nixon pierced the censorship deadlock when he disclosed, on March 6, a few selected portions of U.S. activities in Laos, emphasizing that they began under "two previous administrations."

But the new record shows that the war in Laos involves far more than "1,040 Americans . . . stationed in Laos" as the President's guarded statement listed.

The hearings disclose, as subcommittee sources put it, that "tens of thousands" of Americans are involved in the Laotian war in air combat, in training, advisory, supply and intelligence work — operating from Thailand, from South Vietnam and from U.S. aircraft carriers at sea.

Symington expressed the hope, in making the transcript public, that it will help prevent "another Vietnam."

No conclusions or findings accompany the report, partly because it is incomplete. The subcommittee staff noted that it had gained release of 90 per cent of the transcript, but chief consultant Walter H. Pincus stated in a covering letter that the public's "right to avoid 'embarrassing' past administrations or officials for

reasons unrelated to national security.

Censorship took out of the transcript all summary figures on costs; every reference to the Central Intelligence Agency's operations, which include training, equipping, supplying and directing Gen. Vang Pao's "clandestine" army of up to 36,000 Meo tribesmen in Laos; all references to the use of Thailand's forces in Laos; details on U.S. air operations from Laos; figures showing the escalation of American air strikes in Laos during bombing "pauses" or the halt in the air war against North Vietnam, and other critical facts.

Portions of the story can be reconstructed or estimated, however, despite the deletions. A typical deletion in the transcript reads:

"The total cost of all U.S. activities in Laos, including air operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, is about (deleted) billion a year. Of this, approximately (deleted) billion is related directly to our efforts in South Vietnam."

U.S. air strikes in Laos have been reported to run up to 600 or more sorties a day.

The transcript shows that in northern Laos the average sortie costs \$3,190 and delivers 2.2 tons of bombs. This would add up to a cost of \$1,914,000 for a day of 600 air sorties.

President Nixon on March 6 originally said that "No American stationed in Laos had ever been killed in ground combat operations." But the inquiry, confirming figures disclosed in the dispute over that statement, shows there have been "something under 200 U.S. military personnel . . . killed in Laos." Most of these were airmen, but nearly 50 are listed as "civilian and military" personnel assigned to the U.S. mission in Laos.

There are "two wars" in Laos. One is what began as a "civil war" in the north, in which the main Communist forces consist of constantly increasing numbers of North Vietnamese troops; this is the air and ground war that the American Embassy mission in Vientiane is deeply engaged in running. The other war in Laos is the American air war against the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail south through Laos from North to South Vietnam.



SEN. STUART SYMINGTON
... releases testimony

The Symington subcommittee was focused primarily on the war in the north. But both portions of the Laotian conflict interact with the war in Vietnam, militarily and diplomatically.

Sullivan, who worked on the 1962 Geneva accords, became ambassador to Laos in November, 1964, replacing Leonard Unger.

North Vietnam failed to comply with the 1962 Geneva neutrality agreements "from their inception," Sullivan testified, withdrawing only a token number and retaining about 6,000 troops, while the United States pulled out all its 666 men.

The United States, in November, 1962, agreed to provide supplies and repair parts for U.S.-supplied equipment and other material "as permitted" under the Geneva accords, said Sullivan. Then in 1963 North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops broke the accords, he said, by attacking neutralist forces and "in 1964 North Vietnam began markedly to increase its support to the (pro-Communist) Pathet Lao and its use of the Ho Chi Minh trail . . ."

"In the same spirit of proportionate response to North Vietnamese violations of the agreements," Sullivan testified, "and as part of our effort to assist South Vietnam in its defense," the United States began "air operations" and considerably expanded its ground support.

Sullivan insisted the United States is free to "terminate" its operations in Laos at any time.

The "first U.S. reconnaissance flight was flown over the southern part of Laos May 19, 1964, after consultation with

continued

20 APR 1970

STATINTL

Bombing Began in '64; Nixon Talk Set Tonight

LAOS

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

Hitherto secret testimony today revealed that the American Embassy in Vientiane has quietly directed a still-escalating war in Laos for almost six years.

According to American field officials, testifying at closed Senate hearings in October, U.S. Air Force planes began "armed reconnaissance" over Northern Laos in June 1964. By the following Dec. 14, several months before American bombing of North Vietnam began in February 1965, the planes were making "strike missions" of their own in Northern Laos.

William H. Sullivan, ambassador to Laos from November 1964 to April 1969, told the subcommittee chaired by Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., that this first escalation of the American effort in Laos was personally decided by then President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Oral Request Granted

Johnson was granting an "oral request" by Laotian Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma to bring increased pressure on the lines of communications of North Vietnamese forces which had refused to leave Laos as agreed in the 1962 Geneva accords. This request — and all others since — was kept secret partly because Souvanna Phouma feared his official "neutrality" would be compromised, Sullivan said.

The 235 pages of testimony by Sullivan and leading military and civilian officials in Laos was made public by the Senate subcommittee today. Although heavily censored, the transcript is the first authoritative account of the extent and nature of the secret war waged by the U.S. in northern Laos.

Sullivan made the point that this war is separate from the war being waged farther south along the Ho Chi Minh supply trail where it passes through Laos from North to South Vietnam. The testimony shows that as the American effort in North Vietnam it has steadily escalated in northern Laos — the main focus of the hearings.

More Planes Available

At one point, Col. Robert L. F. Tyrrell, U.S. air attache in the American embassy in Vientiane — chief manager of the air targeting operation — agreed with Symington that with the halt of bombing of North Vietnam, more planes became available for attacks in Laos.

Tyrrell said that U.S. air strikes in northern Laos increased "by roughly 100 percent" in April-May 1969 to support efforts by ground Laotian forces under Meo tribes leader General Vang Pao to turn back a North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao offensive. The following August, Tyrrell said, another increase in air attacks occurred. The percentage was deleted.

Throughout the testimony the censors — working mainly from the State Department, according to subcommittee staff — took out all references to the number of these raids. But they did not delete one statement by Symington that his "apprehensions" about Laos began to increase in late 1965, when, at Udorn base in Thailand, he discovered that "378 strikes" had been flown against Laos in one day.

The censors also permitted publication of the estimated cost for each raid against Laos — \$3,190. But they refused publication of the figure given the committee for the total cost of the war in Laos.

"The total cost of all U.S. activities in Laos, including air operations against the Ho Chi Minh trail, is about (deleted) billion a year," reads the transcript. "Of this, approximately (deleted) billion is related directly to our efforts in South Vietnam."

Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, noted repeatedly — without contradiction — that the total of formal American military and economic aid from 1962 to 1969 to Laos was over \$1 billion.

Col. Peter T. Russell, who heads the secret military aid group for Laos from the U.S. Embassy in neighboring Thailand, said this military aid in 1969 alone amounted to \$50 million — more than five times the Laotian military budget of \$17

billion.

Economic aid the same year came to \$52 million, from which the United States — according to the top official of the Agency for International Development there — finances 75 percent of the shortfall between revenues and expenditures in the total Laotian budget.

Exceeds Laos GNP

Under questioning from Fulbright, the administration officials admitted this total input of all formal economic and military aid each year exceeds the total \$150 million annual gross national product of all Laos.

For the first time, the transcript gives details of the machinery built up through the American Embassy in Vientiane to run this mushrooming operation. It is summed up in the code-word "Project 404," under which the Army and Air Attaches brought in extra operational and administrative personnel.

According to Tyrrell, 117 military and 5 civilian personnel were brought into Laos in the initial "404 package" in 1966. In October, he said 106 people were there in the project, most of them on six-month temporary duty from Vietnam or Thailand.

Tyrrell said that, over-all, 125 U.S. Air Force officers and airmen are assigned to his office. That means, according to an official chart given the committee, that well over half of the total 218 military personnel in all capacities in Laos belong to the Air Force.

Of the 125, Tyrrell said, 60 work at Air Operations Centers in the five military regions of Laos — coordinating targets and plans with the Laotian commanders. Another 21 are "forward air controllers" — so-called "Ravens," or American Air Force pilots who fly T-28 jet trainers and other less sophisticated aircraft spotting targets for the U.S., aside from other aircraft and the Royal Laotian Air Force.

In 1966 and 1967, Tyrrell said, 40 T-28s were available inside Laos. In 1968 the total jumped to 60. The figure for 1969 was deleted, as were the figures on hours and missions flown daily.

The number of Army officers operating in the office of Col. Edgar W. Duskin and in the five military regions under Project 404 was censored. But Duskin said they do take part in the daily Joint Operations Center meetings with Laotian commanders and U.S. Air Force officers, and that they give both "advice" to Laotian officers and "information" to the U.S. Embassy on planning.

The whole operation comes together under the American am-

bassador — first under Sullivan, who created it, and now under G. McMurthie Godley. Sullivan is now deputy assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, dealing almost exclusively with Vietnam.

Sullivan said he held daily meetings with his staff. Every proposed bombing target had to be approved by him. Once approved, the request goes to the 7th Air Force Command in Saigon, which decides when and how the raid is to be carried out.

Sullivan explained how the international neutrality of Laos — set up in the 1962 Geneva accords and never carried out by North Vietnam — had imposed this special procedure on the U.S. Embassy in Laos. Ordinarily, he said, the military functions would be carried out directly by a military mission under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the Geneva agreement made such a mission impossible.

He also said the special Military Aid Program of the Pentagon to equip and train Laotian forces had to be set up surreptitiously. It became the Requirements Office of the Agency for International Development (RO-AIS), run by Col. Russell, the deputy chief of AID in Bangkok.

All reference to the training and equipping of Lao forces in Thailand is deleted from the transcript. So is all reference to American air strikes from Thailand, or the use of disguised Thai forces on the ground.

At one point, when Russell testified about transit of goods from Thailand to Laos, the transcript allows that the cost of Lao training in (deleted) since 1963 has been \$1,188,800.

The extent of the operations in and around Laos caused Fulbright to say that he had "never seen a country engage in so many devious undertakings as this."

continued